From Beirut to Benghazi

Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's 11-hour marathon testimony on the September 2012 attack on a U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya, that left four dead, including U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens, arguably made for better political theater than anything else. Still, it was redolent of the aftermath of another tragic attack on American servicemen in the Middle East.

The 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, carried out by the Shiite militant group Hezbollah resulted in the deaths of 241 Americans, including 220 U.S. Marines. The attack on the barracks rattled Americans, who were still reeling at the time from the aftereffects of the Vietnam War, and it represented the deadliest attack against U.S. Marines since World War II.

It also raised immediate questions about American ends and interests in Lebanon. That country was mired in a sectarian civil war and occupied by multiple foreign powers. The United States had deployed Marines in 1982 to assist in a peacekeeping mission overseeing the evacuation of Palestinian guerilla fighters from Beirut. It redeployed forces to the country that same year following the assassination of president-elect Bachir Gemayel, even though the aforementioned peacekeeping mission had achieved its aims.

An inquiry soon followed, and in December 1983 a House subcommittee determined that security missteps by officers on the ground left the barracks vulnerable to attack. The committee urged the Reagan administration "in the strongest terms" to reassess its policy in Lebanon. Within two months, American forces were withdrawn from the country.

Foreign policy analyst Micah Zenko, reflecting on the 30th anniversary of the withdrawal, noted just how unusual Reagan's policy shift would appear through today's lens:

"What was particularly remarkable about Reagan's bold decision was its rarity. Presidents often authorize using force or deploying troops to achieve some discrete set of political and military objectives. When they prove incapable of doing so with the initial resources and political support, the mission can be scaled back in its scope, enlarged to achieve additional missions, or, the atypical choice, terminated. The latter option requires having the ability to recognize failure, and political courage to end a U.S. military commitment. In large part, it is a combined lack of strategic awareness and political courage that explains many U.S. military disasters."

Comparing foreign policy errors and adjustments can be an inexact exercise, as circumstances vary and context becomes key. In 1983, the United States was still locked in a geopolitical tit-for-tat with the Soviet Union, and it was understood that any overreaction by one power somewhere around the globe could lure the other in and spark confrontation, as it nearly did in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Reagan also understood that a prolonged American presence in Lebanon would only serve to draw the United States into a civil war in which it had little stake, and result in an open-ended military campaign with opaque, imprecise objectives.

But it would be a mistake to overlook the civility and sanity of Washington's reassessment following the barracks bombing. It should serve as a reminder to present and future U.S. officials that inquiry and accountability are indeed good things -- if, in fact, you ask the right questions.

Around the Region

Back in Iraq. While America measures its missteps in Libya, the United States appears to be revamping its presence in the failing state of Iraq. Reports indicate that U.S. special forces, along with Kurdish peshmerga commandos, successfully freed 70 prisoners believed to be facing "imminent mass execution" in an ISIS-held prison north of the town of Haija.

One U.S. soldier was killed in the operation, the first American combat death in Iraq in nearly four years. The Daily Beast's Nancy Youssef provides some context:

"The death of a U.S. service member reinforced critics' fears that the redeployment of American troops to Iraq could lead to an expanded mission -- one that involved combat. Special Forces are not the first to come under increasing threat. U.S. trainees stationed at a base in western Iraq's Anbar province, for example, endure a handful of mortar rounds a day, a defense official told The Daily Beast. There are concerns in the Pentagon that an American service member could be killed by one of those attacks."

Spy vs. spy. The Wall Street Journal's Adam Entous offers a must-read account of deteriorating U.S.-Israeli relations, and how it has resulted in a secretive game of Mideast espionage over the Iranian nuclear agreement:

"Instead of talking to each other, the allies kept their intentions secret. To figure out what they weren't being told, they turned to their spy agencies to fill gaps. They employed deception, not only against Iran, but against each other. After working in concert for nearly a decade to keep Iran from an atomic bomb, the U.S. and Israel split over the best means: diplomacy, covert action or military strikes.

[...]

"As talks began in 2014 on a final accord, U.S. intelligence agencies alerted White House officials that Israelis were spying on the negotiations. Israel denied any espionage against the U.S. Israeli officials said they could learn details, in part, by spying on Iran, an explanation U.S. officials didn't believe.

"Earlier this year, U.S. officials clamped down on what they shared with Israel about the talks after, they allege, Mr. Netanyahu's aides leaked confidential information about the emerging deal."

Turkey swallows the Assad pill. And finally, Al-Monitor's Fehim TaÅ?tekin reports that Ankara is coming to terms with the likelihood of a post-war role for Syrian President Bashar Assad, but only if a timeline for his total departure is established beforehand, and his hands are kept off the country's most important levers of power. TaÅ?tekin:

"On Oct. 19, a high-ranking official in Ankara gave an 'off the record' briefing to a group of Turkish columnists. He said nine countries, including Turkey, the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, have agreed on a formula for a six-month transition under Assad's leadership.

[...]

"One of the journalists compared the 'symbolic president for a specified period' with the German president's limited role in that country's parliamentary government. Another defined it as 'ineffective and unauthorized honorary president.'"

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