A U.S.-supported regime change in Venezuela feels increasingly inevitable, and it will most likely end in disaster for both the United States and the Venezuelan people.
After rounds of deep sanctions, suffocating diplomatic and economic pressure, and two pretend presidents, the U.S. “Maximum Pressure Campaign” has escalated into something far more dangerous than when it arguably began in 2014.
Already, a Naval Carrier Strike Group is posted on Venezuela’s coast, and B-52s have carried out 22 known strikes on fishing boats in the Caribbean, killing at least 83 civilians and foreign nationals in operations that many experts say violate domestic and international laws.
U.S. officials have reportedly conveyed to Nicolás Maduro that he must leave now if he wants safe passage for himself and his family, with Russia likely to be his best guarantee of asylum. Washington has placed a $50 million bounty on the president’s head, blocked humanitarian aid to the country, pushed personal sanctions on senior officials, and thrown its weight behind the most hardline faction of the Venezuelan opposition, which for decades had only been welcomed in the most hawkish halls of the Beltway.
The Trump administration is fast-marching toward its own destruction. The likely power vacuum created by Maduro’s fall would create an immense migratory and humanitarian crisis, empower armed groups and rival great powers like China, Russia, and Iran, and lock Washington into another Forever War in a region already skeptical of American interventions.
Sanctions, pressure, and bombings are among Washington’s favorite strategies for regime change. But unlike the pressure campaign until now, this escalation is more maximalist. The Trump administration, particularly hawks like Marco Rubio and Richard Grenell, seems ready to stomp out the Chavista snake once and for all. Still, no matter how many “Day Zero” plans Machado and the hardliners offer, the situation would not resemble Panama and Chile, like many hawks have been floating, but would likely be closer to Iraq and Afghanistan post-intervention. The fallout would be looting, riots, violence, decay, and anarchy. There is also the possibility that the coup fails or stagnates, like the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba or Operation Gideon in Venezuela in 2020, in which case, the U.S. and Trump would be completely and utterly humiliated.
Despite Maduro’s immense unpopularity, international support for regime change is astonishingly thin. Latin America’s major powers, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, oppose a military intervention. The region’s moderates, including governments traditionally skeptical of Caracas, want negotiations and humanitarian openings, not military strikes. Pope Leo has also voiced concern, and may travel to Venezuela at some point if necessary. In Washington, Democrats and most of the American public oppose escalation.
Support for regime change, such as it exists, largely comes from a narrow coalition, namely, a few right-wing factions in the region, a few of Venezuela’s most hardline exiled activists, and a cluster of hawks in Washington. Notably, even many neoconservatives who backed maximum pressure on Venezuela are urging against direct military action. However, they have been some of the loudest voices in the media. Don’t fall for the manufactured consent.
A forced collapse of the Maduro government would likely not “create stability and promote democracy,” like Venezuelan hardline exile Rafael de la Cruz opined in the Wall Street Journal this week.
Venezuela today is already fragmented by armed actors. The ELN, dissident FARC factions, and the Tren de Aragua criminal network all control significant swaths of territory and economic activity. They govern border crossings, mining zones, cocaine routes, extortion markets, and entire townships. If state authority collapsed suddenly, these groups, along with dozens of smaller colectivos and local armies, would rush to fill the vacuum. The Chavistas, including the now millions of armed militias, would probably not go down easy. Even a U.S. government war game says it would be a complete and utter mess.
The Venezuelan hardliners’ vision for rapid shock therapy — eradicating Chavismo, dismantling social programs, prosecuting political opponents, purging the military, and imposing sweeping austerity — would alienate the millions of lower-income Venezuelans who remain the backbone of Chavismo, and who are the largest socio-economic group left in the country.
There is also the problem of the 300,000 military and paramilitary forces. They have been the biggest beneficiaries of Maduro’s clientelism and corruption, and have gotten immensely rich and powerful as a result. The Bolivarian Forces would likely fight any U.S. attempt to dismantle their status.
Even more, Chavista voters distrust the opposition, fear violent revenge politics, and vividly remember the 1989 Caracazo massacre, when neoliberal reforms triggered mass protests and state killings. Machado’s model would all but guarantee social upheaval and a repeat of the conditions that gave rise to Chávez in the first place. So, best-case scenario, if all goes according to plan, we might have another Chávez in a decade or two. That’s not exactly a win.
A coup or intervention—by air, sea, or special forces—would trigger the very humanitarian and migratory disaster the U.S. warns about. The Trump administration has stressed fears of “mass, uncontrolled migration” and even issued a travel ban on Venezuelans, but intervention would make that scenario far more likely: millions would flee, many would die, and armed actors would spread along migrant routes. A collapsing state could generate refugee flows exceeding those after 2014, much of it directed toward the Caribbean and the U.S. coastline. Given that migration and foreign policy are Trump’s strongest issues, the result would be both a political and humanitarian nightmare.
There is another way, where everyone (but the hawks) wins. This would mean working directly with moderates inside the opposition, including figures such as Henri Falcón, Leopoldo López, and Henrique Capriles, who are committed political and economic liberals, but have been willing to work with Maduro and the U.S. to get concessions for the people and move the country forward. These actors are not perfect, but they have shown a willingness to negotiate, accept incremental democratic openings, and operate within institutional frameworks rather than outside them. Most importantly, they would not throw Venezuela and its people into the ash heap of history.
Co-opting these opposition figures also means cooperating with the Maduro government on specific, verifiable goals like humanitarian corridors, reforming the armed forces, fighting cartels, electoral guarantees, prisoner releases, curbing migration, energy deals, anti-corruption efforts, and demilitarization around mining zones. This is precisely the approach pursued by Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and others. They have extracted far more from Caracas through dialogue than Washington has through coercion. This is a real political and diplomatic opportunity for Trump, who prides himself on making peace deals, rather than starting or continuing foreign wars.
For all his macho posturing and authoritarianism, Maduro has repeatedly signaled that he wants a deal with Washington. He has offered oil, mining concessions, security cooperation, and even direct dialogue with Trump himself. Maduro fears that the United States is willing to kill or topple him. That fear can be used to get concessions and build lasting peace and partnership. Yes, Maduro probably did not win the last two elections, and he is an unpopular tyrant, but toppling him is far too costly and dangerous.
A military or covert intervention in Venezuela would not be cheap, quick, or morally defensible as hawkish propaganda suggests. It would, however, alienate nearly every government in the hemisphere (and America’s partners in the Western world), reinforce the belief that the U.S. brings only war while China brings development, and trap Washington in an open-ended quagmire to fill a power vacuum that armed groups are perfectly positioned to exploit.
There is still time to choose a path that avoids catastrophe.
Joseph Bouchard is a PhD student, journalist, and researcher from Québec covering security and geopolitics in Latin America. His articles have appeared in Reason, The Diplomat, The National Interest, Le Devoir, and Responsible Statecraft, among others.
