Listen to US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell last week describing Kevin Rudd's relationship with Barack Obama.
"We're very closely co-ordinating on climate change, we have a close dialogue on China, North Korea, the Pacific Islands, a range of issues," Campbell says.
"The two leaders have similar perspectives on the role of modern governments and policies. The President and the Prime Minister have a good personal chemistry."
Campbell describes Rudd's personal role as decisive in forming the Group of 20 summit and having it established as the world's primary economic co-ordination body. "Prime Minister Rudd was relentless in his making of the case, he persuaded key players, made the case with a number of players who were a bit reluctant."
This reaction from Campbell is not unique.
In London a few weeks ago, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband said he thought Rudd "a great man" and that on climate change his government "has set a very different course from the one pursued by his predecessor".
A European bureaucrat working for Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, says the European bureaucracy works closely with Rudd on the design of the G20 and that Rudd is "frequently on the phone" to Barroso.
These stories could go on. After many decades reporting foreign affairs, I can say this is not a usual reaction by international leaders to an Australian prime minister.
Something different is at work here. Rudd has gatecrashed the party of international leaders and quickly become an influential member.
How did it happen? What does it mean? What can it offer Australia? Does it hold some dangers, that mistakes will be covered up, policy not properly contested?
Rudd represents continuity and change in the way he governs as a foreign-policy Prime Minister. He once told a friend that foreign policy was one-third framework and two-thirds issues management. According to that friend, he says the government's framework is not to bend over in the shower. It's a marvellous anecdote, perhaps apocryphal. It captures the Rudd combination of the academic looking for a framework and the earthy, hard-headed Australian realist, a combination he projects in his dealings with foreign leaders.
The first time Rudd met George W. Bush, when Rudd was opposition leader and Bush, John Howard's great friend, was president of the US, Rudd called him "mate" and reassured him that a Rudd Labor government would not indulge in gratuitous anti-US gestures or rhetoric.
Americans are prone to taking people at their own estimation of themselves. The self-confidence involved in Rudd calling Bush mate is a small thing compared with the substance of the conversation, but the self-confidence is a large part of Rudd's international success.
In the celebrated telephone conversation from Kirribilli House in which Rudd successfully urged Bush to call a G20 summit, one of the notable features was Bush trying to wind up the conversation and Rudd insisting on getting his way on the G20. It worked. Bush called the G20 summit.
Rudd is committed to the US alliance as the bedrock of Australian security, a force for good in the world and a substantial part of Australia's international orientation. He is also strongly committed to getting the most out of the China relationship, especially economically, for Australia. But at the same time he is wary about China's intentions.
He works hard to make the relationship productive and he is prepared to argue parts of China's case internationally. But he is not scared to criticise China over human rights or to defend Australia's interests in an argument with China over, say, foreign investment. Significantly, Rudd also recognises the power and importance of other Asian powers, especially Japan and India.
He made a mistake in not visiting Japan, a democracy and intimate supporter of Australia, before he visited China, and he has been slow to visit India. But he corrected both these mistakes and did so pretty quickly.
He also recognises the unique importance of Indonesia to Australia and has laboured mightily to woo President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. He has made Indonesia into the leading recipient of Australian aid.
In all these areas there have been stumbles.
Japan objected to all the attention Rudd paid early to China and didn't like being lectured about whales. India would like Australia to sell it uranium and the bashings of Indian students have damaged Australia's reputation. Indonesia was not amused about the high degree of publicity given to the so-called Indonesian solution.
But Rudd has been quick to try to correct mistakes.
Two other elements round out the framework part of Rudd. One is a traditional social democratic commitment to the grand causes of global governance. In this Rudd is indeed different from Howard, who was sceptical of foreign affairs grandiloquence, but he does resemble all Labor prime ministers in his commitments. He wants a seat for Australia on the UN Security Council, he wants nuclear disarmament and has set up a commission to promote it, he is a hyper-activist on climate change and has been asked to take a special role in the lead-up to the Copenhagen summit.
Finally, Rudd is an enthusiast for international institution building. The G20 is the most important and successful element of this. At least partly because of Rudd's efforts, Australia has a seat at the table of the premier global policy co-ordination body.
Rudd also wants to build an Asia-Pacific community embracing everyone from the US to India, which can deal with all issues from trade to security. This concept is still amorphous but will make progress at a conference in Sydney early next month..
Rudd says he doesn't mind whether the APC is embodied in an existing institution, involves the rationalisation of several existing institutions or is something new. So altogether this is a framework of high ambition.
But what is it about Rudd's methods that is distinctive? Just being a globalist as a prime minister, and strategically assertive, is not as strange as some commentators make out.
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