Redefining the 'War on Terror'

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British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has done a great service by declaring in a January 15 column in The Guardian that "ultimately, the notion [of the "war on terror"] is misleading and mistaken."

Words mean a lot. They create frameworks for thinking about things. They reinforce or undermine stereotypes. They spur people to action. They can inform. And mislead. Create striking clarity. Or becloud the real issues.

The “war on terror” did all these.

This single phrase evoked the successful struggles against Fascism in World War II and Communism in the Cold War and suggested that similar worldwide mobilization was required to defeat terror.

It reflected a uniquely American tendency to over-simplify and sloganize: “War on Cancer… War on Poverty… War on Drugs… War on Terror… .”

It created an environment of fear that was used to justify a broad range of actions that undermine civil liberties, from the Patriot Act to Guantanamo.

It fostered extreme oversimplification: “You’re either with us or against us.” And implied that military force is the main weapon.

It is a phrase fitting for a soundbite, but not for a thoughtful discussion or for the basis of a great nation’s policy.

There is a struggle. But it is against terrorists, who use the tactics of terror to pursue their objectives. And against the conditions that breed terrorists.

There is no single, global, over-arching enemy. Terrorists are manifold. They have many different motives. And share little in common, except for the tactics of terror.

As Miliband points out: “The more we lump terrorist groups together and draw the battle lines as a simple binary struggle between moderates and extremists, or good and evil, the more we play into the hands of those seeking to unify groups with little in common. Terrorist groups need to be tackled at root, interdicting flows of weapons and finance, exposing the shallowness of their claims, channeling their followers into democratic politics.”

In this he echoes a little-noticed 2007 Washington Post column by Zbigniew Brzezinski: “The Bush administration's elevation of these three words into a national mantra … has had a pernicious impact on American democracy, on America's psyche and on U.S. standing in the world. Using this phrase has actually undermined our ability to effectively confront the real challenges we face from fanatics who may use terrorism against us.”

As Brzezinski rightly pointed out, “The phrase itself is meaningless. It defines neither a geographic context nor our presumed enemies. Terrorism is not an enemy but a technique of warfare -- political intimidation through the killing of unarmed non-combatants.”

This is not to say that the threat of terrorist attacks is imaginary. It is a real and present danger, not only in the US, but also in many other countries around the world, developed and developing alike. Because terror tactics can and will be used by individuals and groups that believe terrorism will further their objectives. But it is not a unified threat, controlled by a single organization or leader. Often it is focused on driving military forces from occupying land terrorists view as theirs, and they justify their tactics by invoking ideology or religion.

The Obama Administration’s national security team should clearly differentiate between the tactics of terrorism and specific terrorist organizations, prioritizing the latter based on the level of threat posed to the US and its friends and allies. Once identified and prioritized, and in concert with interested and willing partners, the US should develop and embark on ways to isolate, engage and neutralize, transform, or eliminate them. Depending on the nature of the organization and level of threat posed, a mixture of intelligence, diplomacy, covert action, and military force should be deployed by the US, its partners and allies.

Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton provided a preview of the Administration’s position in her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “For terrorism, we must have a comprehensive strategy, leveraging intelligence, diplomacy, and military assets to defeat Al Qaida and other terrorist groups by rooting out their networks and drying up their support for violent and nihilistic extremism.”

There are important examples of terrorist movements that have been eventually transformed. The PLO and the IRA, and even the Israeli Irgun, all evolved from the use of terrorist tactics to engagement in the political process. General David Petraeus’s approach in the Sunni dominated Iraqi Al Anbar province, turning enemy terrorists into situational allies, is yet another. The processes of isolating and engaging terrorist movements will, of course, vary depending on location and other considerations including religion and culture. Successful engagement and transformation requires clear demonstration and broad acceptance of the value of peaceful outcomes – in other words, a focus on common good of those involved.

Because the Middle East is the central cauldron for much of the world’s terrorist activity, the US must renew its focus on that region. Secretary-designate Clinton emphasized that the US and its allies “… must also actively pursue a strategy of smart power in the Middle East… .” She emphasized a renewed “determination to seek a just and lasting peace agreement that brings real security to Israel; normal and positive relations with its neighbors; independence, economic progress, and security to the Palestinians in their own state.”

As the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the nexus of many regional issues, and the rationale for much terrorist and counter-terrorist military activity, the central question will be whether a mix of engaging moderates and isolating extremists can move terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to renounce violence in favor of active political participation. Next steps in Gaza will provide an early test.

Similarly, a concerted drive by the US, Europe, and other powers such as India, to complete the United Nations Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism would do much to establish broad consensus both on the nature of terrorism, and effective ways to combat it.

Foreign Secretary Miliband is right: “The call for a ‘war on terror’ was a call to arms, an attempt to build solidarity for a fight against a single shared enemy. But the foundation for solidarity between peoples and nations should be based not on who we are against, but on the idea of who we are and the values we share.”

Theodore Couloumbis is vice president of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy and professor emeritus at the University of Athens, Greece; Bill Ahlstrom is an executive at a US multinational; Gary Weaver is professor at American University’s School of International Service; these views are their own.
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