President Trump met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this week to discuss a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Although hostages remain in captivity, the conditions are increasingly favorable, not just for a ceasefire, but for initiating some type of stability operations in the territory. With Iran’s strategic influence in the region significantly degraded, now is the time for the United States to take the lead in shaping what comes next in Gaza.
Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dana Stroul has repeatedly emphasized that Washington must coordinate with Israel and Arab states to develop a serious, regional approach for post-conflict stabilization in Gaza. This includes support for governance, security, and reconstruction efforts. This isn’t new for the United States, as stability operations are embedded in U.S. doctrine, even if they’ve been met with skepticism in recent years. From post-WWII Europe to Panama after Noriega’s fall, the U.S. has experience in shaping transitions after conflict, sometimes with success, and always with important lessons learned.
What is needed in Gaza now is not a return to the status quo, but a deliberate and integrated approach to stabilization that takes into account the political, security, and humanitarian realities on the ground. In the modern age of lethality, conflict can create a window of opportunity in which political restructuring and social reforms become possible. But these openings are short-lived. If the U.S. and its regional partners fail to act, extremist factions will emerge to fill the vacuum.
A realistic stabilization strategy in Gaza will need to unfold across three lines of effort: governance, security, and reconstruction.
Governance: Regional Legitimacy and Local Ownership
No amount of funding or technical assistance will succeed without some form of credible Palestinian governance. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is currently the most likely entity to fill that role, though its legitimacy is contested, especially in Gaza and by Israel. Regional actors, such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, can help shape an environment where a reformed, more representative Palestinian governance structure can take root. These countries, some with decades of experience in conflict mediation and civil-institution building, can help facilitate a transitional governing body that has buy-in from local leaders and civil society groups.
Security: Multinational Support, Local Commitment
Security is the foundation upon which all else will rest. While it is unrealistic to expect that foreign troops will patrol Gaza, regional partners can support the development of a vetted Palestinian security force capable of enforcing order and countering remaining extremist threats. Jordan and Egypt have experience training Palestinian forces and could contribute to a regional training mission under an Arab or UN-mandated framework.
A temporary multinational observer mission comprised of personnel from neutral Arab states, such as Jordan and Egypt, could provide early warning and build confidence among local populations. Israel will insist on strict security assurances, and the international community will need to balance the security guarantees for Israel and some autonomy for Palestinians. A third-party security monitoring body could help mediate this balance while preventing spoilers from derailing progress.
Reconstruction: Coordinated Investment and Oversight
The third line of effort, reconstruction, must be handled with transparency and accountability. Billions of dollars have flowed into Gaza in the past decades, with much criticism of it being misused or diverted. A new mechanism is needed, one that ensures donor oversight, prevents corruption, and integrates local labor and contractors to stimulate the economy.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of whom have the financial means and political weight, should take leading roles in Gaza’s reconstruction. This should be in conjunction with an international trust fund, like the one used in Iraq, that reports to a board composed of Arab, Western, and Palestinian stakeholders.
The U.S. Role: Broker, Convener, Enabler
The United States does not need to have boots on the ground in Gaza, but it must lead. This means convening regional actors, committing diplomatic and financial resources, and pressing both Israel and Palestinian factions to accept a long-term stabilization strategy. This approach doesn’t ignore Israeli security concerns, nor does it bypass Palestinian self-determination.
Washington has the leverage, relationships, and historical lessons to guide this moment. The next phase in Gaza will not be easy, and it will be messy. But without coordinated stability operations grounded in regional cooperation, Gaza risks slipping further into ungovernable territory, prolonging suffering and perpetuating insecurity for Israelis and Palestinians alike.
Assad A. Raza is an adjunct professor and U.S. Army veteran with multiple deployments across the Middle East. Follow him on X @AssadRaza12 and on LinkedIn.
