As President Lee Jae-myung of South Korea prepares for his first official summit with President Donald Trump in Washington, expectations are shaped by both historical precedent and the increasingly transactional nature of alliance politics. At face value, the summit offers a familiar tableau: reaffirmations of friendship, military camaraderie, and shared democratic values. But beneath the optics lies a more urgent question—can the U.S.–ROK alliance be recalibrated, not merely preserved, in an era defined by strategic competition, shifting trade norms, and the erosion of traditional security guarantees?
The summit takes place at a time of strategic recalibration not only in Seoul and Washington, but across the Indo-Pacific. The re-election of President Trump has reinvigorated a vision of U.S. alliances that is cost-based rather than trust-based. Defense relationships are now judged by balance sheets rather than shared deterrence goals. At the same time, South Korea faces increasing pressure from both the United States and China to demonstrate geopolitical loyalty, even as its leadership seeks to preserve maneuverability and domestic stability. The choices made in this summit may shape the trajectory of the alliance for years to come.
The economic backdrop is already tense. A last-minute agreement prevented the full imposition of 25% tariffs on Korean exports, reducing the rate to 15% in exchange for a $350 billion Korean investment package and additional long-term energy commitments to the U.S. While this deal diffused immediate friction, it underscored a broader structural asymmetry: Washington is increasingly treating economic relations with allies as bargaining chips, leveraging market access for political concessions. Seoul, by contrast, seeks predictability, regulatory stability, and fairness.
If this summit is to enhance the alliance rather than merely manage friction, the economic conversation must shift away from short-term deals and toward a more institutionalized framework. That includes robust coordination on industrial policy, joint investments in emerging technologies, and aligning export control regimes. The stakes are high: economic fragmentation among allies only strengthens adversaries. A shared strategic framework for technology cooperation—in fields such as semiconductors, clean energy, and AI—can anchor the alliance in future-oriented sectors while building long-term resilience against Chinese economic coercion.
Defense cost-sharing will again be a centerpiece of the discussion. Trump is expected to demand a significant increase in Seoul’s contribution to the stationing of U.S. forces and maintenance of shared infrastructure. However, if this issue is reduced to a ledger sheet, it will hollow out the alliance’s strategic rationale. The 70-year-old U.S.–ROK partnership cannot be sustained on cost-efficiency arguments alone. Instead, the summit must redefine burden-sharing as a platform for mutual defense enhancement—through co-development of weapons systems, integration of command-and-control networks, and greater South Korean participation in joint planning and contingency operations.
This is especially critical in emerging domains of conflict. Expanding South Korea’s role in areas such as missile defense, space surveillance, and cyber operations would not only reinforce deterrence against North Korea but also enhance allied posture in the broader Indo-Pacific. Seoul’s defense industry is increasingly competitive, and co-production agreements could benefit both economies while deepening operational interoperability. The U.S. should view South Korea as a defense partner capable of meaningful contributions—not merely a host nation to be billed.
President Lee arrives in Washington with a vision of pragmatic foreign policy grounded in national interest. His administration has embraced strategic flexibility, seeking to manage relations with both Washington and Beijing while avoiding entanglement in great power rivalry. This balancing act is often criticized in Washington as equivocation, but it is in fact a rational response to South Korea’s geopolitical constraints. The summit offers a rare opportunity for Lee to clarify that Seoul’s hedging is not passive neutrality, but a strategic necessity.
To that end, the summit should avoid framing issues in binary terms. Demanding that Seoul “choose sides” between Washington and Beijing is strategically self-defeating. Instead, the focus should be on practical alignment: securing maritime trade routes, deterring North Korean aggression, countering coercive economic practices, and strengthening rules-based regional institutions. These are areas where the U.S. and South Korea can deepen collaboration without forcing ideological litmus tests.
A key challenge remains the persistent gap in threat perception. South Korea remains focused on North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, while the U.S. increasingly views regional security through the lens of competition with China. This divergence, if left unaddressed, risks undermining strategic cohesion. The summit must confront this reality by reaffirming extended deterrence not just rhetorically, but operationally—through more robust consultative mechanisms, shared contingency planning, and enhanced crisis communication protocols. A renewed and detailed agreement on nuclear planning and deterrence posture would be a step forward.
Moreover, trilateral cooperation with Japan should be strengthened as a stabilizing force in the region. The Camp David trilateral agreement provided an initial roadmap, but concrete steps—such as integrated missile defense exercises, intelligence fusion centers, and synchronized sanctions enforcement—would give the trilateral architecture enduring relevance. The political climate in Seoul has long complicated ties with Tokyo, but recent normalization efforts have opened the door for a more institutionalized framework.
Importantly, the summit must send strong political signals. A joint declaration articulating long-term strategic objectives—such as alliance modernization, economic security cooperation, and regional stability—would restore a sense of predictability and purpose. Beyond rhetoric, institutional innovation is needed. Establishing a regular ROK–U.S. strategic economic dialogue or a joint innovation council would help stabilize alliance management across political transitions and reduce policy volatility.
Finally, while the Taiwan issue is unlikely to feature prominently in public discussions, it cannot be ignored indefinitely. The U.S. and South Korea must begin quiet but serious consultations about roles, responsibilities, and risk management in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis. Silence in peacetime could lead to miscommunication in wartime. A stable alliance requires both shared interests and shared assumptions.
This summit is not just a diplomatic photo opportunity. It is a test of political will, strategic coherence, and alliance innovation. For Washington, it is a moment to demonstrate that allies are not transactional instruments but strategic partners. For Seoul, it is a chance to show that alliance leadership can coexist with autonomy and foresight. If both sides can move beyond short-term calculus and instead recalibrate their expectations and priorities, the summit could mark not only a reset, but a genuine revitalization of one of the Indo-Pacific’s most vital security partnerships.
Jihoon Yu is the director of external cooperation and an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.
