Lev Nachman and Wei-Ting Yen warn in Foreign Affairs (“Taiwan’s Democracy Is in Trouble,” August 1, 2025) that polarization is eroding the island’s national security. On this point, we agree: polarization is a real and growing challenge for all democracies, especially those confronting authoritarian coercion from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But the timing and framing of their argument raise serious concerns. The authors issue this warning only after Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) suffered a political defeat. If Taiwan’s democracy were genuinely imperiled, surely the risks would have warranted attention before the recent recall outcome.
The recalls were a test of Taiwan’s democratic order. Voters were asked whether to remove several legislators affiliated with the opposition Kuomintang (KMT). The public rejected the recalls by wide margins. That decision reflects democratic agency, not democratic decline. The authors’ concern appears not to be that the system failed, but that it failed to deliver the outcome they preferred.
Security Should Not Be a Partisan Weapon
Nachman and Yen write that moderate voters are “frightened by Beijing’s interference in Taiwanese democracy (which was evident throughout the recall campaigns),” insinuating that the outcome was shaped by CCP interference, an assertion that strains credulity. The CCP interference is not new. Taiwanese voters are more discerning than such claims imply. In recent years, perceived CCP interference has typically benefited the DPP, not the opposition. Suggesting otherwise without evidence flattens public judgment and overstates Beijing’s influence on domestic accountability.
In framing the recall defeats as a national security concern, Nachman and Yen fall into a broader pattern that has become increasingly visible in Taiwan’s political discourse. Rather than treating security as a matter of shared responsibility, some political actors have begun using it as a proxy for partisan loyalty. Dissenting views on cross-Strait policy are not just debated. They are framed as evidence of disloyalty. Critics are not just wrong. They are accused of enabling the CCP.
During the campaign, DPP leaders promoted slogans such as “罷免投同意 反共更有力” (“vote yes to recall, oppose Communism more effectively”). This rhetoric conflated political disagreement with national betrayal. Even more striking was the performative nature of the campaign. The DPP deployed provocative tactics such as the viral “來來來 怎麼樣” dance (“Come on, come on, what now?”), which mocked opposition lawmakers on social media. If the purpose of the recall was to protect Taiwan’s democracy from CCP interference, reducing it to taunts and theatrics undermined the seriousness of that claim.
The Illusion of Cross-Party Solidarity
Nachman and Yen acknowledge the political nature of the recalls but then argue that the process has created an opening for cross-party cooperation. They go further still, as they write, suggesting that “the recall movement has generated a small but growing sense of solidarity between moderate DPP supporters and moderate KMT ones.” This is a deeply misleading characterization. Taiwan’s democratic history is no stranger to opportunists masquerading as defectors and those who rebrand political ambition as moral awakening when it serves their interests. While the recalls sparked public debate and civic participation on both sides, there is little evidence that the campaign built new bridges across Taiwan’s political divide. As the authors have in fact rightly pointed out, it exacerbated mutual suspicion and reinforced negative perceptions of partisanship.
The authors also claim that moderate DPP and KMT voters “are jointly frustrated over the legislature’s incompetence,” a charge implicitly directed at the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan. But blaming institutional dysfunction, if there is any, on the legislature alone overlooks the executive’s responsibility in fostering dialogue and the judiciary’s in being a fair arbitrator. Divided government is not dysfunctional by default. In healthy democracies, oversight is not obstruction, and public dissatisfaction with institutions cannot be reduced to a rejection of legislative authority.
A Deliberate and Mature Electorate
Voters reaffirmed institutional boundaries. The outcome reflected a public preference for political stability and constitutional restraint, rather than endorsement of any single party. The recalls failed not due to apathy, but because a critical mass of voters rejected the attempt to convert a safeguard into a partisan tool. While the campaign generated energy online and in activist circles, it did not resonate with the broader electorate, whose instincts leaned toward moderation and procedural legitimacy. This divergence highlights the growing gap between social media fervor and the mainstream priorities of the Taiwanese people.
The authors also cite polling data from the government-affiliated Institute for National Defense and Security Research showing that DPP supporters express more willingness than their KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) counterparts to defend Taiwan in the event of a conflict. But they sidestep the more difficult question: would this gap be as pronounced if citizens who support cross-Strait dialogue, exchange, and stability did not feel alienated by the governing party’s messaging?
Their interpretation overlooks an important factor: political trust in the commander-in-chief. That some KMT and TPP supporters hesitate to back a war under President Lai may reflect concern not about defending Taiwan itself, but about being asked to fight under a leader they associate with escalatory or polarizing positions. That, too, is a national security risk: one rooted not in disloyalty, but in perceptions of ideological rigidity and ineffective governance. Ignoring this distinction oversimplifies public opinion and politicizes defense cohesion at a time when Taiwan needs to cultivate broad-based readiness, regardless of who holds the presidency.
Public trust and societal cohesion are prerequisites for credible deterrence. If a segment of the population feels distrusted or cast as unpatriotic for dissenting, Taiwan is not building resilience; it is reinforcing its own fragility. Whole-of-society resilience must truly mean the whole society.
Division Plays Into Beijing’s Hands
Beijing’s political warfare strategy is rooted in division. Overpoliticizing the CCP threat, labeling domestic rivals as pro-Communist, or reducing national security to a partisan loyalty test risks doing Beijing’s work for it. This approach undermines civic trust, weakens institutional legitimacy, and corrodes the foundations of democratic unity. True resilience requires public transparency, responsible oversight, and political maturity from all parties. Taiwan’s democratic pluralism is a vital defense asset, not a vulnerability that should somehow be clamped down simply because Beijing exploits open societies.
Even after the recall defeats, senior DPP figures have continued to support additional recall efforts scheduled for late August. Ker Chien-Ming, the DPP’s legislative caucus leader, has affirmed that President Lai Ching-te remains committed to seeing those campaigns through, despite growing public fatigue and diminishing strategic value. This raises further questions about the party’s posture toward moderation and reconciliation. If the DPP’s leadership sees recall as a legitimate democratic “self-adjustment,” as many of its supporters claim, then it must also recognize that the failure of the recall efforts constitutes a democratic correction.
Conclusion: The System Held
The broader concern here is not with any single party, but with the health of Taiwan’s democratic health. When national security becomes a partisan tool, its meaning is diminished. When dissent is conflated with treason, dialogue becomes impossible. Taiwan has faced external pressure for decades. What has preserved its autonomy is not conformity, but a diverse and engaged citizenry committed to open debate and constitutional governance.
This is not an argument for complacency. The CCP remains a persistent and adaptive threat. Its tactics are sophisticated, ranging from military intimidation to economic coercion and cognitive warfare. All parties have a duty to approach cross-Strait policy with transparency, seriousness, and strategic discipline. That responsibility includes the opposition, the KMT and the TPP. But it also includes the governing party and its allies in civil society and academia. Analysts should be especially cautious not to mirror the framing strategies they critique.
Taiwan’s democracy is not in trouble. It is undergoing stress, as all democracies do. The recall defeat is not a victory for one side or a loss for another. It is a reaffirmation of democratic agency. Voters evaluated the claims, considered the stakes, and made a choice. That choice deserves respect.
Howard Shen is an independent analyst on Taiwanese and Indo-Pacific politico-security affairs. He was foreign press secretary to Hou Yu-Ih, the Kuomintang’s 2024 presidential candidate.
