As the war with Iran enters its sixth month, it’s impossible to ignore all the ironies associated with the Trump administration’s ill-advised decision to initiate hostilities against a country that wasn’t poised to attack the United States or undermine U.S. national security.
Much of the current focus is on re-opening the Strait of Hormuz through which about one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas ordinarily flows. Closure of the strait has driven up the price of fuel and basic goods, both in the U.S. and around the world. The irony is that the Strait of Hormuz was open before the U.S. decided to attack Iran and there were no indications that Iran had intentions to close the strait. Closing the strait was always a lever that Iran could pull, but Tehran had no incentive to do so since it would have adverse effects on its own economy.
Since launching the war, President Trump has threatened to "completely decimate and destroy" or "annihilate" Iran on several occasions, giving the regime in Tehran a strong incentive to endure any pain caused by closing the Strait of Hormuz.
Moreover, closing the Strait of Hormuz was completely predictable since almost all analysts and military planners previously raised the chokepoint’s vulnerability in assessing the costs and benefits of a war with Iran.
Iran’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz is a signal to other players. The Houthis in Yemen are now more emboldened to attack shipping in the Red Sea, where nearly 15% of global sea trade moves through, creating the prospect of further disruption within the global economy.
At least one stated objective of the war has been to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and it’s fair to say that Iran’s nuclear program was viewed as a source of leverage. The ironies are several. To begin, there was a nuclear deal with Iran (however imperfect) in place that President Trump withdrew from during his first term. That deal didn’t absolutely prevent Iran from having a program that could ultimately result in a nuclear weapon, but the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) put restrictions on Iran's uranium enrichment capacity, stockpile, and centrifuge usage and allowed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors unprecedented access to Iran’s nuclear activities. Scrapping the deal meant that Iran had the better part of a decade to continue their nuclear ambitions.
Against that backdrop, in June 2025, the Trump administration launched Operation Midnight Hammer, striking Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Afterwards, Trump declared that Iran’s nuclear program was "completely and totally obliterated." But despite that declaration, the administration launched Operation Epic Fury in February 2026 with one of the reasons being to “ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon.”
Iran’s nuclear program has been significantly degraded by Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Epic Fury. But it is impossible to know with any certainty that is completely destroyed and unable to be revived. In particular, the IAEA had previously estimated that Iran had amassed 400 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, which is more than what’s needed for a peaceful civilian nuclear energy program. Prior to Operation Midnight Hammer, that enriched uranium was believed to be stored at Fordow and Isfahan but has since gone missing. The IAEA has no knowledge of the enriched uranium’s whereabouts, but many believe it may be at Pickaxe Mountain, an even deeper underground facility. Whatever its location, the 400 kilograms of enriched uranium is believed to be sufficient to produce up to 10 nuclear weapons if further enriched to weapons-grade levels.
Finally, the ultimate irony is that unnecessary military action against Iran actually gives Tehran even more incentive for a nuclear weapon as a way to ward off regime change. The mullahs have seen what has happened to countries like Iraq and Libya – both of which did not have nuclear weapons. They also know that North Korea – a country characterized by the U.S. as a threat believed to have 50 nuclear weapons and the ability to produce up to 90 more – has not been the object of regime change. And notably, it hasn’t attacked the United States.
Given that the U.S. is unlikely to achieve two of its stated goals (regime change and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon), what is a path forward? Recognizing that the war was a mistake is a good first step. Acknowledging that – however odious the regime in Tehran is – Iran is not an existential threat to U.S. national security is also important. Doing so is an understanding that continued conflict is not a productive option, opens the aperture to other possibilities, and acceptance of realistic – even if less than perfect – outcomes that do not diminish U.S. national security.
With no boots on the ground, it becomes “easy” for the U.S. to simply cease hostilities. Instead of military conflict to eliminate a threat, containment and diplomatic engagement – along with our European allies and nations in the region – to manage the threat is a better choice. It is, after all, how the U.S. confronted the Soviet threat during the Cold War and led to the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Charles V. Peña is a Non-Resident Fellow with Defense Priorities. He has more than 30 years of experience as a policy and program analyst and senior manager, supporting both the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Peña is the former Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, a former Senior Fellow at The Independent Institute and George Washington University Homeland Security Institute, and author of Winning the Un—War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism.
Comment
Show comments
Hide Comments
