As the war in Ukraine grinds on, a troubling question demands our attention: How is Russia still producing advanced weapons systems—missiles, drones, and fighter jets—despite some of the toughest sanctions in modern history?
The answer may be unnervingly familiar. During World War II, Switzerland maintained its famed neutrality, yet profited handsomely from the Nazi war effort—secret bank accounts, looted gold, and even arms sales. Today, Western firms may be echoing that moral compromise through seemingly innocent supply chains.
Friends from the Ukrainian National Police tell me they find that many of the components used in surveillance, drones, and missiles—originate from the U.S., Netherlands, Japan, and Switzerland. A study by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Schemes unit identified approximately 2,000 different electronic components made by major U.S., Japanese, and Taiwanese firms being used in five types of Russian Sukhoi warplanes (RFE/RL, June 2024).
We’re up against a troubling truth: sanctioned or dual-use components continue to feed Russia’s war machine in Ukraine.
The firms implicated don’t dispute it—they point to lawful compliance and third-party distribution. But Ukrainian officials are blunt. “Weapons that kill our civilians are filled with Western-made technology. Someone is enabling this,” says Yuriy Sak, an adviser to Ukraine’s Defense Ministry (Business Insider, Nov. 2023).
This isn’t speculation. The U.S. Commerce Department itself warned in 2023 of “non-transparent procurement practices” that bypass export controls (U.S. Department of Commerce, CHIPS Act Report, 2023).
U.S. companies can avoid being complicit in the deaths of innocent Ukrainians. Here’s how. Companies can track sudden spikes in orders from Russia-aligned intermediaries—especially with upfront, expedited payment.
John Hardie, of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, emphasizes: “These aren’t subtle shifts. They’re glaring red flags. Companies don’t need CIA briefings—they need better internal scrutiny” (FDD Commentary, 2023).
Companies with dual-use products should copy practices that are common in sectors like pharmaceuticals and banking:
• Robust end-use documentation
• Site visits, unannounced.
As an example of how a site visit might go, here’s a hypothetical scenario, although it’s probably too undiplomatic and would need some fine-tuning. Let’s say that for the last five years, you’ve been selling 100 microchips a year to a company in Turkey. Suddenly, as you go over recent orders, you see that your buyer in Turkey wants 2,000 chips. You know that chips like this have shown up in Russian missiles used against Ukraine.
You ask your sales guy to show up unannounced in your buyer’s office in Turkey. “I’d like to see where the chips are going,” he states. “I’d like the answer in 24 hours.” If the buyer can’t prove a benign explanation for the sudden change in quantity, it’s reasonable to guess that those chips could be ending up as part of Russian weaponry used in Ukraine. You discontinue further sales to this buyer.
That was hypothetical, but the risk for doing nothing is rising. Legal scholars such as Martin Lederman, professor at Georgetown Law, warn that “if victims of Russian aggression can prove negligence, civil litigation isn’t out of the question”.
The reputational fallout is already real. Ukrainian investigators are meticulously cataloging component origins. And when the war ends, accountability may follow—just as it did in postwar Switzerland.
Ethical due diligence isn't optional—it’s imperative. As an added consideration, if you’re a company president or owner, you don’t want someone like me writing about you in a respected journal.
The ghosts of Switzerland’s wartime profiteering are stirring. American and Western firms must act decisively—or risk being remembered for enabling war, not preventing it.
Mitzi Perdue, Fellow, Center for Intermarium Studies, Institute of World Politics, and Member, Education and Research Group, American Society for AI
