It hasn't received much attention outside of the defense industry, but the executive order President Trump signed in February establishing the America First Arms Transfer Strategy has ushered in some profound changes in U.S. priorities.
The order reframes U.S. arms transfers as an instrument of industrial policy. Namely, it outlines using foreign purchases to rebuild domestic production capacity, prioritizes the platforms most critical to the U.S. National Security Strategy, and rewards partners who invest in their own defense. Applied to the Indo-Pacific, this framework shows India as an ideal defense partner under this defense strategy.
What the EO Does
The America First Arms Transfer Strategy is primarily an industrial directive. Its first objective is to use foreign arms sales to build production capacity for weapons that the Secretary of War determines most operationally relevant to executing the U.S. National Security Strategy. Practically, this is akin to how many production lines function or plan by building a catalogue of the most critical weapon systems and platforms that need to be prioritized.
The second objective is to use foreign capital to support domestic reindustrialization. This largely translates into foreign partners investing in the United States, which helps the country to expand production lines and improve supply chain resilience. Related to this, the strategy also wants to incentivize nontraditional defense companies to enter the industrial base.
The third objective follows directly from the second: arms transfers must reinforce U.S. acquisition and sustainment activities, building supply chain resilience without adding to backlogs on priority components that affect American or partner readiness. The logic is disciplined and focused on the fact that foreign sales should strengthen the industrial base, not strain it.
Partner prioritization comes fourth in the order's stated objectives, but it is the criterion that carries the most strategic weight: the U.S. will prioritize transfers to partners that have invested in their own defense, occupy critical geography in U.S. plans and operations, or contribute to American economic security.
The strategy also aims to address issues of delayed deliveries. The previous partner-first approach resulted in production backlogs, cost overruns, and years-long delivery delays as orders were mismatched to production capabilities. Within 120 days, the Secretary of War is directed to submit a sales catalog of prioritized platforms, the systems the U.S. wants to produce at scale and wants allies to buy. This is supply-driven, not demand-driven. Washington decides what it needs to manufacture and then identifies buyers who advance that goal. A Promoting American Military Sales Task Force will oversee implementation and publish quarterly performance metrics. The old model let partner demand shape U.S. sales. This one inverts it, basing the catalog on platforms most critical to U.S. operational requirements.
Where India Fits In
India meets the EO's criteria across the board and does so without U.S. military aid or a formal alliance obligation.
The 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly calls for a readjustment of global military presence toward the Western Hemisphere. It still maintains that the Indo-Pacific remains a critical theater but with a clear condition: regional partners must step up. As the NSS states, allies must "spend — and more importantly do — much more for collective defense." The strategy commits to keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open but places the burden of that commitment increasingly on capable partners in the region. India, often regarded as a net security provider in the region, is the kind of partner this logic demands.
On the industrial logic, India is not simply a buyer anymore as its own defense ecosystem matures. Today, Indian conglomerates are actively investing in U.S. industrial capacity. JSW Steel revived a steel mill in Mingo Junction, Ohio, originally built in 1872 and idle for nearly a decade, by investing over $80 million to restart operations, creating jobs and producing steel that qualifies under Buy America requirements.
Reliance Industries recently committed to backing the first major oil refinery to be built in the United States in nearly 50 years, at the Port of Brownsville, Texas. Bharat Forge, a major exporter of 155mm artillery shell bodies, has signed agreements with U.S. defense companies AM General and Mandus Group to co-develop next-generation artillery platforms, and is also investing in North Carolina in manufacturing aluminum forgings.
Indian defense and space startups increasingly treat the U.S. not just as a market but as a place to put down roots. Digantara, a Bengaluru-based space surveillance startup, opened an office in Colorado Springs, secured contracts with U.S. Space Command, and was selected for the Missile Defense Agency's SHIELD contract vehicle. NewSpace Research and Technologies has signed research agreements with both the U.S. Air Force Research Lab and the U.S. Army Research Laboratory.
This investment flow within the United States and U.S. supply chains reflects a deliberate alignment of interests. Further, India's own Atmanirbhar Bharat policy, which prioritizes self-reliance in defense production, means India prioritizes collaboration through co-development and co-production, localizing supply chains within its own industrial base wherever possible rather than drawing from U.S. production capacity. That is precisely what the EO's third objective calls for - arms transfers that reinforce acquisition and sustainment without straining existing supply chains.
But it’s on the fourth criterion where India truly shines. India is a serious military power with U.S. platforms already deeply integrated into its force structure, and it funds all of it independently. Ranked 4th globally by the 2026 Global Firepower Index, India maintains the world's second-largest standing army and operates a fleet of U.S.-origin systems including P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, Chinook and Apache helicopters, GE jet engines, and more. None of it came through U.S. aid or charity. India pays for its own defense, just as the EO envisions a partner doing.
Geography makes the case further. India sits at the center of the Indian Ocean, flanks the Strait of Malacca, and shares a contested land border with China. In February 2026, the Indian Coast Guard, in what was its first-ever such operation,intercepted three U.S.-sanctioned, Iran-linked tankers approximately 100 nautical miles west of Mumbai, dismantling an international oil smuggling network operating in its exclusive economic zone. It was an unsolicited act of enforcement that aligned directly with U.S. sanctions policy.
The America First Arms Transfer Strategy rewards partners that fund their own defense, buy the platforms Washington needs to produce at scale, and hold critical ground in the Indo-Pacific. India meets all three criteria; on its own terms, through its own investment, and with a geographic position no other partner can replicate. The strategic case for deepening U.S.-India defense cooperation was already strong. The EO makes it a matter of stated U.S. policy.
Kriti Upadhyaya is a Visiting Fellow for India Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
