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March 17, 2009Tehran-ology and Khatami
Last week, in response to my post on the subject, Matt Duss of Wonk Room had the following to say about my take on internal Iranian politics:
Sullivan writes that to “focus narrowly on Khamenei and the Royal [sic] Guard, would put us in the same place we were in the 1970s: out of touch with the situation on the ground, and disconnected from the concerns of ordinary Iranians. These decisions, as President Carter learned in 1979, have an impact on foreign policy.”This is a little odd. We were out of touch with the situation on the ground in Iran in the 1970s mainly because we were the deeply committed sponsor of an oppressive Iranian regime that represented the crux of U.S. regional security strategy. That regime was overthrown, then they kicked us out. It’s a rather different situation now.
I don't wish to split too many hairs here, because it's my hunch that Duss and I are mostly in 9/10 of agreement and are merely debating the remainder. Nonetheless, I take a bit of an issue with his recollection of the Iranian policy time line.
Yes, we supported the Shah. But we supported that Shah for over two decades, and through five administrations. Some took different tracks with the Shah - Kennedy thought very little of the man, whereas Nixon and Kissinger trusted him implicitly - and applied different levels of pressure and leverage upon him to alter his policies. In truth, the United States had less control over the oil-rich Pahlavi by the 1970s than in previous years. But the primary mistake made by all of these men was to view the Iranian state in the context of one, monolithic figure. The revolution took years to brew, but ultimately, our failings in Iran were logistical. We understood very little about the country, and worse yet, knew very little about what fueled popular discontent. Because the Shah seemed mostly capable, we considered all other power centers in the country to be malleable and moot.
And this fundamental misunderstanding is as prevalent today as it was in 1979. As Ilan Goldenberg noted in his response to Duss, the system in Iran is very complex, and I'll add, overly bureaucratized and corrupt. Yes, American foreign policy must begin with the Supreme Leader, but it must also consider the president (often the public face on the regime), and while you're at it, you should probably make sure people like Mohammad Ali Jafari are in the room. These are just a handful of the powerful figures - representing entire factions - in Iran.
And that's why we must follow their presidential elections closely. Much less than the eventual outcome itself, these elections do in fact offer us insights we were sadly lacking prior to the revolution. With the departure from the race of Mohammad Khatami, we may in fact be witnessing the formation of a center-right coalition intent on ousting controversial President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This may, according to Meir Javedanfar, have been at the behest and consultation of the Supreme Leader himself. As Meir notes, Khatami is a rather divisive figure in Iran, and were he to even win, it could be difficult for the former president to actually govern once elected.
Shmuel Rosner believes Khatami's withdrawal assures re-election for Ahmadinejad in June. Perhaps. Regardless, these are matters that the Obama administration must take into consideration when debating how, where and when to engage the Iranians. Acting too soon or too overtly could strengthen the wrong candidate, which thus far Obama seems reticent to do.
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