For the first time in nearly ten years, U.S. and Chinese leaders will meet in Beijing this week to discuss trade, Taiwan, and the war in Iran, among other issues. The timing is awkward: already postponed once, the summit takes place amid a stalled-out war with Iran while the fragile ceasefire is in danger of collapsing.
China feels confident going into the meeting, and with good reason: despite a somewhat weak macroeconomic outlook, the country has made huge progress in tech sectors since President Trump’s last visit in 2017, particularly in AI and electric vehicles. It has successfully leveraged control over rare earths to deflect U.S. tariff pressure and has enhanced bilateral relationships with other Western countries as they seek alternatives to a Washington that is perceived as unreliable. Moreover, conflict in Iran has distracted U.S. strategic focus from Taiwan and tied up munitions that could have been used for deterrence in Asia. These wins will likely be at the forefront of Chinese leaders’ minds as they press Washington for concessions .
Given this environment, Washington will need to prioritize its asks, which likely means avoiding sticking points related to the Iran war. Specifically, it should refrain from sanctioning Chinese oil refineries and pressuring Beijing for assistance in reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
U.S. sanctions on China’s small “teapot” refineries have been ineffective in stemming Chinese purchases of Iranian oil, while unclear messaging on responsibility for opening the strait creates confusion and projects weakness abroad. The upcoming summit may set the tone for bilateral relations between the superpowers for years to come, including on more perennial issues like Taiwan. Refraining from demands vis-à-vis Chinese involvement in Iran may help Washington retain leverage in some of these other, more long-standing strategic areas.
In late April, the United States levied sanctions against a Chinese refinery that was one of Iran’s largest buyers of crude oil and petroleum products, claiming that the purchases funded state-sponsored terrorism by sustaining Iran’s economy.
The reality is more complicated.
Recent analysis indicates that Chinese oil imports have actually declined by about 25 percent from prewar levels, reducing global demand and serving to stabilize oil markets and the global economy under conditions that would otherwise threaten extreme volatility.
While this phenomenon is not fully understood and may be unsustainable over the long run, it calls into question the need for sanctions, to say nothing of their efficacy. China has already directed its companies not to comply with the sanctions, invoking a 2021 blocking measure against foreign laws perceived to unfairly restrict trade. This open flouting of U.S. attempts at economic coercion, combined with Washington’s inflammatory rhetoric around terrorism sponsorship, sets a disagreeable tone ahead of the meeting for both sides.
Pressure on China regarding the Strait of Hormuz is also unlikely to be effective and creates poor optics.
U.S. messaging around the strait and responsibility for opening it has been unclear, with policymakers claiming that the United States has “absolute control of the strait” while asking China to “step up with some diplomacy and get the Iranians to open the strait.” This unclear messaging creates confusion domestically and projects weakness abroad by creating the perception that United States is appealing to a rival for assistance. It helps to confer legitimacy on China as a mediator and power broker, and it raises further uncomfortable questions for U.S. policymakers around a conflict whose strategy and objectives have been called into question from the start.
Reopening the strait is in everyone’s interest, including Beijing’s, and Washington could and should leverage this reality to solicit cooperation from Beijing. However, framing matters. By setting up cooperation as a very public, strident demand, Washington is likely to induce reluctance in Beijing, which doesn’t want to be seen as capitulating to U.S. interests. This reluctance, in turn, reflects poorly on Washington’s capacity for influence and threatens to distract from other issues. Cooperation on reopening the strait should be handled more privately to allow both countries to maintain credibility at home and abroad.
This week’s meeting between the superpowers is already fraught. Avoiding or reframing some of the more acute issues surrounding the Iran war would allow negotiators to avoid flashpoints and deliberate on longer-standing trade and defense issues, giving both sides the chance to walk out with some wins.
Sarah Dimichino holds an M.A. from Seton Hall University's School of Diplomacy and International Relations and was a 2025 Harold W. Rosenthal Fellow.
