The Trump administration’s recognition that the world is now multipolar was groundbreaking. No presidential administration since before the Cold War saw the world in such a light, and many post-Cold War administrations actively pretended not to see it. This recognition has helped pave the way for new twenty-first century strategies and toward the adoption of new geopolitical goals.
Which makes the recent focus on Iran all the more confounding.
When it comes to bipolarity, the goal is to balance with or defeat the other pole. In unipolarity, the goal is to maintain hegemony for as long as possible, as post-Cold War American presidents attempted for decades.
Multipolarity, however, requires a more dexterous policy. It requires three things: one, for each “pole” to maintain dominance in its given sphere. Secondly, to balance against the other poles. And thirdly, protecting national security interests to allow for the successful completion of the first two goals.
These interests vary. A nation needs to ensure it has a steady energy supply. It also must produce key products or, barring that, secure trade routes. It can also involve ensuring that no foreign power gets close enough to upset one’s dominance of their own sphere.
When the above is applied to America, one finds that the country is in relatively good shape for multipolarity. America clearly dominates its sphere, the New World. In the Americas, there is no power which comes close to the United States; the next largest economy is Brazil’s (substantially smaller than America’s). And no other power has a sustained military presence anywhere in the Americas, a result of the Monroe Doctrine.
When it comes to the second goal – balancing against the other poles – America has been less successful. Its military might means that this issue is not as crucial for it as other, weaker poles (such as Russia), but the path America is taking in the Russo-Ukrainian War helped push Russia and China, the other two poles, together. This is not to say that the United States should have sought a close friendship with Russia; but pushing them together did not help with balancing.
On the third – securing national interests – America has done an effective job. It is energy independent. And President Donald Trump’s reshoring strategy is a direct attempt to help keep America from relying on other countries for key industries.
By and large – aside from pushing Russia and China together – this is all good news. Which makes the decision to re-engage heavily in the Middle East a puzzling one, as it does not mesh with any of the above goals.
For starters, Iran is far from America’s sphere. Which does not necessarily rule out action, but it’s unclear how striking Iran helps America balance against Russia and China. American influence has already substantially grown in the Middle East over the past months, as relations with Syria have warmed. It does not need to have influence in Iran. In the past age of empire, a colony in Iran may have been well-placed to keep an eye on China; but that will not happen today and should not be a goal. Nor should regime change, as there is no guarantee that Iranians liberated from the mullahs will vote for a pro-American government.
What about national interest? Perhaps Iran has key resources America needs?
Not really. The United States, energy independent, does not rely on Iran for oil. Only a small fraction of oil comes to the United States through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran can threaten to close. Over 80 percent of the oil passing through that strait goes to Asia, with a plurality going to China.
What about trade? President Trump called for Iran to become “a great trading nation,” but it’s unclear what America needs trade-wise from Iran. Factory jobs did not move to Tehran, nor did other key industries.
The only aspect left is the idea of Iran threatening the United States. Currently, they do not. The argument is that this would change if Iran got a bomb, but this too is questionable. After all, Iran’s regime has long been very careful to talk tough while not actually doing things which could get them in trouble. After America’s attack they even warned the United States ahead of time exactly where and when they would be counter-striking. Would Iran really throw caution to the wind, develop an ICBM, and immediately lob a nuke at New York or Washington, knowing full well that any American response would wipe them off the map? It’s unlikely.
What a nuclear Iran would do, however, is permanently take regime change off the table. This change would hardly inhibit America in a multipolar world. While in multipolarity it’s better to have lots of options, one does not need all options, all the time.
There are plenty of ways America could act in a multipolar world. But focusing on the Middle East, and Iran specifically, is—at best—a distraction from our real national interests. We should turn our attention elsewhere.
Anthony Constantini is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.
