Hatoyama Debuts Japan's New Foreign Policy
Like previous Hatoyama statements, this speech was met with a great deal of enthusiasm from his supporters and an equal amount of uncertainty from others. The uncertainty arises for a reason. Japan has been ruled by a single party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), for most of the past 60 years. Even if people knew exactly what the DPJ has in mind (and they do not), they would still have a degree of uncertainty concerning any party that broke such a long-standing status quo. The DPJ's choice phrases have not helped to clarify intentions: The party's leaders speak frequently of "love and fraternity," "an economy for the people" and a "more equal" alliance with the United States -- phrases for which concrete applications are not always clear.
"Japan would have little interest in jeopardizing its relationship with its security guarantor, especially given that doing so would put it at greater risk from an increasingly powerful China."
On a deeper level, the DPJ's landslide victory might have caused some anxiety because of Japan's role in the first half of the twentieth century. Because the LDP ruled Japan almost without pause for the entire second half of the century, its solid thumping in the 2009 elections has forced other international players to wonder what a non-LDP Japan could look like. The situation inevitably revives memories of Japan's role leading up to and including World War II. After all, throughout history, Japan has had several sudden and dramatic shifts in behavior. Needless to say, modern Tokyo is a far cry from the military-dominated Imperial government of the 1930s. The point is rather that a shift in Japanese politics always arouses considerable interest among its neighbors and other nations with a stake in the region.
Which brings us to the United States. The Americans fought a bloody war with Japan, and the LDP governance was a creature of the post-war U.S. occupation. It is unsurprising that the Americans are interested in finding out what the new leadership will be like, especially considering some of the DPJ's more controversial stances on the U.S.-Japan alliance. The DPJ has argued for a greater voice within this security alliance and for greater independence in working with its neighbors. It has called into question the alliance's history, the current status of forces agreement governing U.S. troops in Japan, and the party seems ready to let the mandate for Japan's Indian Ocean refueling mission supporting the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan expire. On a visit to Japan last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates urged the new government to uphold its existing agreements with the United States and reminded Japan of the benefits it has experienced from being under the American nuclear and defense umbrella.
At the same time, there are signs that the new Japanese government might cultivate a more positive relationship with Russia. Moscow and Tokyo have animosities that run deep -- going back to the Russo-Japanese war, World War II, and the Cold War (when Japan was the cornerstone of the U.S. containment strategy against the Soviets in the northern Pacific). The countries never signed a peace treaty, despite formally ending hostilities in the 1950s, and the Soviet possession of four tiny islands in Japan's far north gave rise to a fierce resentment that continued to burn even after the Soviet Union fell.
Yet in his speech on Monday, Hatoyama -- whose grandfather nearly resolved the islands issue as prime minister in the 1950s, and who has family ties to the Russians -- reiterated that he intends to resolve the dispute and make formal peace with Russia. This time, what normally would appear to be an empty campaign promise seems to have some potential. Given the rocky relationship between Russia and the United States at present, it might be hard to imagine that Washington would smile on a groundbreaking deal between Tokyo and Moscow.
Nevertheless, the DPJ's rise is not nearly as threatening to the U.S.-Japanese alliance as it may seem. Japan's geopolitical situation necessitates that it takes greater responsibility in its own region -- in fact, such a change has been developing for years. Tokyo faces a rising China, a nimble competitor in South Korea and security dangers from North Korea, all while the government is hoping to revive the economy and make Japan’s presence felt internationally. Signing a peace treaty with Russia would merely be a convenient way of opening up opportunities for Japan as it pursues its self-interest in this changing context. Russia's holdings in the northern Pacific are decidedly small, and its economy is insignificant compared to that of the United States -- it offers no possible substitute for Washington. Japan would have little interest in jeopardizing its relationship with its ultimate security guarantor, especially given that doing so would put it at greater risk from an increasingly powerful China.
As Hatoyama stressed yet again on Monday, the alliance remains the foundation of Japanese foreign policy. This stance reflects a geopolitical reality that his party will not seek to change, regardless of its rhetoric.
