With a pivotal first-round presidential election slated for August 17, the Middle East looms large in Bolivia’s foreign policy debates. Centre-right businessman and LSE-trained economist Samuel Doria Medina is leading all credible polls (though not with a wide margin), setting the stage for a possible rupture with the ruling Movement Toward Socialism’s (MAS) longstanding alliances, including Palestine and Iran. That is, if he can somehow unify the center and the right into winning in the first or second round, a task that hasn’t been possible in more than two decades.
For most of those two decades, the MAS has embraced a foreign policy deeply critical of Israel and openly supportive of Palestine and Iran. Under the leadership of Evo Morales and later Luis Arce, Bolivia expelled the Israeli ambassador in 2009 following Operation Cast Lead, severed diplomatic relations altogether a few months later, and cut all ties again in 2023 amid the war in Gaza.
In late 2023, Bolivia once again made headlines by joining a bloc of countries at The Hague calling for the investigation and prosecution of alleged Israeli war crimes. This move was followed weeks later by a cooperation agreement with the Iranian government that included technological and military collaboration, as well as a drone program.
Bolivia has positioned itself as a loud and early critic of Israel’s war in Gaza, accusing it of genocide and advocating for international legal action. The Arce government repeatedly denounced specific military actions taken by Israel in Gaza and the West Bank, and even weighed whether to bar Israeli tourists; a blow to a small but steady stream of backpackers who have long favored the Bolivian Andes for their trips after military service.
These moves were broadly aligned with grassroots sentiment on the left. La Paz is layered with graffiti that read “Palestina Libre” (Free Palestine) and “Israel genocidio” (Israel genocide). Details about the conflict and unfolding humanitarian crises are broadcast every day on national radio and television stations, keeping the war present in daily life and shaping popular perceptions.
Still, on the right, particularly in Santa Cruz and Christian-majority strongholds, support for Israel has been steady. Some smaller but still visible demonstrations in support of Israel have been organized, while Christian churches and social organizations have even organized trips to the region. The left’s increasing momentum on action in Gaza and the Middle East has presented the right with an opportunity to consolidate ideological support among their base, viewing the conflict like a “moral, Biblical war,” as was put by the leader of a Baptist church in Santa Cruz.
Locally, Bolivia has become a key battleground between Israeli agents and Iranian proxies. U.S. and Israeli security experts, as well as Argentina’s Milei government, have alleged that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah have found safe haven in Bolivian territory, particularly in the Chapare, the Chaco, the Amazon, and Santa Cruz. These areas have been hotbeds for drug and arms trafficking, which Iranian proxies may allegedly be using to fund operations in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, claims the MAS has dismissed as “imperialist lies” and “hallucinations.”
In this context, the candidates have proposed vastly different foreign policy visions, most sharply illustrated in their stances on the Middle East.
Doria Medina has taken a markedly different tack from the usual discourse. The businessman and long-time political figure has avoided stoking ideological flames. He has, perhaps cleverly, not spoken specifically on the conflict, Israel, Iran, or Palestine.
His mentions of foreign policy, even generally, have been very scarce, instead focusing on the economy and democracy. He has, however, criticized the MAS’s views on foreign policy, particularly its support for “tyrannies,” while supporting re-engagement with the Western world, which could include Israel. One of his #SamuelSolutions posts on Facebook called for a full bilateral relationship with the U.S., including under a Trump administration. His campaign has emphasized pragmatic diplomacy on a meritocratic basis, and bolstering trade relations with both the West and the Global South, aiming to position Bolivia as a “bridge” to the world rather than a committed ideological fighter in a geopolitical battlefield.
Doria Medina’s position is about as centrist a position as you can get, and would likely dictate his approach to the Middle East as President. In practice, it would likely mean that Bolivia stops being a direct ally with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, and instead pursues a more distant approach, while restoring trade and diplomatic ties with Israel.
By contrast, the MAS candidates, Andrónico Rodríguez and Eduardo del Castillo, have signaled continuity with current government policy. Rodríguez, the young MAS leader in the Senate, has defended the government’s self-avowedly “anti-imperialist” foreign policy and said he wants to be a “voice against genocide and massacre” in Palestine. Del Castillo, the interior minister and a hardliner on security, has repeatedly issued support for Palestine and condemnation of Israel. Both have promised to deepen Bolivia’s role in South-led fora critical of Western foreign policy.
Farther on the right, candidates like Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga and Manfred Reyes Villa have also voiced strong criticism of the MAS’s foreign policy, though significantly more ideological in its tone. Quiroga, a former president and longtime conservative figure, has consistently attacked the Morales and Arce governments for “supporting authoritarian regimes,” accusing them of isolating Bolivia from its Western democratic allies.
While he has not commented extensively on the current war in Gaza, his past rhetoric frames foreign policy as a moral and ideological battleground between liberal democracies and repressive regimes, implicitly siding Bolivia with the West and Israel, without calling out Israeli policy in Gaza. Both Quiroga and Reyes Villa’s appeals often invoke the Christian religion as national identity, and both have courted hardline religious support in the lowlands, especially in Santa Cruz, where pro-Israel sentiment runs deeper among the evangelical right. They would likely reverse course on the Middle East as president.
Doria Medina’s political success may be partly attributed to his ability to navigate this minefield of more ideological divisions, while the country continues to face its worst constitutional, economic and unity crisis in decades. The country is focused on finding any way out of this slump, and is willing to look for any and all partners in doing so. The MAS and hard-right’s more ideological vision may close the country to certain partnerships and solutions, while Doria Medina can pitch himself as a problem-obsessed bridge-builder.
In a country deeply polarized and regionally disunified, Doria Medina’s mild, technocratic tone and appeal to normalcy have offered a reprieve, seemingly welcomed by a lot of voters. His cautious approach to foreign policy, and avoiding the conflicts in the Middle East specifically, has become a microcosm of his broader electoral strategy: stay out of the ideological trenches and sell voters a vision of competence and steady-handedness.
We will just have to wait and see if it pays off electorally, and if it can make life better for the average Bolivian.
Joseph Bouchard is a journalist and researcher covering security and geopolitics in Latin America. His articles have appeared in Reason, The Diplomat, Responsible Statecraft, and The National Interest, among others. He is an incoming PhD student in Politics at the University of Virginia and an SSHRC Doctoral Fellow on Latin American Politics.
