Neither Realism Nor Idealism Can Succeed
"We must never alter or forget our principles," remarked U.S. President Barack Obama to the Egyptian people on June 4 regarding his administration's intended approach with other nations. Yet, on July 4, President Obama switched his priority to "fixed national security interests" in American dealings with countries such as Iran. Then, on August 12, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Susan Rice emphasized, "standing aside while the world's most vulnerable endure conflict, disease, and despair is surely a breach of our common humanity. But it is also a threat to our common security."
At first glance all of these public statements may be understood as reflecting a versatile yet cohesive American foreign policy. Alas, U.S. actions have not tracked alongside speeches by truly combining values and security. Wants, means, and ends in foreign relationships remain at odds with the principles Americans claim to hold dear.
Though seemingly trite, the problem lies at the heart of international affairs and shapes how much of the world views the United States. It is a difficult issue involving that holy grail of foreign policy - a pragmatic balance between realism and idealism; between championing America's standards and imposing its will; avoiding warfare yet preserving security; and engaging regimes but not enabling harmful ones.
Now this terrible dilemma confronts yet another U.S. administration whose officials' words often create expectations world-wide, but whose deeds indicate known status quos are preferred over uncertain potential changes. Responses to events in Iran are a case in point as are officially-endorsed encounters with North Korea and Myanmar.
On August 4, the world heard White House Spokesman Robert Gibbs strategically acknowledge Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as "the elected leader" of Iran a day before the latter was sworn into office. Whether Ahmadinejad was or was not "elected" is the gist of the protracted "conflict" and "despair" (to use two of Ambassador Rice's terms) within Iran. True, democratic nations often deal with various forms of government - including Iran, Myanmar, and North Korea. Recognition of leaders in those nations is a part of U.S. attempts to directly - and through America's allies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia - "engage" worrisome, non-democratic, regimes for reasons of national security.
But even autocracies, dictatorships, and theocracies require consensus among their stakeholders to function. In Iran's case, Ahmadinejad's re-confirmation to the presidency ripped compromises that once patched together clerics and politicians. So whether viewed from a principled or a security viewpoint, from a neoconservative or a liberal one, from idealism or realism, what is gained by facilitating consensus through official recognition remains unclear. Even worse, Iranian officials now believe negotiation and obfuscation are possible from a position of strength against American and European administrations perceived as strategically and morally weak.
Regrettably, such actions set a precedent for other regimes lacking international authenticity whom will expect that recognition can be leveraged from the West by, for instance, developing nuclear technology. North Korea and Myanmar are learning, as have Iran's leaders, the value of yet another means of gaining legitimacy - holding foreigners as hostages for leverage. And the military junta in Myanmar and Kim Jong Il of North Korea must be delighted by the West's accommodating tone.
Complicating matters further still is America's incohesive approach to foreign policy. Despite President Obama professing engagement "will not be advanced by threats," offers to negotiate with Iran are turning into shrill demands with deadlines and dire warnings. Ahmadinejad, upon being sworn in for a second term as Iran's President, sneered "no one in Iran is waiting for your messages." North Korea's ruler warned of "merciless retaliation" against foreign intervention within days of recognition generated by former U.S. President Bill Clinton's visit. Myanmar's Foreign Ministry dismissed international demands that the rights of its citizens be respected as based on "total ignorance" while U.S. Senator Jim Webb's goodwill mission was still ongoing.
Recent Iranian, Myanmarian, and North Korean leaders' reactions highlight one major reason why American attempts to champion denuclearization, disarmament, peace, tolerance, human rights, and even democracy in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia have not been taken seriously. Many prior U.S. administrations have been regarded as talking the talk but not walking the walk. After all, leaders in those regions have witnessed realpolitik prevail on a regular basis in official American dealings with them - with ideals cast to the wind.
Ordinary citizens of many nations believe they cannot count on the U.S. when push comes to shove. Retribution by Saddam Hussein on Kurds and Shiites who rose up in rebellion against his dictatorship expecting support from a former U.S. administration is a case in point. The recent statements from Washington on President Ahmadinejad are another, as Iranians and others have been quick to express via telephone, email, text message, Twitter, and Facebook.
Explaining, amending, even retracting official statements and actions cannot rectify the underlying problem of trust, highlighted yet again, between the leadership of the United States and the peoples of the Third World. America was not the only major power to accept Ahmadinejad's presidency as a fait accompli; British and EU ambassadors even attended the swearing-in ceremony. Quasi-official meetings by American politicians with Kim Jong Il and general Than Shwe did lead to the release of U.S. citizens; the French government did likewise for its employees in Iran via Syrian diplomats and fiscal incentives. Yet, for better or worse, no other Western nation has the visibility and stature of the United States, nor does any other government's acknowledgement confer as much legitimacy.
So, indeed, it is the same hackneyed tale with different protagonists. But the fundamental lessons never seem to sink in. Realistic approaches may be necessary when dealing with other nations, even ones where tyranny prevails. However taking only that track may "undermine our national security" because "the power of our examples" is strong - to cite phrases used by John Brennan, Assistant to the U.S. President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Yet clinging to idealistic stances can lead to protracted conflict, as happened in Afghanistan and Iraq.
U.S. foreign policy has long been dualistic and, consequently, flawed. It needs to be nuanced, inclusive, and sensitive to the values and needs of Americans and other people to be effective. All options need to be weighed carefully and cautiously, rather than rushing into either recognition and engagement or rejection and force whether with Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, or other countries from which trouble comes forth. Ultimately should not those who craft U.S. foreign policy ask whether the multifaceted costs and consequences of giving primacy to national security interests over fundamental principles, or of only following the reverse paradigm, of choosing either realism or idealism rather than regularly integrating both in practice, have been carefully calculated?
A pragmatic balance between strategic goals and humanitarian needs is necessary for U.S. foreign policy to be effective. The world's people are watching to see if there really is a "new thinking and new approach," or if it is business as usual.
