Change in the Caspian and Near East
The Turkish government has launched an "all-track" offensive that unites track-one diplomacy -- official actions to resolve conflicts, with track-two -- unofficial efforts by nongovernmental professionals to find peace, in order to find a solution agreeable to all sides to ensure its powder keg of a neighborhood does not explode.
The 'all-track' offensive comes in response to the war in the Caucasus, and the development that Iran is facing new sanctions due to its refusal to cooperate with the United Nations regarding its nuclear energy program.
Part of Turkish Prime Minister Recept Tayyip Erdogan's plan is to reach out to all countries in the region in an attempt to find common ground. When this common ground is fully developed, he wants them to work with each other to establish a mechanism to tackle common security, both economic security and energy security in the Caucasus.
His first step was Wednesday's visit to Moscow, then a stop on Thursday to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi.
While Erdogan was meeting with Saakashvili, Turkey's President Abdullah Gül was talking to yet another major regional player; Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, president of Iran. Erdogan will also meet with Ahmadinejad later this week.
Although Israel and the United States have criticized the Turkish government for inviting Ahmadinejad to Turkey, the Turks were right to do so; from their perspective, that is. There are three major powers in the region; Russia, Iran, and Turkey. All of these powers oppose each other, and at the same time, rely on each other for one thing or another.
If Turkey and other countries have learned one thing in recent days it is that they should not be dependent on Russia. This is especially important for Turkey when it comes to energy. Turkey has to import most of its energy. When it does, it can only choose between a couple of countries. Although Iran's regime wishes to export a radical message, it poses less of an immediate expansionist threat than that of the Russian Federation. Finding regional friends outside of Moscow thus takes precedence.
Furthermore, although Turkey has the second largest army in NATO, it is not sure that NATO will act if war breaks out in the region. NATO is, according to its charter, forced to react when one of its members is attacked, but the recent conflict in Georgia and the reaction of the West has given many in the region the impression that NATO is not willing to do what it was once created for: Protecting its members against Russian imperialism.
Lastly it has to be pointed out that Turkey wants to become more than just a regional power; it wants to become a regional and world leader. It has started negotiations between Israel and Syria, and is now looking to assist in the diplomatic process in other neighboring countries. Leading an effort that could decrease regional tensions would do a lot to improve Turkey's image in this regard.
Whether the West likes it or not, a lot is changing in the region. Russia seems to resemble the former Soviet Union, while Iran and Turkey are trying to become major and active regional players. On top of that, former Soviet Republics are asking themselves what they want to do, and what they want to become. Do they want to have a better relationship with Russia, or with Iran? With Turkey or with the United States? Or with all? Is their future with the West, or with the regional powers to the East?
Transformation has come rapidly for the Near East. Recent developments show that the leaders in the region are aware of this fact and are trying to deal with it the best way they can. They adapt, and when necessary, they take new steps. Steps the West may not appreciate, but steps that make sense if they wish to be relevant actors in the region.
