What Kind of Grand Deal with North Korea?

When former U.S. President Bill Clinton flew into Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, to secure the release of two American journalists, I thought to myself that the Obama administration decided to alter its erstwhile assertive sanctions through China, the de facto guardian state of North Korea, instead of suspecting that Mr. Clinton might have every reason to expect a hero's welcome at home. Apparently, Mr. Clinton's surprise visit was enough to lead many North Korea experts to believe the clock of relations between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea went back to the time when the U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué was made in October, 2000.

In October 2000, in one of the more surreal periods of thawing between the US-DPRK relationship, since Vice Marshall Jo Myong-rok, as the special envoy of Chairman Kim Jong-il of the DPRK National Defense Commission, made a historic visit to America from 9-12, 2000 after the first South-North Korean summit meeting was held in June. Then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited North Korea from October 23-25 in the same year in accordance with the agreed upon statement. Nine years ago, Washington and Pyongyang alike agreed that "there are a variety of available means to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula and formally end the Korean War by replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with permanent peace arrangements." The U.S. and North Korea also confirmed that they would "make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity."

Will Mr. Clinton's visit, then, bring about a turning point in relations with North Korea that has been reluctant to show up at the now-stalled six-party talks? In fact, there are very few, except for the White House, to believe that Mr. Clinton's visit was ‘private.' The implications are certainly profound in terms of the future direction and ambitions of American foreign policy. To this end, President Obama will not hesitate to execute his North Korea policy after listening carefully to what Mr. Clinton saw and heard from the ailing leader in the North, given the former President's political weight. Mr. Clinton, unlike former President Jimmy Carter, who had visited North Korea in 1994, still has significant and influential voice in the political realm. North Korea may have thought that the choice of Mr. Clinton must be the best card available on the list to deliver its ‘grand deal' to President Obama. To hear from some South Korean experts on North Korea talk about the prospect of the U.S.-DPRK relationship, yet, it seems likely that the conservative South Korean government is determined to ‘watch with care' the speed and direction of the Washington-Pyongyang relationship.

The late Kim Il-sung, the father of Kim Jong-il, revealed, it's known, that his country had no intention to develop any nuclear weapons during the talks with Mr. Carter in 1994. However, Kim Jong-il's old desire to possess the forbidden nuclear weapons has now become a totem of the dirt-poor state, which dangerously undermines the vision of "a nuclear free world" raised by Barack Obama as a senior at Columbia University twenty six years ago. While President Obama follows through with efforts to engage with the regime in Pyongyang, the sick ‘Dear Leader' Kim, aged 67, is bound to trumpet out the so-called ‘military first politics' so as to strengthen its shaky leadership.

North Korea's continued attempt to obtain an advanced nuclear weapons program is certainly obscuring President Obama's vision. In Mr. Obama's eyes, needless to say, threats are more likely to emanate from small-sized-but-powerful states or terrorist organizations like North Korea and Al Qaeda than from the nuclear-armed superpower Russia. To this end, North Korea's reckless challenge to global security represents the fundamental reason that President Obama should place North Korea's nuclear issue high on his foreign policy agenda. At the same time, lots of pundits here in Seoul contend that North Korea should now comprehend correctly and wisely what the U.S. and South Korea offer.

In this regard, a more engaged North Korea policy is essential not only for Mr. Obama's vision but for the regional stability in Northeast Asia where both nuclear armed states and potential nuclear aspirants exist together. North Korea's threats have been mounting rapidly over the last few years, and it is by no means impossible that by the middle of the twenty first century North Korea's advanced missile capabilities could seriously threaten the United States, to say nothing of South Korea and Japan.

Few today believe that the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his underlings will abandon the suspected nuclear weapons aimed at bolstering the ailing regime and securing a possible domestic revolt from opponents. The 67-year-old leader, who reportedly has pancreatic cancer, will keep the nuclear weapons as a memento of his youngest son, being called ‘Brilliant Leader.' That said, North Korea is now unimaginable without nuclear weapons. Inevitably, a new security environment needs a new paradigm, although the Obama administration cannot grant the Kim regime full recognition as a nuclear state akin to India. Kurt Campbell, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, hinted at a developmental implication by revealing that "If North Korea is prepared to take serious and irreversible steps, the U.S., South Korea, Japan, China and others will be able to put together a comprehensive package that would be attractive to North Korea." Campbell's assertion is nothing new, but it is enough to show that there's no magic bullet in dealing with the troubled North Korean nuclear issues.

Given the current atmosphere between the United States and North Korea, the long-term outlook over the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is by no means more clouded than the right-wing kooks in Seoul and Washington expect. North Korea's test-firing of missiles and purposeful apprehension of two American journalists have worsened relations between the two countries but the fundamental deadlock lies in the fact that none of the decision-makers in Washington have been yet ready to keep the whole equation of the denuclearized picture in their heads. South Korea also seems to give a nod toward the Obama administration's pragmatic but principled measures.

The question is whether the Obama administration will be able to stop a North Korean nuclear program and North Korea's nuclear proliferation activities. Mr. Clinton's visit was no doubt a cheering prospect but the nuclear reality facing us would be grimmer than other people think, unless President Obama can pull off a deal with Kim Jong-il. What can Mr. Obama offer him?