South Korea’s security strategy has long been anchored in its alliance with the United States, reinforced by close trilateral ties with Japan. However, in recent years, Seoul has gradually expanded its strategic horizons, finding growing value in deepening cooperation with Europe. This shift is not merely symbolic; it reflects converging threat perceptions, the evolution of Europe’s role in global security, and the recognition that transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security are increasingly interlinked.
Europe’s renewed attention to the Indo-Pacific is one driver. France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the European Union have all released Indo-Pacific strategies, underscoring their stake in maritime security, freedom of navigation, and regional stability. European navies, from the French Charles de Gaulle carrier group to the German frigate Bayern, have already made deployments to the region. These moves are not token gestures. They represent Europe’s understanding that the global economy and the rules-based order depend on open sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific, which is also South Korea’s lifeline as a major trading nation. For Seoul, Europe’s growing involvement offers opportunities to build a wider coalition of like-minded states committed to maritime security and rule enforcement.
The strategic rationale goes beyond shared values. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the dangers of authoritarian revisionism, reinforcing parallels with security challenges in Northeast Asia. South Korea has supported sanctions against Moscow and supplied military aid to Kyiv, while recognizing that Europe’s struggle in Ukraine has direct implications for the Korean Peninsula. If Russia succeeds in reshaping borders by force, the precedent would embolden Pyongyang and its patrons. Coordinating with Europe on sanctions enforcement, defense industry collaboration, and diplomatic messaging strengthens deterrence against North Korea while bolstering global solidarity against aggression.
Defense industry cooperation is another important dimension. Europe and South Korea are increasingly intertwined as suppliers, buyers, and co-developers of advanced defense systems. South Korea’s exports of K2 tanks and K9 howitzers to Poland, as well as cooperation with Norway, Finland, and others, highlight how Europe views Korean defense technology as cost-effective, reliable, and strategically valuable. For Seoul, these partnerships not only generate economic benefits but also embed South Korea in Europe’s defense modernization, creating reciprocal dependence that enhances strategic resilience. As the U.S. prioritizes burden-sharing and “America First” policies, South Korea’s ability to build complementary defense ties with Europe offers diversification and leverage.
Maritime security cooperation deserves particular emphasis. With growing concerns about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, gray-zone coercion, and the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea’s illicit shipping, European navies working alongside the Republic of Korea Navy can add legitimacy and global reach to enforcement measures. Seoul’s collaboration with the Dutch Navy during sanction enforcement exercises exemplifies how Europe can play a practical role in upholding rules at sea. This cooperation also sends a strong message: the Indo-Pacific is not a closed regional theater, but a global commons that requires joint stewardship.
Critics may argue that Europe’s role in the Indo-Pacific will remain limited due to distance, resource constraints, and competing priorities closer to home. While these caveats are valid, they overlook the symbolic and normative weight that European engagement carries. Even modest deployments or joint exercises with South Korea serve as multipliers of legitimacy, reinforcing the principle that challenges to international order are not confined to one region. For Seoul, aligning with Europe also reduces the perception that its security is narrowly tethered to U.S. strategic choices.
Finally, closer ties with Europe help South Korea manage the complexities of U.S.-China rivalry. By positioning itself as part of a broader coalition of democracies that transcends the Indo-Pacific, Seoul can avoid being seen solely through the lens of Washington-Beijing competition. Cooperation with Europe allows South Korea to frame its security diplomacy in terms of global norms and multilateralism, not just regional balancing. This widens Seoul’s diplomatic options and underscores its role as a middle power with global influence.
The stakes for South Korea are high. The world is entering an era of systemic competition between democratic and authoritarian models. The meeting of Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un, and Vladimir Putin earlier this month underscored the tightening axis of authoritarian states. For South Korea, building stronger security cooperation with Europe is a strategic hedge against such developments. It strengthens deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, broadens diplomatic partnerships, and situates Seoul within a wider network of states committed to defending the rules-based order.
Security cooperation with Europe is not about replacing the U.S.-ROK alliance. Rather, it is about complementing it—widening South Korea’s strategic options, diversifying its partnerships, and embedding the country in a global web of security cooperation. In an era when challenges to international security are globalized, Seoul can no longer afford to treat Europe as distant. The transatlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters are linked, and South Korea’s security will increasingly depend on recognizing, and acting upon, that reality.
Jihoon Yu is the director of external cooperation and an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.
