Making Sense of Expanded Deterrence

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The United States has adopted and begun to publicize a policy of expanded deterrence against terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. As outlined recently by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “[T]he United States will hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor or individual fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction – whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.” This policy is a vitally necessary component in reducing the likelihood of a catastrophic terrorist attack against the U.S., and should be rigorously implemented and more broadly publicized.

But imagine if a nuclear weapon goes off in an American city and the U.S. identifies the culprit network as extending through Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Because it is currently a unilateral policy, countries seeking to help won’t know how to deal with expanded deterrence, and some therefore might seek to hedge in their assistance because of questions about how the U.S. will implement its approach. Or take another example: a biological attack occurs in Frankfurt or Tokyo and the U.S. identifies a network based in the Pakistan-Afghanistan area as the culprit. How does the U.S. expanded deterrence policy intersect with its NATO or U.S.-Japan alliance commitments? The bottom line: How does the U.S. expanded deterrence policy work in a complicated, enmeshed world of allies, partners, fence-sitters and neutrals – as well as foes?

These scenarios suggest that the U.S. should work to internationalize expanded deterrence against WMD terrorism by working to develop mechanisms for like-minded countries to work together in deterring and, if necessary, in responding cooperatively to catastrophic terrorist attacks. This would benefit the U.S. by adding to the strength and legitimacy of our deterrent and retaliatory capabilities while minimizing friction and costs both before and after an attack. The valid premise of the current policy is that the threat to hold states and sub-state entities complicit with a WMD terrorist attack to account will contribute to dissuading them from becoming so involved – influencing countries and sub-state entities not to do certain things. Internationalizing the policy would take up where the threat leaves off to enlist countries’ support in actively doing things. In other words, drawing countries into the approach would serve as a correlative carrot to the deterrent threat’s stick.

But other countries would also benefit by cooperating with the U.S. in an expanded deterrence policy. The U.S. is not alone in being threatened by catastrophic terror, yet it is alone in its ability to project power. Joining with the U.S. in the policy would substantially increase the strength of other countries’ deterrent and retaliatory capabilities. Further, many of the initiative’s benefits would be shared. Expanded deterrent threats issued and endorsed by many countries, especially powerful ones, are more likely to be seen as credible and therefore more likely to deter than threats issued by single nations or small groups. Even the United States would benefit from the added credibility multiple allies would supply. Further, the initiative would reduce friction and even conflict in the aftermath of a catastrophic strike, given that, currently, there is no clear set of rules of the road for countries either suffering or inadvertently serving as a launch pad for a catastrophic attack. Countries signed on to the policy would know how to abide by the rules, thus lessening the probability of either over- or under-reaction. As former State Department WMD official Thomas Lehrman points out, states that join would receive an effective deterrent and retaliatory capacity in exchange for the acknowledgment that external assistance and involvement might well be required, thus strengthening an international precedent for international cooperation in assisting states that cannot adequately police their own territories. Conversely, countries that elect not to cooperate would justifiably merit greater scrutiny, as with those nations that have not joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Finally, multilateral cooperation and trust would spread burdens, such as by enabling wider intelligence collection and analysis in an area where unilateral assets are less likely to be effective.

While an international approach might take many forms, its basic purpose would be to enable countries to work together in deterring and responding cooperatively to catastrophic terror attacks by pooling their deterrents, facilitating cooperation and minimizing misunderstanding in the event of a strike. A workable arrangement would likely best emerge from extensive and meaningful consultations rather than a pre-judged form to be “sold.” Indeed, much of the virtue of the approach would derive from the process, as it would provide the U.S. with a vehicle to lead in addressing a problem recognized by most nations. Countries that signed on to the policy could choose from a menu of productive steps, such as appropriately posturing military and intelligence assets, passing legislation, and pushing international resolutions to enable a cooperative policy of expanded deterrence against WMD terrorism.

Several models exist for a workable arrangement, including especially the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative, which have the advantages of flexibility in design, structure and implementation. The legitimating infrastructure also exists. UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism provide a firm international legal basis for the policy by encouraging states to take significant steps to prevent WMD terrorism, including by multilateral agreements, international cooperation, and national legislation designed to prevent and suppress terrorist acts. Existing U.S. security commitments to NATO, Japan, and other countries could serve as building blocks. More broadly, the “positive security assurances” provided by the NPT nuclear weapons states in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995), which calls on the P-5 to take immediate action to aid non-nuclear weapons states threatened by nuclear use or coercion, might provide a particularly apt model.

From the U.S. perspective, any such initiative would need to balance U.S. interests such as maintaining its ultimate freedom of action and husbanding its commitments and resources against the advantages of international legitimacy, assistance and reducing friction. Under no circumstances must a U.S. President consult any international institution before responding to a catastrophic attack, but having the option and the established means to cooperate with other powers in pursuing its own expanded deterrence policy is surely a worthy goal. And, even if the attempt to craft a workable initiative were to fail, the effort would be worthwhile, if only to show a world so suspicious of American unilateralism that the U.S. did not want to go it alone in adopting a tough but necessary policy.

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