The Honeymoon Might Be Short in Asia

David Pilling, writing at the FT, bravely points out that, popular adulation aside, key Asian governments are not likely to be thrilled with the actual policies of an Obama administration.

For all the faults of the Bush administration, it actually proved quite adroit at maintaining support from the region's three big powers:

In New Delhi, Mr Bush was almost revered for clinching the US-India civil nuclear deal. In Beijing there was appreciation of his pragmatism as early rhetoric about China being a strategic competitor gave way to an alliance based on mutual interest. In Tokyo, Junichiro Koizumi, prime minister for five and a half years of the Bush presidency, gained much political mileage (plus, admittedly, a little derision) by portraying himself as the US president’s buddy-in-chief.

Despite all of his multilateralist rhetoric, Obama has indicated that his policy inclinations actually run counter to a lot of the priorities of these key countries. No recitation of his economic policy passes without a threat to cut off the creation of jobs in China and India. His instincts on trade seem to be fairly unilateralist. Repeated statements by the President-elect against expanding nuclear power under current technology must give India pause. And, though he hasn't addressed the Japanese alliance in his campaign that I've seen, the Japanese government is likely to be nervous that any "change" to the current defense stance in Asia would be to their detriment.

None of this is meant as an implicit criticism - these policy preferences might or might not be good ones. But, whatever policy he embarks on, it bears remembering that current US policy is actually surprisingly in synch with these countries' interests. There are a lot of ways these policies can change that would kick up a fuss that might surprise all of the people cheering in the streets the other night.