As Iran’s ruling theocracy faces its deepest legitimacy crisis in decades, a familiar question has resurfaced in Western policy circles: who is the alternative? The answer is not academic. History shows that when authoritarian systems collapse without a credible democratic roadmap, the result is often instability or the recycling of power rather than genuine change.
According to a January 12, 2026 statement issued by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the death toll from the nationwide uprising has surpassed 3,000. Since then, CBS News has reported that the toll may be far higher, with estimates exceeding 12,000. If accurate, such a surge within days would reflect a level of state violence on a scale rarely seen in contemporary history. It also reinforces a central reality of authoritarian breakdown: when a regime resorts to mass killing to survive, it accelerates the loss of legitimacy that makes long-term survival impossible. Far from restoring control, repression at this scale deepens public outrage, expands resistance networks, and strengthens the logic of fundamental political change.
Two competing visions dominate the discussion today: one centered on Reza Pahlavi, and the other represented by an organized opposition coalition (NCRI) under the leadership of Maryam Rajavi. These are not merely rival personalities. They reflect fundamentally different conceptions of authority, transition, and democratic legitimacy.
Support for restoring the Pahlavi name to Iran’s political future rests largely on nostalgia rather than consent. In 1979, Iranians overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty after fifty years of centralized rule marked by censorship, political repression, and the concentration of power in the monarchy and its security apparatus. That uprising was a popular rejection of hereditary authority. The clerical regime’s later seizure of power does not invalidate that verdict.
Reza Pahlavi has sought to recast himself not as a monarch, but as a transitional figure. Yet his publicly articulated transition framework raises serious concerns. As one analyst writing in International Policy Digest has observed, questions about Pahlavi’s vision and legitimacy have led some commentators to conclude that he is not “the successor to Cyrus the Great,” underscoring broader doubts about his ability to serve as a unifying or democratically grounded transitional figure.
His plan envisions a “leader of the national transition” who would oversee and approve the formation of interim executive, legislative, and judicial bodies. In practice, this concentrates authority in a single unelected individual during the most sensitive phase of political change.
The proposed transition period is lengthy and loosely constrained, with extensions possible under mechanisms subject to centralized approval. Elections are deferred rather than guaranteed, and key institutions are appointed rather than derived from popular mandate. Whatever the intent, this structure risks reproducing the very concentration of power Iranians have repeatedly rejected.
From a democratic governance perspective, this is not a neutral bridge. It is a hierarchy. Transitional authority without firm limits, independent oversight, and immediate accountability creates conditions for a new form of authoritarianism, even when introduced under the banner of national unity.
By contrast, the NCRI advances a markedly different model. Rather than elevating a single individual as the arbiter of transition, it proposes a clearly bounded, institutional process designed explicitly to return power to the people.
For more than four decades, this coalition has functioned around a republican framework rather than lineage or symbolism. Its transition plan is limited in scope and duration, designed solely to organize free and fair elections and convene a constituent assembly. Authority is not personalized. It is procedural.
At the center of this approach is Maryam Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan, which calls for a secular democratic republic, separation of religion and state, gender equality, freedom of expression, abolition of the death penalty, minority rights, and a non-nuclear Iran. Importantly, the plan does not prescribe Iran’s future leadership or political system beyond the democratic process itself. It outlines safeguards, not successors.
This distinction is fundamental. Democratic transitions tend to succeed when interim authorities are constrained by timelines, pluralism, and the obligation to relinquish power. They tend to fail when transitional leaders claim exceptional authority without electoral legitimacy.
Another stark contrast lies in leadership structure. Women constitute more than half of the NCRI’s membership, and women hold many senior leadership positions within its governing bodies. This is not symbolic inclusion. It reflects decades of institutional practice.
Iranian women have long played central roles in political organization and opposition networks. Any credible alternative to the current system must reflect that reality structurally, not rhetorically. Monarchist transition proposals offer no comparable guarantees of women’s political authority or institutional parity.
Legitimacy is not manufactured through visibility abroad or media recognition. It is forged through sustained opposition under repression. Members of the NCRI and its principal constituent organization, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), have opposed both the Shah’s dictatorship and the clerical regime, paying a heavy price in imprisonment, torture, and execution.
Over decades, opposition networks associated with this coalition have documented state repression, exposed Tehran’s regional activities, and brought international attention to concealed military and nuclear programs. This record reflects organizational resilience and continuity, qualities often required to manage a democratic transition rather than merely announce one.
No opposition movement is without internal challenges, and Iran’s transition will ultimately depend on choices made inside the country. Still, Iran does not need a return to hereditary authority, even under a transitional label. It needs a temporary, accountable, civilian framework that dismantles the concentration of power and restores sovereignty to the people.
On that measure, the NCRI’s platform offers a more structurally credible democratic transition framework than models centered on personalized authority.
The lesson of 1979 remains clear. Replacing one form of centralized rule with another is not progress. Genuine change begins only when power returns to the people and remains there.
Dr. Sofey Saidi is a scholar-practitioner in international relations, global governance, and conflict resolution. She earned her Ph.D. in International Relations from Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Switzerland.
