Afghanistan: A Carrot in U.S. Talks with Russia and Iran
AP
X
Story Stream
recent articles

Four years ago, the United States ended its war in Afghanistan. Since the U.S. withdrawal, Afghanistan and counterterrorism have rightly been deprioritized as foreign policy issues. However, amid the Trump administration’s efforts to achieve a modus vivendi with Russia and Iran, cooperation on monitoring terrorist threats from Afghanistan could be another carrot Washington offers to both countries. U.S. security and prosperity are not affected by what happens in South-Central Asia. But unchecked terrorism in Afghanistan has much graver consequences for Russia and Iran.

The tragically executed withdrawal from Afghanistan should not obscure the long-term benefits of terminating U.S. involvement: the war was unwinnable for political and military reasons; a significant drain on U.S. military resources; and a humanitarian disaster for the Afghan people. Despite claims Afghanistan would become a haven for global terrorist organizations, the United States has not faced a serious threat to the homeland from groups operating in South-Central Asia.

By contrast, terrorism is a relevant security challenge for Russia and Iran that won’t be going away any time soon. ISIS-K, a South Asian affiliate of the Islamic State, is based out of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its ranks include Chechens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Afghans, and Pakistanis, many of whom were previously members of other regionally based terrorist groups. ISIS-K’s grievances against Russia and Iran are largely motivated by the former’s wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya and the latter’s adherence to Shia Islam. Both countries also waged long military campaigns against ISIS in Syria (and in Iran’s case, Iraq).

ISIS-K has carried out several large-scale attacks that demonstrate the group’s range and capabilities. In March 2024, four ISIS-K members attacked a concert hall in Moscow that left nearly 150 people dead and another 500 wounded. Two months prior, the same group bombed a public memorial ceremony in Iran, killing another 80 people. Earlier ISIS-K attacks against Shia shrines in Iran in 2022 and 2023 killed and wounded dozens of civilians.

ISIS-K has also attacked foreign interests within Afghanistan, including the Russian and Pakistani embassies in Kabul and a hotel hosting Chinese nationals. Americans will remember that during the U.S. withdrawal it was ISIS-K, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban, that carried out the Abbey Gate suicide bombing which killed 13 U.S. servicemembers and 170 Afghan civilians.

In the war’s later years, U.S., Afghan, Pakistani, and Taliban forces all conducted operations against ISIS-K in eastern Afghanistan. The U.S. withdrawal left a security vacuum that the Taliban quickly filled. While the Taliban’s counterterrorism operations have led to a decrease in the number of attacks, this could also reflect a shift in ISIS-K’s strategy toward launching more attacks outside Afghanistan instead.

Though the Taliban government has a stronger domestic security apparatus than its predecessor, the regime must also contend with severe economic and humanitarian crises on a shoestring budget. Additionally, Pakistan’s ongoing campaign against the Pakistani Taliban in eastern Afghanistan further complicates the Taliban’s ability to maintain a monopoly on force.

Russia and Iran have offered to help the regime in Kabul contain ISIS-K despite both countries’ historical wariness of the Taliban. Last month Russia offered to assist in combatting the terror group as part of its normalization policy toward the Taliban. Meanwhile, Iran and the Taliban have reportedly worked together to disrupt ISIS-K attacks since at least 2023. Even the Biden administration considered working with the Taliban after the Moscow attack to contain what U.S. officials viewed as a rising threat.

The Trump administration has demonstrated a willingness to strike deals with U.S. adversaries. With Russia and Iran, there are good reasons for doing so. The United States has a clear interest in stabilizing its relationship with Russia, a fellow nuclear power, to minimize the risks of escalation in Ukraine. Likewise, a bargain with Iran that limits its nuclear program, opens its economy for international investments, and lowers the temperature in the Middle East would greatly reduce the possibility of a devastating regional war.

Intelligence sharing is a low-cost but valuable offering the United States could make to two countries facing a heightened terrorist threat. The U.S. intelligence community has decades of experience detecting, monitoring, tracking, and disrupting terrorist threats overseas. Indeed, before the 2024 ISIS-K attacks against Russia and Iran, U.S. officials exercised their “duty to warn” and told both countries about the group’s plans.

Of course, counterterrorism cooperation should be a secondary issue in U.S. talks with Russia and Iran. But the offering would demonstrate Washington’s seriousness about working towards a rapprochement with Moscow and Tehran. Both have a lot to lose if terrorist threats metastasize on their doorstep. The United States should exploit this insecurity for its own gain.

Matthew C. Mai is a contributing fellow with Defense Priorities.