For weeks, some external media and advocacy narratives regarding northeastern Syria were dominated by warnings of imminent massacres of ethnic groups and large-scale population displacement. These warnings appeared across Western and regional policy commentary, advocacy reports, and online analysis, framing any change in control as likely to trigger immediate communal violence and large-scale civilian flight.
The current reality, in which the national government in Damascus increasingly exercises operational control, stands in sharp contrast to those predictions. Instead of the anticipated violence and chaos, the region is undergoing a calculated bureaucratic and security transition. Since the formalization of the agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Syrian Internal Security Forces have deployed into the city centers of Qamishli and Hasakah. This deployment marks a visible return of central authority to areas previously under exclusive SDF control.
The trend toward centralization was mirrored on the diplomatic stage at the recent Munich Security Conference. In a significant shift in diplomatic optics, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani was observed in cordial exchanges with SDF Commander Mazlum Abdi and senior official Elham Ahmed, including them in multilateral meetings with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, members of Congress, and Saudi officials. The inclusion does not signal a resurgence of the SDF, which has lost control of roughly 80 percent of its territory and much of its financial base. Rather, it suggests a calibrated political signaling by Damascus and international stakeholders. The objective appears to be the construction of a non-humiliating political off-ramp for the SDF leadership, integrating them into a state-centered framework to preempt any reversion to insurgency.
Consequently, the focus on the ground has moved from military confrontation to the logistics of state restoration. The primary friction points are no longer about frontlines, but administrative mechanics: the transfer of control over Qamishli Airport, the management of the Rumaylan oil fields, and the integration of security personnel into the Ministry of Interior. The rapid collapse of the massacre narrative, contrasted with the quiet entry of police patrols and civil servants, underscores the extent to which the region is pivoting toward a restoration of sovereignty, shaped by demographic constraints that favor the reassertion of a centralized administrative framework.
Divergence on the Integration Process
While the agreement provides a legal framework for de-escalation, the practical phase immediately encountered a fundamental divergence in interpretation. A resistance dynamic has emerged within the YPG leadership, characterized by attempts to reframe the integration deal as merely a temporary ceasefire or a preservation of the status quo. Munich highlighted this friction, where the disparity between optics and substance became apparent. When pressed on their role, Ahmed initially stated they participated as Syrians, only to later add that they represented the SDF and the Autonomous Administration. Similarly, Abdi noted that "Kurds should govern themselves" while notably avoiding explicit references to autonomy or decentralization.
This rhetorical ambiguity presents a functional risk. If the symbolism of diplomatic inclusion runs ahead of the substance of integration, it risks inflating expectations among the SDF’s base. Mismanaged public messaging could reproduce the breakdown seen after the March 10 agreement, potentially leading to renewed escalation. To mitigate this, Damascus appears to be managing resistance through bureaucratic conditionalities. A clear indicator is the status of the new governor of Hasakah. Although the appointment was made based on an SDF nomination, the Syrian government has restricted the position to a caretaker role. By withholding permanent confirmation, the central government retains administrative leverage to ensure the process moves toward full state control rather than a power-sharing arrangement.
Ultimately, the friction centers on the mechanics of military integration. The YPG leadership continues to advocate for bloc integration, which would allow them to preserve their internal command hierarchy within the Syrian army. In contrast, the government is enforcing a protocol of individual integration. This requires SDF members to undergo security vetting by the Ministries of Defense and Interior before being reassigned to one of the three designated brigades or police units. The insistence on individual vetting indicates a state policy designed to dismantle the militia’s organizational cohesion rather than legitimize it.
The Strategic Drawdown of U.S. Forces
Parallel to the administrative transition in Hasakah, significant shifts in the U.S. military posture suggest a structural winding down of the American military role in the Syrian theater. This interpretation gained further support after a subsequent report, citing U.S. officials, indicated that the Trump administration had ordered a complete withdrawal of roughly 1,000 American troops from Syria within two months, suggesting that Washington no longer views a permanent ground presence as necessary. Reports from February 11 also indicated that U.S. forces had initiated a withdrawal from the Al-Tanf garrison, a strategic position located at the intersection of the Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi borders. As the primary coordination center for operations against ISIS in the Syrian desert, the vacating of Al-Tanf suggests that Washington appears less committed to maintaining an indefinite foothold in the country’s south.
These logistical maneuvers align with the diplomatic context observed in Munich. The engagement of U.S. officials with SDF representatives within a framework facilitated by the Syrian Foreign Minister reflects a nuanced policy shift. It suggests that Washington may be incrementally shifting away from the leverage-based strategy often advocated by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and figures like Senator Lindsey Graham, and toward a model more consistent with the views of Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, who has emphasized the viability of a unified Syria. The diplomatic courtesy extended in Munich does not appear to be a renewal of strategic partnership with a non-state actor, but rather a component of a state-centered controlled dissolution strategy.
By dismantling outposts and facilitating diplomatic integration, Washington is effectively closing the chapter on regime change or nation-building via sub-state actors. While unaccompanied by high-profile announcements, the situation on the ground amounts to a de-facto retrenchment, less a sudden reversal than a geopolitical correction, which aligns U.S. interests with the reality that the central state is returning to the northeast.
Israel Adapts to a Centralized Syria
Israel’s post-Assad strategy, which had benefited from a fragmented Syrian landscape, specifically through leverage in the northeast and support for Druze autonomy in Suwayda, has faced a strategic reversal. The collapse of the SDF’s autonomous project in the northeast has removed a critical pillar of this policy, compelling the Jewish State to recalibrate its approach toward the central government in Damascus.
This shift is being accelerated by direct pressure from the United States. According to reports surfacing on February 11, President Trump explicitly informed Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa that he has given Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a one-month timeline to finalize a comprehensive security agreement with Syria. The U.S. administration has articulated a clear preference for a unified country rather than multiple fragmented zones, signaling a reduced tolerance for strategies that perpetuate fragmentation.
For Israel, this presents a complex paradox. While a consolidated Syrian state was initially viewed as a threat, a functioning government in Damascus offers a single, deterrable counterpart responsible for border security, in contrast to the unpredictability of non-state actors or gray zones. Reports indicate that significant progress has already been made in negotiations regarding a security mechanism and de-escalation protocols. However, a major technical obstacle remains regarding the status of Mount Hermon (Jabal al-Sheikh), where conflicting security requirements continue to delay a final settlement.
More broadly, the resolution of this specific dispute will serve as an early test for the entire stabilization process. Competing expectations still persist among regional and international actors, ranging from assumptions of enduring Kurdish autonomy and prolonged U.S. military involvement to skepticism that Damascus can fully reassert centralized authority across the northeast. Whether Syria’s re-centralization succeeds will depend on if diplomatic alignments can be translated into durable security arrangements on the ground, keeping symbolism, bureaucracy, and security realities aligned.
Deniz Karakullukcu works as a foreign policy and security advisor at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM).
