Stiffening the Russia Reset
The secret to success in geopolitics, Bismarck said, is to make a good treaty with Russia. Something similar may be passing through President Barack Obama's mind this week in Moscow. For weeks, U.S. diplomats have labored to get a draft replacement to the START Treaty - the 1991 long-range-warhead-limiting accord set to expire in December - in place before the July visit.
If the trip goes well, we get a treaty we don't really need (with its fraying arsenal, Russia is the main beneficiary); if it goes poorly, we get an ICBM-shaped fly in the ointment of future U.S.-Russia diplomacy. Either way, we're in for an anti-climax.
By making an upfront investment on an initiative that disproportionately favors Moscow, Obama hopes to recruit Russian assistance down the road on matters that disproportionately benefit Washington - notably, Afghanistan and Iran. His strategy seems to be a geopolitical equivalent of "paying it forward": Treat Russia with Great-Power respect, and it will act like a respectable Great Power. Like American leaders before him, he believes that Russia is willing and capable of becoming a constructive international problem-solver alongside the US, if only we can get the opening pitch right.
This may be a mistake.
First, Russia does not want to help the US in Afghanistan or Iran; it's the chief beneficiary of American difficulties there. In Afghanistan, Moscow hopes America will remain mired in the same mountainous morass that wrecked the Soviet military in the 1980s. In Iran, Russia benefits doubly from prolonging the status quo: its main geopolitical rival remains tied down by Ahmadinejad and its main energy rival remains tied down by sanctions (Iran is the only country capable of threatening Russia's natural-gas monopoly in Europe; the minute tensions subside, Gazprom has a serious problem).
Second, even if Russia wanted to help the US, it has little to offer. Last Thursday's announcement by the Kyrgyz government that it would continue hosting the U.S. base there removed Russian leverage over supply routes to Afghanistan. Russian influence in Iran has long been over-stated; Moscow is unlikely to bring pressure to bear for fear of undermining 1980s-era arrangements that limit Iranian subversive activities among Russia's Muslim minorities.
Russia's importance lies less in what it can do to help America than in what it can do to hinder and distract us - e.g., by selling S-300 missiles to Iran, obstructing sanctions in the UN, or deploying missiles to Kaliningrad.
And herein lies the real danger of Obama's unfolding Russia policy: The very maneuvers - conciliatory posturing, prioritizing START - that are meant to entice Russia cooperation may actually lead Moscow to behave less predictably.
To the Kremlin, Washington's emphasis on "resetting" relations look like an admission of guilt for 20 years of Western "encirclement." This is a dangerous signal to send when the regime is seeking to shore up its power base following the economic downturn. Should Moscow see in Obama's actions an America that is chastened and needful, it could sense a widened margin of error - for cracking down on dissidents, annexing the Crimea or even invading Georgia again.
Countering this perception should be a major focus of your time in Moscow, Mr. Obama. At least five steps are needed.
1. Remind the Russians that they get more out of START than we do. Be willing to walk if necessary - it will cost Putin more than it costs you.
2. Schedule a meeting with the opposition. Don't make the mistake Ford made with Solzhenitsyn; Nemtsov will be in town - have lunch with him, in public.
3. Don't let the Russians link Missile Defense to START. With Iran and North Korea abuzz, America needs an insurance policy more than ever. The fact that the feasibility study is unfinished offers an excuse; use it.
4. Stop in Warsaw and Prague on the way home. America's allies undertook great risks to support U.S. initiatives. A gesture of inclusion would cost little and do much to head off perceptions of a "Yalta II."
5. Once you're back, invest in NATO's Eastern flank. The emphasis on ‘Reset' must be accompanied with a signal of commitment to Central Europe. Moving U.S. bases eastward would help, as would more money for exposed NATO militaries.
Until such efforts are made, Obama's policy toward Russia will remain a rhetorical opening rather than a holistic, balanced strategy. Effective diplomacy requires firm boundaries, which the Administration has so far failed to set. Sign START, Mr. President, but make sure it doesn't come at the expense of all the things - missile defense, New Europe and Russia's capacity for self-reform - that constitute America's true long-term interests in this region.
