To hear President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio discuss Venezuela one would almost think that they were talking about two different countries.
When Trump has discussed developments in the seven months since U.S. forces seized Nicolas Maduro he has been almost giddy with delight. When he last spoke about Venezuela he proclaimed that Delcy Rodriguez, whom he had handpicked to serve as Maduro’s successor, was “doing a great job” and that the country was now “incredibly successful.”
The metric he used to define this success was simple—the amount of oil “going to Houston and Louisiana…. (that has) “paid for the war many times over.” He noted that “they’re taking in billions of dollars selling millions of barrels of oil, and they’re getting some and we’re getting some and everyone is making a lot.”
When pressed on when elections would be held, Trump merely responded that “they’re not ready…. At some point they will be… and we’re going to be standing right on top of it.”
Rubio by contrast has been at least prepared to discuss the need for concrete steps towards a democratic government and has avoided Trump’s gushing praise of Rodriguez, while lauding U.S. efforts thus far “to improve the daily lives of Venezuelans.”
In a recent interview he somberly highlighted “the work that has to happen to lay the groundwork for an election,” stressing “true freedom of the press…,” “multi-party participation…,” “national reconciliation…,” (and) an electoral commission that will accurately count the votes.” While not setting a specific date, he asserted that the process will require “a little patience, not years, but certainly months and weeks.”
Trump’s oil-based happy talk about Venezuela has an element of truth—production has increased from 800,000 to 1,200,000 barrels per day. But his optimism about the prospects for Venezuela’s oil may be overblown with production still less at than half of its peak level.
And while the legal framework for foreign oil investment has been revised, with Venezuela’s political future still uncertain, international oil companies remain skittish about writing the huge checks that would underwrite a full revival of the sector.
Rubio seems to have a clearer grasp of the steps needed to move forward. But he may be lowballing the difficulties ahead when he describes the U.S. role merely as that of a “facilitator” of a process to take place among Venezuelans.
Negotiations are about to begin between the governing regime and a group of opposition figures, led by Dinorah Figuera, former head of the last Venezuelan National Assembly which can claim democratic legitimacy (subsequent ones having been chosen in rigged elections).
Figuera has been “invited” by the U.S. government to take on this role. But many opposition elements, notably those led by Maria Corina Machado, the country’s most popular political figure, are not included in the talks, and will be watching closely to see whether they bear fruit.
There is reason for skepticism as under both Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro multiple dialogues took place, only to founder in the face of the regime’s refusal to put its hold on power at any risk. Should this pattern be repeated, Trump and Rubio will face the question of whether they are prepared to use U.S. control over Venezuelan oil to force Rodriguez to agree to a genuine democratic transition.
The two come from different places on Venezuela. For Trump the “perfectly executed” operation which seized Maduro was a demonstration of his bold leadership, and he clearly relishes Rodriguez’s compliant attitude on leaving the United States in charge of Venezuela’s oil exports.
For him, Venezuela was and must remain a “success,” especially as any final outcome in Iran, his other, far bigger foreign adventure, is likely to fall farn short of his initial hopes. Success would mean maintaining Venezuela’s current fragile stability at least through to the end of his term, and if the price is that the democratic transition fades into the indefinite future, it is one that he is likely prepared to pay.
However, Rubio’s calculus must inevitably be different. He is intimately involved in managing the de facto protectorate over Venezuela (while remaining strangely distant from other front burner issues such as Ukraine and Iran). With deep experience on Latin American issues, he doubtless recognizes the risk that ignoring the popular desire for genuine change could well lead not to stability but to an explosion of protest.
Also, for him Cuba, not Venezuela, is the ultimate prize—one which has already been identified by the administration as the target of some yet to be determined action. Rubio’s roots are in South Florida’s Cuban exile political community for which any deal like the one Trump may be content to impose on Venezuela—an economic opening managed by the existing regime under American tutelage—is not likely to be remotely acceptable.
Any Presidential ambitions which Rubio may have will depend on staying in the good graces of Trump who seems enamored of Rodriguez and content with the status quo in Venezuela. But at the same time he may face opposition pressure for him to use American oil leverage to guarantee a real transition rather than to accept vague promises.
With negotiations between the governing regime and elements of the opposition getting underway, the clock is beginning to tick on what could be tough decisions for both Trump and Rubio.
Richard M. Sanders is Senior Fellow, Western Hemisphere at the Center for the National Interest. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he served at embassies throughout Latin America, including in Venezuela, and in positions in Washington dealing with the region.
