One of President Donald Trump’s first actions in his second term was an executive order calling for a review of all international organizations to which the United States belongs or provides funding. While there have been some decisions resulting from this order, overall, it has been slow, incomplete, and inconclusive. Overall, the opacity and delay have undermined U.S. influence. The International Labor Organization (ILO), which concluded its annual member state meeting last week, is a case in point.
The ILO is not among the most well-known United Nations organizations. Nor is it among the most important in terms of U.S. national interests.
The ILO was founded in 1919 under the defunct League of Nations to promote the welfare and rights of workers and to promulgate international labor standards, including maximum hours, workplace injuries, and unemployment compensation. This may not seem like radical stuff today, but it was at the time. Even today, however, ILO scrutiny can convince governments to improve labor standards and rights.
But in countries like the U.S. with strong labor laws and mechanisms to enforce them, the ILO is largely superfluous. Even though the U.S. has ratified only 14 ILO conventions, of which 10 are in force, confidence in U.S. labor protections is strong – contributing to the declining trend of private sector unionization in America.
Where the ILO is useful for the U.S. is incorporating its conventions into trade agreements with other countries that can be reluctant to abide by U.S. labor standards but are much more open to adopting “international” standards. More broadly, U.S. businesses benefit from ILO standards because they establish a floor, preventing a race to the bottom. The ILO can also be useful in exposing labor abuses in countries such as China. For instance, a 2026 ILO report strongly criticized China and called on it to “immediately cease any discriminatory practices, including racial harassment, against the Uyghur population and any other ethnic minority groups” and notes evidence of “coercive labour-transfer programmes in both Xinjiang and Tibet” and “that persons who decline to participate in labour-transfer programmes generally risk being sent to detention camps.”
These criticisms are more forceful than China generally receives from UN organizations and are embarrassing for Beijing. This frankness is possible due to the unique structure of the ILO that grants voting power to businesses and labor organizations in addition to governments. These non-governmental voices bring more focused attention to labor policy and less concern over broader diplomatic niceties.
On balance, the ILO is useful to the U.S., but not vital – particularly from a domestic policy perspective. The limited value is why President Jimmy Carter was willing to withdraw from the ILO over its bias and politicization in the 1970s. But the occasional usefulness was also why President Ronald Reagan rejoined the ILO after U.S. complaints were resolved.
Which brings us to President Trump.
Along with nearly 200 other international organizations, the ILO was subject to the executive order to review U.S. participation in international organizations.
Over the course of 2025, the President announced that the U.S. would withdraw from, cease funding, and end cooperation with a handful of international organizations on an ad hoc basis. But the review failed to meet its August deadline, leaving scores of international organizations uncertain about whether the U.S. would remain a member or continue funding.
In January 2026, the White House belatedly released a list of 66 international entities that the U.S. would withdraw from and no longer fund. But the ILO and many other major international organizations were not included in this list. They remain in limbo, not knowing whether the U.S. will continue to participate in or provide funding to them.
This indecision has negatively impacted U.S. influence, including at the ILO.
The U.S. has traditionally held the position of Deputy Director General at the ILO. Last year, the U.S. approached the ILO Director General about replacing Celeste Drake, who was previously an advisor to President Biden, with Nels Nordquist who had served on President Trump’s National Economic Council. The U.S. also asked the ILO to revert to prior practice of having the policy departments report to the Deputy Director General rather than directly to the Director General.
Taking this as a signal that the U.S. wished to remain engaged with the ILO, the reorganization was approved and Nordquist was set for appointment. The U.S. State Department also notified Congress of its intent to pay $50 million in arrears to the ILO.
Despite some in the administration in favor of continued ILO engagement, the U.S. never publicly stated that it would remain an ILO member state. Nor did the administration convincingly articulate to Congress its rationale for the payment.
Without these commitments, the appointment dragged and eventually Nordquist pulled out. The U.S. proffered Sheng Li to replace him and the ILO announced his appointment in April believing the U.S. would pay $50 million in arrears. But the appointment was rescinded this month ahead of the annual International Labour Conference because the U.S. payment did not materialize.
At the conference, the ILO was weighing a new Convention on Decent Work in the Platform Economy. Even if the U.S. is unlikely to ratify a new convention, U.S. businesses can be impacted when ILO conventions are adopted by other countries where U.S. businesses operate. Because of this, the U.S. will generally seek to positively influence the negotiations even if it is unlikely to ratify the convention. This past week, the U.S. voice was weaker because of uncertainty over U.S. commitment to the ILO and America ended up being in the small minority (406-8, with 36 abstentions) voting against the convention.
Does the U.S. want to maintain membership in the ILO? It seems so since the U.S. has sought the Deputy position. But the administration failed to do the basic work to facilitate that goal, such as announcing that the U.S. would remain a member or working with Congress to explain the rationale for funding.
Unfortunately, because the U.S. failed to act earlier, the situation now looks as if the ILO is issuing an ultimatum. Regardless of reality, the U.S. cannot yield to this perception, or it will lose leverage with other organizations.
This situation is self-inflicted. The failure of the U.S. to take a position on the ILO and other major international organizations over the past year is an indictment of U.S. policy, coordination, communications, and decision-making regarding U.S. participation in international organizations.
Brett D. Schaefer is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he focuses on multilateral treaties, peacekeeping, and the United Nations and international organizations. He was a member of the United Nations Committee on Contributions and an expert on the UN Task Force for the United States Institute of Peace before joining AEI.
