Another coup has hit Africa, this time in Madagascar. While the dust has not yet settled, the instability on the “Big Island” has the potential to harm U.S. and allied critical mineral supply chains and alter Chinese, French, and Russian influence in the surrounding Indian Ocean. The U.S. and its partners should engage with and support the efforts of African institutions, such as the African Union (AU) and regional bodies, and avoid counterproductive over-retaliation.
Madagascar had been rocked in recent weeks by deadly Gen Z protests that have shaken countries around the world. Malagasy youth had been in the streets since September 25, protesting the country’s abysmal electrification and poverty rates, as well as the corruption of President Andry Rajoelina and his allies.
Everything changed when a key army unit mutinied and joined the protestors on October 11, and less than a week later the military has taken power. The army announced it was taking over on October 14 as President Rajoelina, who had fled the country days prior, tried to dissolve the Madagascar’s National Assembly, as the National Assembly moved to impeach him. The High Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the army and installed Colonel Michaël Randrianirina as President on October 17.
The turmoil in Madagascar could disrupt the island’s mining sector, which is a major producer of cobalt, graphite, and nickel, all of which are used in lithium-ion batteries. Madagascar is the world’s second-largest graphite producer, with China, India, Germany, and the United States all leading purchasers. Japan and South Korea import roughly a quarter and a third of their nickel from Madagascar, respectively.
U.S. critical mineral supply chains have a significant and growing stake in Madagascar. The United States purchases four percent of its graphite imports from Madagascar, making the island its fourth-largest supplier behind China, Canada, and Mozambique. U.S.-based Energy Fuels Inc. recently acquired the Toliara project in October 2024 and was working to reach a final investment decision by early 2026. The deposit has titanium, zirconium, rare earth, and radioactive ores, which are used in aircraft, aerospace equipment, electric vehicles, nuclear energy infrastructure, and renewable energy systems.
Even if there is no political violence in Madagascar, future regulation changes could impact supply chains. Pro-sovereigntist juntas that took power in West Africa in recent years have altered their mining codes and aggressively targeted foreign mining companies to renegotiate deals. This campaign has dampened investment, led to mine seizures, and caused production shutdowns in some cases. The new Malagasy junta and any hypothetical civilian-led transition government have had little time to signal—much less develop—an economic strategy, but the uncertainty is itself a risk.
Madagascar’s location makes it a key partner for China, France, and possibly Russia in the Indian Ocean. Madagascar has maintained close business and political ties with France since gaining independence in 1960. France works with Madagascar through several institutions, including regional bodies and France’s Southern Indian Ocean Zone, which hosts nearly 2,000 French defense personnel across French islands near Madagascar. The United States also works with Malagasy forces to support maritime security in the Indian Ocean. While France has stressed the importance of respecting the constitution, China has used its typical strategy of urging dialogue and maintaining a low profile to ensure it can protect its business ties with whoever emerges in power.
Moscow could look to capitalize as it has in other former French colonies, but the situation is less ripe for Russian intervention than other African cases. The infamous Wagner Group meddled in the 2018 Malagasy elections, and the Kremlin is likely still interested in Madagascar as it tries to expand its naval power projection using African coastlines. Where the now-subjugated Wagner Group offered its services to Mali’s and Niger’s new juntas quickly after they took power, Russian state officials reportedly met with Randrianirina on October 16. However, the Gen Z protests are focused on underdevelopment, not insecurity, and anti-French sentiment appears relatively less prominent than it was in West African protests. Moscow has had success exploiting the French and insecurity but offers relatively little on the development side.
African institutions should urgently lead efforts to engage with the junta, and the United States and others should find ways to support. The AU has recommended establishing a delegation, special envoy, and follow-up mechanism to support regional mediation efforts, and the SADC sent a fact-finding mission to the island immediately after the coup as an initial step to helping facilitate a return to constitutional order. The AU and SADC facilitated a successful transition from 2009 to 2013 after Madagascar’s last coup, and the AU has called for Madagascar and regional partners to reactivate that “Roadmap.”
The international community must avoid over-retaliating out of fear of “legitimizing coups,” which has repeatedly failed in recent years. While the AU has already suspended Madagascar, further moves such as blanket sanctions, aid cuts, and a refusal to engage with the new authorities are counterproductive. Such attitudes dragged out African mediation efforts after the 2009 coup. More recently, this approach totally backfired in West Africa. The ordinary citizens impacted by regional and international sanctions rallied around the new juntas, enabling them to entrench themselves in power, and then these juntas withdrew from the regional institutions entirely and fled into Moscow’s open arms.
Madagascar’s unique context further warrants a measured approach. The army did not upend a well-functioning democracy; it took power amid a constitutional crisis created by a presidency that had lost legitimacy with a sizeable portion—if not most—of the country. The High Constitutional Court outright rejected labeling the situation as a coup and institutionally legitimized military leadership because all other constitutional alternatives had been “exhausted.”
The Malagasy military has historically and presently shown a willingness to transition power back to civilian-led, democratic governance. Malagasy security forces participated in the last transition, and Randrianirina has already outlined a transition plan that includes key aspects from the 2011 Roadmap, including representation for civilians, a consensus prime minister, and plans for a constitutional referendum and elections within the next two years. Randrianirina further showed good faith when he reversed his initial decision to dissolve the High Constitutional Council. The court and Randrianirina disagree on the feasibility of election timelines, but this is a perfect issue for the AU and SADC to mediate and then facilitate.
Following Africa’s latest coup, Africans and their partners must learn from the mismanagement of other coups. U.S. and Western officials can protect their critical mineral supply chains and maritime security in the Indian Ocean by backing African efforts to pragmatically engage with the new authorities and hold the junta to its promises for a relatively speedy return to civilian-led rule.
Liam Karr is the Africa team lead for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. His team produces weekly updates and maps on conflict in Africa, featured in outlets including The Economist, Reuters, and The Hill.
