In the days following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, President Trump reiterated his prediction that the communist regime in Cuba, in power since 1959, would “fall pretty soon.” He also took full credit for the regime’s impending downfall while praising his January 3 operation in Venezuela and promising a quick victory in Iran.
Washington’s true goals in Cuba remain unclear. However, the administration’s increasing infatuation with regime change could spark a serious regional crisis.
Trump has recognized that “bad things [could] happen” if Washington moves too quickly against Cuba, and he has so far avoided military options, while suggesting leveraging Cuba’s economic struggles to pursue a “friendly takeover.” Similarly, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is handling the talks, said Washington did not expect Havana “to change all at once.” Rumors of an economic deal have intensified.
Yet Washington’s interventions in Venezuela and Iran have emboldened many Cuban Americans and exiled Cubans to call for an attack designed to topple the regime in Havana. Some even obtained weapons for a “counter-revolution” and carried out a raid on the Cuban Coast Guard, reportedly for “infiltration” purposes.
According to some reports, Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, a long-standing critic of appeasement, and a politician loyal to his South Florida base, has delayed negotiations.
President Trump continues to describe Havana as a “bad regime that’s been bad for a long time” and has instructed his administration to prepare potential criminal charges against Havana’s leaders.
U.S. pressure now builds upon its 66-year-old embargo. Its coup against Venezuela ended Cuba’s “Bolivarian brotherhood,” thus jeopardizing its energy security, financial stability, and diplomatic influence.
Following a January 29 executive order that labeled Havana an “extraordinary threat” because of its harboring of foreign agents and terrorists, Trump enforced a total fuel embargo on the island and threatened tariffs on any state that would bypass it.
Although Washington has authorized limited resupply by private companies and $6 million in humanitarian aid, Cuba’s reserves are on track to be exhausted before late March.
As such, the U.S. continues to pressure the Cuban people to change their regime. Its blockade, which occurs as Cuba experiences its worst economic crisis ever, with a 10% GDP decline over the past five years, severe shortages of food, medicine, and electricity, and an 89% extreme poverty rate, could result in the death of thousands of civilians.
This approach is controversial on the global stage, as demonstrated by the UN General Assembly’s 165-to-7 vote against Washington’s embargo in 2025 and a UN expert panel’s condemnation of Trump’s blockade as “an extreme form of unilateral economic coercion.”
U.S. security concerns regarding the weak regime in Havana are overstated. The Pentagon has called Cuba a “proximate location for [adversaries’] intelligence gathering and force projection.” However, while not entirely untrue, those connections mostly originate from Washington’s aggressiveness and remain limited, considering Washington’s regional dominance and Cuba’s distance from Russia and China.
Similarly, Havana has no connections to terrorist groups but a proven history of working with Washington against terrorism and drug trafficking.
U.S. hopes of regime change are misguided. Sanctions rarely achieve such results. In that light, Cuba has consistently disappointed Washington, even after the Cold War ended and Fidel Castro passed away.
Despite its unpopularity, corruption, and incompetence, Havana maintains a loyal military and a powerful “party-state bureaucracy” unified through decades of ideological resistance to the U.S. and shared control over Cuba’s key economic sectors.
Most importantly, forcing regime change upon Cuba remains undesirable. The exodus of 2 to 3 million people since 1959 has left Cuba with a small, fragmented political opposition. Its diaspora is also divided. Therefore, Washington likely has no proxy to collaborate with who will be able to muster legitimacy on the island.
Regime change could worsen Cuba’s demographic and socio-economic divisions, especially if there is a sudden influx of exiles. New leaders would find it difficult to replace the regime’s food supply, medical care, and energy distribution.
Clashes might occur between regime supporters and victims. This chaos could favor drug traffickers and criminal groups or lead to a military takeover.
In a worst-case scenario, Washington could become entangled. For instance, a desperate Havana might create a crisis involving U.S. troops at Guantanamo Bay for nationalist reasons. Local unrest could cause many Cuban Americans to die in the fighting. Washington might also be tempted to intervene out of fear of refugee flows or to portray itself as Cuba's liberator.
However, many Cubans might resent that decision, considering the parallels with the U.S. intervention in 1898 during their war of independence against Spain, which marked the start of decades of American dominance, which gave birth to frustrations that culminated in the communist revolution of 1959.
Instead of chasing regime-change illusions, Washington should pursue diplomacy. Economic engagement and immunity for Havana’s leaders could help the U.S. weaken Russia and China, promote trade and investment, and access Cuba’s large cobalt and nickel reserves, all while maintaining stability and gradually promoting political liberalization.
Thomas P. Cavanna is a Non-Resident Fellow at Defense Priorities
