President Trump made a personal commitment on November 19 to work on ending the war in Sudan and has since reiterated his aim to end the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in several public appearances and in his recently released National Security Strategy. The level of suffering in Sudan is staggering, with over 12 million people displaced and 21 million facing extreme hunger. The suffering will only grow without urgent effort, as another major armed showdown is looming in central Sudan, while a genocide is simultaneously unfolding in western Sudan—with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces killing at least 60,000 people in the largest war crime of the war.
As Trump looks to end the war, there are two fundamental ways he can move toward securing an initial ceasefire. First, he can degrade both sides’ ability to wage war. Cutting external support would restrict the RSF’s and SAF’s ability to conduct drone strikes across Sudan and degrade their ability to undertake decisive offensives. Second, he can increase both sides’ buy-in to the peace process. Decreasing the factions’ ability to wage war would help toward this end by removing recourses to violence, but Trump can introduce more incentives—or carrots—to secure their cooperation.
The most straightforward way Trump can degrade both sides’ ability to wage war is by cutting the external support both sides receive. The UAE has been the most decisive external actor, providing equipment and weapons to the RSF, including Chinese-made drones that the RSF has used to strike civilian infrastructure. The support enabled the RSF to repel an SAF offensive in early 2025 and enforce a de facto partition with the capture of all population centers in Darfur by October. On the other side, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar have all sent weapons and drones to the SAF, with the SAF also seeking anti-air systems from Russia to counter RSF drone capabilities.
The Trump administration has wisely involved some of these outside parties as it tries to achieve a first step toward peace, but these same countries have shown little willingness to compromise. Trump’s Senior Adviser for Africa Massad Boulos has intensified talks among the Quad—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States—since September to end the war. While this has led to various statements about the need for an urgent ceasefire and humanitarian action, no action has materialized. What’s more, these same countries and other external actors have increased their support to the warring parties, throwing into question whether they are even negotiating in good faith.
President Trump and his administration can change this trajectory by engaging more regularly and at a higher level with these regional partners. While Boulos has gotten the peace process to where it is today, he has a broad mandate in both scope and area, including business deals and peacemaking across the entire continent, which limits his ability to take Quad talks to the next level. Boulos needs more support, including greater involvement from Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Trump himself. The administration can follow up increased high-level engagement by dedicating additional institutional resources to the Sudan peace effort, including by filling the currently empty Special Envoy to Sudan position.
The Trump administration should also consider levying additional sanctions against the RSF and linked arms networks to achieve their stated goal of stopping arms shipments to the genocidal militia. There is little room to “both-sides” Sudan’s warring parties. Both sides have committed numerous war crimes, but the RSF is responsible for most violence against civilians and the overwhelming majority of intentional targeting of civilians, including acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
An easy first step would be designating the RSF as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This would further increase the cost for RSF backers, ultimately discouraging foreign entities and individuals from supporting the RSF. The policy has bipartisan congressional support, and US officials can also coordinate with their European counterparts as they consider their own sanctions on the RSF.
The United States should then target the entities and individuals arming the RSF. Biden-era sanctions on RSF leaders and several Emirati companies have not been enough to stop the influx of arms fueling these atrocities. Trump must take stronger action. This would involve more comprehensively targeting Emirati-linked networks, which ship weapons through multiple African countries before being smuggled across the Sudanese border, particularly via Chad and Libya.
To increase buy-in to the peace process, President Trump must seek to ease tensions between the SAF and UAE, something he is uniquely positioned to do. The UAE is incredibly wary of the SAF’s Islamist ties, something the U.S. has taken strong actions to address. The SAF, for its part, has taken note and sought to address these concerns. However, the SAF also views the UAE as a belligerent in the process, undermining its willingness to engage in the Quad framework at all.
Trump may be the only one capable of bringing the two closer together, which he can do by brokering a deal that addresses the SAF’s concerns over UAE-RSF ties and the UAE’s agricultural and port interests in SAF-held territory. Such a deal would secure the UAE’s $6 billion deal to develop the Abu Amama port, which the SAF-led government cancelled in 2024, and offer other UAE investment opportunities in Sudan’s reconstruction. In exchange, the UAE would promise to end its support for the RSF.
Trump can only increase overall buy-in on the peace process if he maintains the U.S.’s status as a neutral arbiter. The SAF has recently resorted to accusing Boulos of bias, a standard Sudanese strategy to recuse itself from peace talks, but rhetoric that the administration must still guard against. The administration has taken firm action against the SAF for its Islamist ties and chemical weapons use, rightfully so. It now should take the opportunity to apply equal pressure on the RSF with an FTO designation and levying additional sanctions on related to the unfolding genocide in el Fasher.
Hopefully, President Trump’s personal intervention into the Sudan conflict will become a turning point. While there would still be much to address about Sudan’s future, an initial ceasefire would limit the scale of the violence and enable more stable peace talks, an influx in humanitarian aid, and the beginning of reconstruction in non-frontline areas. Trump and his administration are uniquely positioned to use the momentum from the recent DRC-Rwanda peace deal, dealmaking expertise, and the U.S.’s status as a uniting neutral power to make this happen.
Liam Karr is the Africa team lead for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.
Michael DeAngelo is an Africa Analyst for the Critical Threats Project at AEI.
