The memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran has drawn fierce criticism, some of it political and some of it overstated. It is, after all, only a framework document, not a final agreement. But the initial rounds of talks show that Tehran reads the MOU much differently than Washington. From Iran’s perspective, the MOU grants them leverage, legitimacy, money, time and veto points — while taking key American tools off the table.
The pattern that emerges from a close reading of the fourteen points is striking. Nearly every provision can be interpreted in a way that grants Iran immediate benefits or protections, while most of the obligations imposed on Tehran are deferred, conditional, or dependent on future negotiations.
Point 1 establishes the ceasefire, and includes three mentions of Lebanon. But when Iran says Lebanon it means Hezbollah. This provision is an attempt both to save its terrorist proxy and to derail the separate ongoing peace process between Israel and Lebanon. It also drives a wedge between Israel and the United States by holding Washington responsible for Israel’s actions. But as President Trump points out it is a two-way street; Iran must also restrain Hezbollah.
Point 2 says that the US and Iran will “refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs.” In practice, this means Washington is not to encourage regime change or openly support a popular uprising—something Tehran evidently fears, or it would not occupy the second point of the agreement.
Point 3 sets the 60-day negotiation timeline which is purely aspirational. Iran will draw things out then make a last-minute proposal tilting highly in their favor. But as gas prices reset (they have already been falling for a month) the political pressure to reach a deal diminishes, so US negotiators should just take their time. Better to extend the deadline than sign a bad deal.
Point 4 lifts the American blockade and commits the US to “remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Note that Iran defines “proximity” as the entire Persian Gulf region.
In Point 5 Iran opens the Strait of Hormuz, but only for 60 days. But Iran is not giving up its claim to control the Strait, and the MOU establishes a process for Iran and Oman to conduct bilateral negotiations over how to administer the Strait and collect future fees. These talks have already begun. President Trump shot back that maybe the US would be the future toll collector.
Point 6 establishes the controversial $300 billion reconstruction fund. President Trump has said repeatedly this will not involve US funds, and it is curious why it is even in the MOU. This investment structure does not deny Tehran the ability to cause problems. Given that money is fungible, every foreign dollar invested in rebuilding Iranian infrastructure frees funds that can be redirected into missile programs, proxy forces, and military reconstruction.
Point 7 terminates all US sanctions, which has been a dream of the Islamic Republic for decades. Implementing this will be difficult because it requires Congressional action, and it is doubtful the president could get the votes. Perhaps the Iranians don’t understand this aspect of US law, since President Obama was willing to suspend sanctions using a temporary loophole. President Trump will not.
We don’t reach the nuclear program until Point 8, where Iran says it won’t obtain nuclear weapons. All well and good. But the MOU directly ties Iranian compliance on handing over enriched uranium to US lifting of sanctions. This is a significant concession since previously the White House simply demanded Iran give up the uranium. The Iranians are certain to note this when the uranium topic comes up.
Point 9 forbids the United States from any military buildup while the talks are ongoing, or to impose new sanctions or use economic pressure. This neutralizes many of the tools—military, economic, and diplomatic—that Washington would ordinarily use to strengthen its hand during negotiations. President Trump has basically ignored this provision, and rightly so.
Point 10 is an extension of point seven, that gives Iran immediate sanctions relief in the form of waivers for the export of crude oil. This has already been implemented, though the US gets nothing in return.
Point 11 unfreezes Iranian assets, something previous administrations consistently withheld until substantial concessions had been secured. Here, Tehran appears to receive the money upfront. However one possible benefit of this approach is that the billions of dollars in civil judgments against Iran under the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) may finally be paid to victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism.
Point 12 states that a mechanism will be created to ensure implementation and compliance for this and future deals. History suggests that Tehran will test and ultimately violate any agreement that it finds inconvenient. Unless the enforcement mechanism includes an explicit and credible threat of force, compliance provisions will amount to little more than aspirations. Iran is already pushing back against IAEA inspections.
Point 13 tells us that Iran will not begin serious negotiations until points 1 (Lebanon), 4 (blockade), 5 (opening Hormuz), 10 (oil waivers) and 11 (unfreezing assets) are already implemented. It further states that the talks will deal exclusively with the other paragraphs of the MOU, and nothing else. So, no limits on missiles and drones, no ending support for terrorism, nothing about the human rights of the Iranian people or any other and other matters of concern to the United States will be allowed. Secretary of State Rubio has pushed back against this reading, but Iran is not budging.
Finally, Point 14 says that the final deal will be endorsed by a binding United Nations Security Council resolution. This effectively grants Russia and China leverage over the future implementation of any accord, since they have veto power on the Council.
The bottom line is that by Tehran’s reading of the MOU framework, Iran gives up almost nothing it cannot later reclaim, while the United States surrenders critical leverage it may never get back. Tehran gets time, cash, oil revenue, sanctions relief, diplomatic legitimacy, protection from pressure, and a narrowed agenda that excludes terrorism, missiles, drones and human rights. Washington gets mere promises from a regime whose foreign policy is built on breaking them. It will take longer than 60 days to untangle this mess.
James S. Robbins is Senior Vice President of Research and Business Development at the Institute of World Politics and former special assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
