Defense and security cooperation between Canada and South Korea has long been treated as strategically secondary, often overshadowed by each country’s primary alliance commitments and regional priorities. For Canada, NATO and continental defense have traditionally dominated strategic thinking, while for South Korea the alliance with the United States and deterrence against North Korea remain existential concerns. Yet this tendency to view bilateral cooperation as peripheral is increasingly outdated. In an era defined by systemic rivalry, contested maritime domains, and the erosion of international norms, Canada–South Korea defense cooperation is no longer optional. It is becoming strategically necessary, precisely because the two countries operate in different regions but face structurally similar challenges.
Both Canada and South Korea are middle powers whose security and prosperity depend heavily on maritime trade, alliance credibility, and the stability of a rules-based international order. Neither seeks to overturn the existing system, yet both are increasingly exposed to gray-zone coercion, cyber threats, supply-chain disruptions, and the militarization of new domains such as space and the seabed. These shared vulnerabilities create a strong basis for cooperation that is pragmatic rather than ideological. More importantly, they highlight how regional security dynamics have become deeply interconnected. What happens in the Indo-Pacific increasingly affects Canada’s security, just as developments in the Arctic and northern maritime domains shape the broader global balance that matters to South Korea.
This interconnection opens up a particularly important, yet underdeveloped, logic of mutual support. South Korea is well positioned to assist Canada’s growing efforts to contribute to the maintenance of the Indo-Pacific maritime security order. Canada’s Indo-Pacific engagement has increased in recent years, but it remains constrained by distance, limited assets, and competing commitments in Europe and the Arctic. South Korea, by contrast, brings advanced naval capabilities, sustained regional presence, and operational experience in highly contested maritime environments. Cooperation with South Korea can therefore act as a force multiplier for Canada, allowing Ottawa to anchor its Indo-Pacific strategy more firmly in regional realities through joint naval activities, information sharing, and coordination on issues such as sanctions enforcement against North Korea.
At the same time, the logic of support runs in the opposite direction as well. Canada possesses deep expertise in Arctic and northern maritime security, including cold-weather operations, undersea infrastructure protection, maritime governance, and the management of strategic competition in a sensitive and rapidly changing region. As climate change accelerates Arctic accessibility and geopolitical interest, South Korea’s stake in northern security is quietly growing. Seoul depends increasingly on Arctic sea routes, global energy flows, and the stability of northern maritime commons, yet it lacks long-standing operational and governance experience in the region. Canada is therefore uniquely positioned to help South Korea think more systematically about how a non-Arctic state can contribute responsibly to Arctic and northern maritime security without undermining existing governance frameworks or exacerbating regional tensions.
Maritime security emerges naturally as the core pillar of this bilateral relationship. Both countries face threats that fall below the threshold of open conflict, including gray-zone activities, sabotage of undersea cables, and challenges to freedom of navigation. Canada’s participation in UN sanctions enforcement against North Korea demonstrates growing willingness to act, but sustained effectiveness requires close cooperation with capable regional partners. South Korea provides exactly that kind of partnership. Conversely, South Korea’s expanding naval profile and global maritime ambitions would benefit from Canadian perspectives on Arctic operations, maritime domain awareness in extreme environments, and coordination among like-minded states in northern waters. The real value of cooperation lies less in large-scale joint exercises than in interoperability, shared situational awareness, and alignment in niche but strategically significant capabilities.
Despite this strong strategic logic, defense-industrial cooperation remains one of the weakest links in the relationship. This is paradoxical given South Korea’s emergence as a major defense manufacturing power and Canada’s persistent struggles with procurement delays, cost overruns, and limited industrial capacity. In theory, the two economies are complementary: South Korea offers speed, scale, and production efficiency, while Canada brings advanced technologies, Arctic testing environments, and access to North American defense ecosystems. In practice, however, regulatory barriers, political caution, and divergent procurement cultures continue to limit progress. Without a clearer framework for co-development or joint sustainment—particularly in maritime and dual-use technologies—defense-industrial cooperation risks remaining ad hoc and politically sensitive rather than strategically transformative.
There are, of course, real constraints. Canada’s defense resources are stretched across NATO commitments, Arctic security, and domestic priorities, while South Korea cannot afford to dilute its focus on deterrence against North Korea. There is also a risk that bilateral cooperation becomes overly derivative of U.S. strategic priorities rather than grounded in an independent Canada–South Korea logic. Moreover, without institutionalized mechanisms, cooperation may remain episodic and personality-driven, vulnerable to shifts in political attention.
Yet these constraints do not negate the strategic case. On the contrary, they underscore the need for a more focused, realistic approach. Canada–South Korea defense cooperation matters not because the two countries face identical threats, but because they face interconnected ones. South Korea can help Canada become a more credible and effective contributor to Indo-Pacific maritime security, while Canada can help South Korea better understand and engage with emerging Arctic and northern maritime security dynamics. This form of cross-regional complementarity offers a quiet but powerful model of middle-power cooperation—one that does not seek to replicate alliances, but to reinforce global stability through practical, capability-driven partnership in an increasingly complex security environment.
Jihoon Yu is the director of external cooperation and an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.
