Washington’s foreign policy establishment clings to outdated binary categories—allies versus adversaries—while our supposed partners exploit this intellectual laziness to extract maximum benefit at minimum cost. The Trump administration now confronts a strategic reality that demands new frameworks: the rise of “two-lane allies” who simultaneously pocket American security guarantees while empowering our rivals.
A two-lane ally operates in parallel tracks: Lane A involves formal treaties, base access, joint exercises, and trade agreements. Lane B runs counter to American interests through weapons purchases from rivals, proxy support for adversaries, and diplomatic maneuvers that undercut U.S. objectives. This is a systematic exploitation of American strategic incoherence.
Turkey: NATO’s Trojan Horse
Turkey exemplifies this parasitic relationship. In Lane A, Ankara maintains NATO membership, hosts American nuclear weapons at Incirlik, and periodically dangles F-16 modernization requests. In Lane B, Turkey purchased Russia’s S-400 air defense system—directly threatening NATO’s integrated defense architecture—while transforming into the region’s primary sanctions-evasion hub for Moscow and Tehran.
The numbers tell the story: Turkish-Russian trade surged 200% since 2022, while Turkey simultaneously requested $20 billion in F-16 upgrades from Washington. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government facilitates Hamas operations, platforms Muslim Brotherhood networks, and threatens Israeli gas infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean, all while demanding American diplomatic protection from consequences.
The solution requires immediate recalibration. Remove Turkey from the F-35 program permanently. Relocate critical assets from Incirlik to Greece and Jordan. Impose secondary sanctions on Turkish banks facilitating Russian transactions. Make every defense cooperation agreement contingent on verifiable cessation of support for Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood networks.
Qatar: The Arsonist Firefighter
Qatar perfected the two-lane model through calculated ambiguity. Lane A features Al Udeid Air Base hosting 10,000 American troops, major non-NATO ally designation, and billions in U.S. defense contracts. Lane B reveals Qatar funneling $1.5 billion to Hamas since 2012, broadcasting jihadist propaganda through Al Jazeera, and hosting Taliban leadership while American soldiers fought in Afghanistan.
Doha’s recent mediation theatrics expose this game. Qatar positions itself as an indispensable mediator precisely because it sustains the very terrorist networks requiring mediation. It’s protection racketeering disguised as diplomacy. The Qatari sovereign wealth fund pours millions into American universities, creating intellectual capture that prevents honest assessment of this dysfunction.
The Trump administration should demand Qatar choose a lane. Either Qatar expels Hamas leadership and ceases all financial flows to Gaza, or America relocates Al Udeid to Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Designate Qatari financial institutions supporting Hamas as terror-financing entities. Investigate every Qatari-funded program in American universities under foreign agent registration requirements.
Oman: The Enabler’s Enabler
Oman operates a subtler two-lane strategy. Lane A maintains studied neutrality, facilitates occasional U.S.-Iran communications, and provides overflight rights. Lane B systematically enables Iranian sanctions evasion, serves as Tehran’s diplomatic lifeline, and undermines maximum pressure campaigns against the Islamic Republic.
Muscat’s “neutrality” consistently tilts toward Tehran when stakes increase. Omani ports facilitate Iranian oil transfers. Omani banks process transactions for sanctioned Iranian entities. Omani territory hosts Iranian intelligence operations targeting Gulf states. This is active facilitation of American adversaries.
Structural Solutions for a Structural Problem
These two-lane allies thrive because Washington lacks frameworks for managing sovereign actors who aren’t quite enemies but certainly aren’t friends. The Trump administration must institutionalize new mechanisms:
Create a “Strategic Reliability Index” scoring allies on concrete metrics: sanctions compliance, intelligence sharing, counterterrorism cooperation, and voting alignment in international forums. Link security guarantees directly to scores. Countries falling below thresholds lose access to advanced systems, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic protection.
Implement “graduated decoupling;” a systematic reduction of dependence on unreliable partners. Every two-lane ally hosting American assets must compete with alternatives. Make them fear irrelevance more than they value hedging.
Deploy information operations exposing two-lane behavior. American taxpayers deserve transparency about which “allies” simultaneously take their money and undermine their security. Reputational costs remain underutilized tools against governments that depend on Western legitimacy.
The binary ally-adversary framework served Cold War purposes but fails today’s complexity. Two-lane allies extract maximum advantage from American strategic confusion, banking security guarantees while building leverage with rivals. The Trump administration possesses the clarity and courage to demand these partners choose lanes, and impose consequences on those who refuse.
America’s position remains strong enough to enforce strategic discipline. The question is whether Washington possesses the intellectual honesty to acknowledge that many “allies” are gaming the system, and the political will to stop them.
Gregg Roman is executive director of the Middle East Forum.
