Russian Threat or Cold-War Nostalgia?
Reaction to the Georgian crisis has raised the specter of a return to the Cold War.
Some argue that Georgia’s impulsive young president, Mikheil Saakashvili, clearly made a serious miscalculation about Western support for him and his regime.
Others believe Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was merely waiting for a pretext to demonstrate Russia’s new self-confidence by reasserting its traditional sphere of influence in what Russians call the “near abroad.”
The European Union has been rhetorically critical of the Russian invasion, but tepid in specifics. Clearly, Europe’s energy dependence on Russia drives its mildly scolding approach. The most vocal countries among the EU-27 were the former Soviet satellites, Sweden and the UK. Others, such as Germany, France, Spain and Italy, appear convinced that diplomatic and market bridges to Russia must be maintained.
The United States has been resolute in condemning Russia’s aggression against Georgia. But America too has been cautious; sending humanitarian aid to relieve the war-stricken regions of Georgia - but delivering that humanitarian aid by US warships. This has prompted Russia to increase its naval presence near Georgia’s Black Sea ports, announce plans to deliver Russian humanitarian assistance to Caribbean hurricane victims, and to hold joint naval exercises with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.
Former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the so called “stans,” sensing that Russia’s new assertiveness could cascade their way, have been quietly neutral.
Meanwhile, China and India - facing their own ethnic autonomist movements of Tibetans and Uigurs in China and Muslims in Kashmir - are worried about the apparent legitimization of ethnic self-determination following precedents in Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and even Palestine.
Are we seeing the first stages of a new Cold War? Or, is this merely a gradual readjustment, as the world evolves to a more traditional multi-polar configuration complicated by economic globalization?
Russia under the de facto leadership of Putin is both willing and able to flex its energy muscles in Europe, and to militarily reassert its geopolitical dominance on Russia's southern borders. What complicates matters for the West is its potential to disrupt an even larger portion of the world’s energy supply by willfully crippling the Caucasus oil and gas pipelines. A further lure for Russia is meddling in the larger Middle East scene through Iran and Syria.
A return to the old Soviet profile, minus its Marxist-Leninist overlay, would isolate Russia from the rest of Europe and push it toward Eurasian regionalism and possibly resuming its former role as patron of revolutionary movements elsewhere.
It is much more likely that the Russians will choose renewed assertiveness in world affairs, balancing their economic interests in trade and investment with the symbols of showing the flag globally and claiming the status and the influence of a major power. The larger question is whether Russia will forgo destabilizing the various nuclear weapons regimes and step back from aiding Iran and other revolutionary powers in their nuclear quests.
The choices posed by the American election are masked by campaign rhetoric, as both candidates essentially had to condemn Russian actions in Georgia and overlook Saakashvili’s recklessness.
Broad philosophical differences nonetheless separate the two presidential candidates' approaches to foreign policy.
Sen. McCain focuses on promoting democratic values, undermining rogue states and isolating authoritarian regimes. Sen. Obama emphasizes multilateralism and collective legitimacy, and resists the temptation to create what Cavafy called “barbarians” to justify international action.
Neither emphasizes - perhaps because they do not understand - that the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity are, after all, in conflict with one other. And that is what emerged in the conflict in the Caucasus.
