Obama & North Korea, Tactics Over Strategy
The Obama administration's recent decision to confront North Korean ships in international waters and at foreign ports is a strong, nuanced, and multilateral response to North Korea's recent nuclear test. But for all its boldness, the Obama administration's decision is tactical, not strategic. If the United States hopes to avoid military conflict with the North, it will need to develop an actual strategy for dealing with North Korea rather than simply reacting to events as they unfold.
The Obama administration's declaration last week that it would work with other countries to enforce UN resolution 1874 was a shrewd response to a growing threat. After North Korea announced that a UN resolution requiring forced inspections of its ships would be considered an act of war, it appeared that the recalcitrant regime had forced the Obama administration into an ultimatum: either accept that North Korea will not surrender its infant nuclear capability or take an action that could lead to war.
Rallying the other members of the Security Council, the Obama administration convinced its fellow members to issue the strongest worded resolution on North Korea since 1994, when the U.S. and North Korea were on the brink of war. With this decision, the Obama administration has reclaimed the tactical advantage in the North Korean nuclear crisis, placing the decision to initiate a casus belli directly on North Korea's lap, which they are unlikely to do for now. Rather than accept North Korea's no-win ultimatum, the administration managed to find a short-term alternative that was at once strong and acceptable to its negotiating partners in the Six Party Talks without pushing North Korea to choose between losing face and initiating war. The Obama administration has managed to successfully walk a very thin line between war and weakness.
While the Obama administration deserves plaudits for staving off both war and the appearance of impotence, winning a tactical battle with North Korea shouldn't be confused with winning the war. North Korea is still a volatile threat to regional security and U.S. interests. The Obama administration must establish a North Korea policy based on strategic calculations of interests and utility, not on a posture of reactivity to crisis events as they occur. As long as it continues to respond to tactical events without the guidance of a comprehensive strategy, it is unlikely that the United States will realize a long-term positive outcome in the ongoing crisis with North Korea.
The U.S. strategy toward North Korea should, like any thoughtful strategy, take into account U.S. goals vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula, East Asia, and the U.S. global foreign policy portfolio. Unless the Kim regime collapses, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq will likely remain a higher foreign policy priority than North Korea because in these locations more immediate U.S. interests are at stake. These trouble spots aside, the crisis on the Korean peninsula is more of a threat to U.S. security than any other country or topic in the near term; at a minimum, it is the greatest problem currently facing the United States in East Asia.
The United States has several goals relevant to the North Korean nuclear crisis: 1) avoiding war; 2) preventing the export of weapons and nuclear technology; 3) preventing a nuclear arms race in East Asia; and 4) convincing North Korea to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, especially those requiring a moratorium on missile launches.
Each of these goals should be prioritized relative to the others and should guide the strategic interaction of the United States with North Korea. The single most important goal for the United States is to avoid war. Given the security concerns in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, the United States cannot afford to take on another military engagement. Short of war, the most vital goal of the United States is to ensure that North Korea does not export weapons or nuclear technology; the successful export of these items extends the risk of nuclear proliferation to a global level. Another goal of the United States relative to the crisis is the preservation and enforcement of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This document is the only legal mechanism preventing a nuclear arms race in East Asia. Finally, the U.S. needs North Korea to comply with UN resolutions prohibiting the testing and launching of missiles. Though these tests have never cost any lives thus far, there is great risk, given the inaccuracy of North Korea's missile technology, that a miscalculation or technological error could result in accidentally hitting South Korean or Japanese territory with a missile.
To achieve positive outcomes from the North Korean crisis, the Obama administration will have to raise its level of play from the tactical to the strategic. When faced with new provocations, it must ensure that decisions are not based on fleeting passions, universal principles, or feelings of desperation; rather, decisions should be made within a framework that takes into account U.S. goals toward the peninsula, the region, and the world. A comprehensive North Korea strategy is the only way the United States can successfully navigate this crisis.
