Mali is slowly sliding toward becoming a failed state at the hands of al Qaeda. On October 28, the United States and several other countries escalated security alerts and travel warnings across the country, warning civilians to urgently depart the country for the first time in nearly a decade. The situation bears eerie similarities to early stages of the eventual Taliban takeover in Afghanistan and semi-failed states like Somalia.
US and allied officials in the region must find ways to urgently increase non-lethal assistance to Mali and enhance regional cooperation, including evaluating a possible African-led military response. Aside from the need to prevent a state from falling to al Qaeda, helping address the situation is necessary to stop a potential refugee crisis, protect US and allied mining operations, and strengthen Western credentials as a reliable partner in the region.
Since September, al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen’s (JNIM) 13-year insurgency has reached a critical new phase as the group enforces a fuel blockade on southern Mali. Small groups of highly mobile militants have used advantageous terrain to evade Malian drone cover and overstretched patrols before ambushing convoys of fuel tankers.
The blockade is part of a broader JNIM economic warfare campaign that threatens US and foreign mining in the country. The group has attacked foreign-operated mines and kidnapped foreign workers, demanding that all companies operating in Mali must secure “permission,” code for paying a bribe, to continue operating. The UAE recently paid an exorbitant $50-70 million ransom to free two Emirati hostages.
Could JNIM take this all one step further seize Bamako and topple the Malian government a la Taliban? Probably not. JNIM would likely have to spend years addressing the capacity and legitimacy gaps it faces in southern Mali before it starts directly controlling population centers, although the group is slowly taking steps toward this end.
What it can do is bring down the Malian government. The impact of its blockade has been devastating. Civilians in major cities, including the capital, are facing fuel shortages, extended blackouts, inflation, and the halt of daily activity, including business and school. The insurgents, possibly surprised at the success of their campaign, have increased their demands from lifting a ban on rural fuel trading to the collapse of the Malian government or implementation of shari’a law across the country. The junta has reportedly opened some communication channels with the group.
A government collapse would open the door for negotiations between JNIM and a new government. JNIM has shown an openness to negotiations for years and has already struck a series of “survival pacts” with local leaders in some areas, which has given the group control of much of the rural areas of the country. In these deals JNIM agrees to lift blockades in exchange for what amounts to JNIM shadow governance—taxes, aspects of shari’a law, and disarmament. The long-term prognosis is a Swiss-cheese map—government-held cities in a sea of al Qaeda–contested or –controlled territory—a sight familiar for those who have looked at a map of Somalia in the last decade.
Negotiations on a national scale would be seismic but unpredictable. Symbolically, compromises between JNIM and new authorities could involve an Egyptian-style acknowledgement of shari’a as the “source” of Malian law in the constitution and discussions on JNIM’s allegiance to al Qaeda. However, outcomes could also involve much more practical matters, such as the enforcement of various shari’a law principles, where JNIM is one of many powerful religious voices in Mali.
A government collapse would likely cause a refugee crisis that would destabilize surrounding states and eventually reach Europe and possibly the United States. Several migration routes that end in Europe or even the Americas run through Mali toward Africa’s coasts. A massive influx of refugees would stress already-crowded camps on surrounding borders, as over 300,000 Malians are already refugees in neighboring countries.
The crisis is another moment for already-growing rapprochement between Mali and its regional and Western partners to address shared counterterrorism concerns. While a decade of Western assistance failed to defeat JNIM, the current situation would have been hard to imagine when the junta traded French and UN forces for Russian mercenaries roughly three years ago. JNIM has articulated mostly local aims and likely does not pose a major external risk, but the role of foreign fighters and possible support for external operations remains a concern. Some hardened cadres have made sporadic threats against Europe, and national JNIM negotiations would essentially leave the world outsourcing counterterrorism responsibilities in Mali to an al Qaeda affiliate.
The United States and Europe should continue engaging surrounding countries to bolster their resiliency, given that JNIM consolidating its position in Mali would be a launching pad toward the entirety of West Africa. Burkina Faso would likely be the next to fall, where the group is already in a similar position. JNIM already has rear bases in Ghana, Guinea, Mauritania, and Senegal and active cells in Benin, Togo, and Nigeria, where the group claimed its first attack in late October.
The United States and its allies should increase the number of intelligence assets in the region and discuss increased non-lethal assistance with their Malian counterparts. The region already needs more intelligence assets to protect American and other foreign citizens, as demonstrated by the Islamic State’s recent abduction of an American in neighboring Niger and JNIM’s kidnapping spree. The United States recently resumed intelligence sharing with Mali, meaning these assets can also help the Malian government counter the ongoing blockade. Other supplies, such as armored vehicles and counter-IED equipment, could also help armed convoys better respond to the blockade.
The United States and its international partners must start proactively evaluating options for a possible African-led military response in the event of a Malian request or government collapse. The goal would not be defeating JNIM, which has eluded international forces for more than a decade, but rather to stabilize the country and prevent JNIM from negotiating from a position of undue strength.
Such a response would look much less like the French intervention in 2013 and much more like the AU–supported peacekeeping operations in Somalia or bilateral Rwandan intervention in Mozambique. African forces or peacekeepers would be able to immediately bolster Mali’s capacity to stabilize the situation by conducting more frequent patrols and keeping roadways clear. Regional responses in West Africa have repeatedly disappointed, but the crisis could be the impetus needed to force a reckoning for regional and international partners. Funding and regional political tensions continue to be major obstacles, but the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union (AU), European Union, United States, and United Nations should start evaluating possible funding streams immediately.
The world cannot sit idly by as al Qaeda spreads across West Africa. While a Taliban-style takeover in Mali is unlikely, the fact it cannot be ruled out is alarming, and JNIM has multiple potential pathways to greater power. The United States and its allies must urgently increase assistance to Mali and begin coordinating an international reaction, including a preparing for the possibility of supporting an African-led military response. The stakes are clear, failure means an al Qaeda–controlled state, possible refugee crisis, and missed opportunities to bolster Western economic and political partnerships.
Liam Karr is the Africa team lead for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.
