Justice and Power in a Ukraine Settlement
With the United States adopting a more coercive stance toward Moscow—imposing new sanctions, setting deadlines for a ceasefire, and visibly positioning nuclear submarines—now is the time to consider what a durable peace in Ukraine would require. Coercion may prompt an initial movement toward negotiations, but it cannot, on its own, deliver a durable peace. That will require a strategic approach grounded not in idealism, but in the hard lessons of history—one that builds a credible balance of power and takes seriously Russia’s own sense of justice, however unsettling that may be to many in the West.
The reasons to pursue such a peace are clear: Russia has little hope of reaching Kyiv, and Ukraine has no viable military path to retake Donbas or Crimea. Yet the war drags on as the human and material costs keep mounting. Europe may now be paying for a greater amount of Ukraine’s defense, but the United States continues to send weapons, ammunition, and funds that could arguably be better used elsewhere. Moreover, each day of combat increases the risk of another errant Russian missile landing on NATO territory, potentially triggering direct U.S. involvement.
The terms of any peace in Ukraine must therefore be lasting. As with much in foreign policy, Henry Kissinger is instructive in crafting such a peace. In his 1994 book Diplomacy, he offered a two-part test for lasting peace. First, is the peace just—does a state have reason to disturb it? Second, does it create a balance of power that can check an aggrieved state?
Any Ukraine peace plan must address these not-so-simple tests. It must appear just to both sides and establish a balance of power sufficient to deter future Russian aggression. Without these conditions, any peace would merely be an interlude between wars.
Justice in a Ukraine Settlement
Western discourse often treats justice as objective fairness. In Ukraine, this is reflected in U.N. resolutions assigning war guilt to Russia, arrest warrants for Russian leaders, and calls for a full return to pre-2014 borders. Morally satisfying though these may be, they are unlikely to end the war. In fact, they may prolong it.
In war termination, justice is subjective. If a settlement leaves both parties with little reason to restart conflict, it is just enough. For Russia, that likely means securing territory it already controls and the ability to claim victory at home. For Ukraine, it means survival as a sovereign state.
This form of justice is politically distasteful but strategically sound. By allowing Russia to annex the Donbas and Crimea, or at least permit the region’s independence from Kyiv, the United States would recognize military reality while allowing Russia to claim it protected ethnic Russians in the region. Even with these territorial losses, the Kyiv government would remain sovereign over the remaining 85% of its pre-2014 land.
This redrawing of borders may offend the sensibilities of some, but hard reality matters: survival itself can be justice for a smaller state faced with an assault by a great power. The key is that a just peace is one neither party wants to disturb, and in this case, Russia, not Ukraine, poses the postwar threat. Moreover, the United States holds far more leverage over Kyiv than it does Moscow, as shown during the early months of the second Trump administration. For both reasons, future U.S. negotiators must give Russian concerns considerable weight.
Balance of Power in a Ukraine Settlement
It is not enough that both sides view the peace as just. Any future agreement must create a balance of power capable of deterring future Russian aggression. NATO membership for Ukraine would certainly do that, but it would also guarantee that Russia viewed any settlement as unjust. In short, there would be no peace to preserve because Russia would continue fighting. Worse yet, such a commitment would artificially inflate Ukraine’s importance as a U.S. security interest. Ukraine matters to the United States mainly because it concerns the integrity of the Westphalian order—not because its fall directly threatens U.S. security.
The same logic that counsels against NATO membership for Ukraine also applies to bilateral security guarantees. U.S. interests in Ukraine do not justify a direct war with Russia—and Moscow knows it. A formal U.S. guarantee would therefore be hollow, inviting future humiliation when the United States inevitably backs down from a fight it was never prepared to bear the costs of waging. Here again, history is instructive: Vietnam and Afghanistan have demonstrated the dangers of expending blood and treasure on a massive scale for causes peripheral to U.S. interests.
Many critics advocate for NATO membership and security guarantees, asserting that Ukraine’s fall would embolden Russia to continue its adventurism in the former czarist empire, but they overlook two facts. First, the war has inflicted heavy losses on Russia’s military, which limits its capacity for further aggression in the near future. Second, and more importantly, these assertions rest on the assumption that Putin would regard an attack on a NATO member as no different from his invasion of non-NATO Ukraine. This assumption ignores the much greater risks posed by NATO’s collective defense commitments and is therefore unlikely.
A more durable arrangement would build a balance of power through robust military assistance and arms sales. Europe should continue assuming a greater share of this responsibility, allowing the United States to reallocate resources to other priorities. If European states wish to deploy rotational forces to postwar Ukraine—as the United Kingdom and France have reportedly considered—they should be free to do so, provided it is clear this is not a NATO mission. The Ukrainians have already shown the grit to stop Russia’s military; with sustained Western support, they will pose an even thornier problem for Moscow.
Ending the War in Ukraine
Crafting a lasting peace in Ukraine will require clarity, not idealism. The goal is not to vindicate international norms or deliver moral satisfaction, but to end a grinding war that threatens to escalate. History has shown how peace can be maintained or wasted. At the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the victors integrated a vanquished France into the postwar system. Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia also formed an alliance dedicated to stop any future French aggression. The result was a remarkable forty years of peace in Europe.
The Congress of Vienna stands in sharp contrast to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Germany was forced to accept sole blame for World War I and therefore viewed the Treaty as unjust. The Allies imposed significant territorial concessions and crippling financial reparations without established deterrence. Twenty years after the Versailles Treaty, Germany was fighting against the Allies in another world war.
Peace endures when it is both just—acceptable to the parties involved—and backed by a credible balance of power. That peace will not come cheap. It will require distasteful choices, starting with accepting Russian control of parts of the Donbas and Crimea. It will also mean refusing NATO membership and formal guarantees to Kyiv.
Fortunately, Ukraine’s survival does not depend on regaining lost territory nor joining a Western alliance. A Ukraine that is armed, trained, and equipped by the West can present a formidable challenge to any future Russian invasion—without the risks that come with entangling commitments. It would be a peace in which Dr. Kissinger would take pride.
Captain Todd Glasser, USN, holds the Chief of Naval Operations Chair at the U.S. National War College. The ideas expressed are his alone, and do not reflect the positions of the National War College or Department of Defense.
