The Geopolitical Reality of Tibet

By Stratfor

Anxieties were running high in China before Tuesday, March 10, which marks the 50th anniversary of the uprising in Tibet — when spiritual and political leader the Dalai Lama fled into exile and China stepped up a war with Tibetan guerrillas to rein in the separatist region. The Chinese are inherently prickly about this anniversary, which is one of several prominent anniversaries this year. The coming months will bring the 10th anniversary of the Falun Gong demonstrations, the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square incident and the 60th anniversary of the formation of the People’s Republic of China.

Even without the symbolism of these dates, Chinese authorities are acutely aware of the potential for discontent over Tibet to explode. They were reminded of this when riots broke out this time last year in the Tibetan capital Lhasa, threatening to spoil Beijing’s Olympic Games. Today, in addition to nervousness over the anniversary, a slumping economy is generating wider social instability throughout China, making the Communist Party even more nervous about maintaining control. In recent months, security has gotten tighter — especially in Tibet, where foreign visitors are banned, dissidents and suspected militants are being arrested and soldiers are patrolling the streets.

The name Tibet excites effusions of political emotion the world over, but for China the Tibet issue is not about ideologies, which change with time and temperament. For China, Tibet is about unchanging geopolitical imperatives — the core geographic and political realities of the country’s existence and survival.

The Chinese heartland consists of the fertile river plains and coasts in the eastern half of the Asian landmass where the Yellow and Yangtze rivers empty into the East China Sea. These are the traditional lands of the Han Chinese. To the north, west and southwest are vast expanses of inhospitable and rugged terrain. The two gigantic western provinces, Xinjiang and Tibet, stretch toward the natural borders formed by the Himalayan and Tian Shan mountains and the deserts of Central Asia.

Tibet is the enormous plateau of southwestern China that runs to the Himalayas. The plateau overlooks China’s heartland and is the crucial source from which the country’s major rivers flow. It also forms a high ground on the eastern side of the mountain range that could serve as a defensible foothold for any opposing force stationed there. To preempt such a threat, the Han Chinese have always sought to extend their territory all the way west to the mountains, to distance and protect themselves from successive waves of nomadic tribes and invaders.

Buffer regions in the west have enabled the Chinese to focus their attention where most needed: on the eastern coasts, where they could prosper through trade or keep guard against potential rivals such as the Koreans, Japanese and, later, the Europeans.

This geopolitical setting defines China’s perceptions and reactions to its far west and the ethnic groups that live there. Beijing fears that if the Tibetans slip away, they would create a cascade effect throughout the country, enabling China’s many other minority groups to break away also. Eventually, Greater China would disintegrate, and devoting energy to the restoration of order in the west would leave the heartlands in the east exposed to China’s most powerful rivals.

For this reason, Beijing is intensely fearful that foreign powers could manipulate its buffer regions to undermine the government’s control of the interior. Surrendering or losing Tibet could leave a fatal structural crack in Chinese security. Thus, China occasionally lashes out against foreign countries where groups hold notions of Tibetan independence and whose politicians entertain the Dalai Lama — such as India (where the Dalai Lama lives in exile), Europe (especially France at the moment) or the United States. Beijing is constitutionally paranoid that whenever it begins to prosper and expand, outsiders plot to subvert and destroy it.

Because of the stringent security controls China has imposed on the region, the March 10 anniversary could pass without incident. If the Tibetans did suddenly revolt, they would be quashed just as suddenly. Ethnic Tibetan dissidents or others could create incidents in other regions, outside of the spotlight. But whatever happens, the geopolitics will not change. China needs Tibet, but Tibet is a potential weakness that could be exploited. To compromise on Tibet, from the Chinese point of view, would be to sport with death.