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July 18, 2009Central & Eastern European Leaders' Open Letter to President Obama
A group of distinguished luminaries from Central & Eastern Europe penned an open letter to President Obama on the future of the Transatlantic relationship:
We welcome the "reset" of the American-Russian relations. As the countries living closest to Russia, obviously nobody has a greater interest in the development of the democracy in Russia and better relations between Moscow and the West than we do. But there is also nervousness in our capitals. We want to ensure that too narrow an understanding of Western interests does not lead to the wrong concessions to Russia. Today the concern is, for example, that the United States and the major European powers might embrace the Medvedev plan for a "Concert of Powers" to replace the continent's existing, value-based security structure. The danger is that Russia's creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region could over time lead to a de facto neutralization of the region. There are differing views within the region when it comes to Moscow's new policies. But there is a shared view that the full engagement of the United States is needed.
The full text is below the jump.
We have written this letter because, as Central and Eastern European (CEE)
intellectuals and former policymakers, we care deeply about the future of
the transatlantic relationship as well as the future quality of relations
between the United States and the countries of our region. We write in our
personal capacity as individuals who are friends and allies of the United
States as well as committed Europeans.
Our nations are deeply indebted to the United States. Many of us know
firsthand how important your support for our freedom and independence was
during the dark Cold War years. U.S. engagement and support was essential
for the success of our democratic transitions after the Iron Curtain fell
twenty years ago. Without Washington's vision and leadership, it is doubtful
that we would be in NATO and even the EU today.
We have worked to reciprocate and make this relationship a two-way street.
We are Atlanticist voices within NATO and the EU. Our nations have been
engaged alongside the United States in the Balkans, Iraq, and today in
Afghanistan. While our contribution may at times seem modest compared to
your own, it is significant when measured as a percentage of our population
and GDP. Having benefited from your support for liberal democracy and
liberal values in the past, we have been among your strongest supporters
when it comes to promoting democracy and human rights around the world.
Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, however, we see that Central and
Eastern European countries are no longer at the heart of American foreign
policy. As the new Obama Administration sets its foreign-policy priorities,
our region is one part of the world that Americans have largely stopped
worrying about. Indeed, at times we have the impression that U.S. policy was
so successful that many American officials have now concluded that our
region is fixed once and for all and that they could "check the box" and
move on to other more pressing strategic issues. Relations have been so
close that many on both sides assume that the region's transatlantic
orientation, as well as its stability and prosperity, would last forever.
That view is premature. All is not well either in our region or in the
transatlantic relationship. Central and Eastern Europe is at a political
crossroads and today there is a growing sense of nervousness in the region.
The global economic crisis is impacting on our region and, as elsewhere,
runs the risk that our societies will look inward and be less engaged with
the outside world. At the same time, storm clouds are starting to gather on
the foreign policy horizon. Like you, we await the results of the EU
Commission's investigation on the origins of the Russo-Georgian war. But the
political impact of that war on the region has already been felt. Many
countries were deeply disturbed to see the Atlantic alliance stand by as
Russia violated the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter
of Paris, and the territorial integrity of a country that was a member of
NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euroatlantic Partnership Council -all
in the name of defending a sphere of influence on its borders.
Despite the efforts and significant contribution of the new members, NATO
today seems weaker than when we joined. In many of our countries it is
perceived as less and less relevant - and we feel it. Although we are full
members, people question whether NATO would be willing and able to come to
our defense in some future crises. Europe's dependence on Russian energy
also creates concern about the cohesion of the Alliance. President Obama's
remark at the recent NATO summit on the need to provide credible defense
plans for all Alliance members was welcome, but not sufficient to allay
fears about the Alliance´s defense readiness. Our ability to continue to
sustain public support at home for our contributions to Alliance missions
abroad also depends on us being able to show that our own security concerns
are being addressed in NATO and close cooperation with the United States
We must also recognize that America's popularity and influence have fallen
in many of our countries as well. Public opinions polls, including the
German Marshall Fund's own Transatlantic Trends survey, show that our region
has not been immune to the wave of criticism and anti-Americanism that has
swept Europe in recent years and which led to a collapse in sympathy and
support for the United States during the Bush years. Some leaders in the
region have paid a political price for their support of the unpopular war in
Iraq. In the future they may be more careful in taking political risks to
support the United States. We believe that the onset of a new Administration
has created a new opening to reverse this trend but it will take time and
work on both sides to make up for what we have lost.
In many ways the EU has become the major factor and institution in our
lives. To many people it seems more relevant and important today than the
link to the United States. To some degree it is a logical outcome of the
integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU. Our leaders and
officials spend much more time in EU meetings than in consultations with
Washington, where they often struggle to attract attention or make our
voices heard. The region's deeper integration in the EU is of course welcome
and should not necessarily lead to a weakening of the transatlantic
relationship. The hope was that integration of Central and Eastern Europe
into the EU would actually strengthen the strategic cooperation between
Europe and America.
However, there is a danger that instead of being a pro-Atlantic voice in the
EU, support for a more global partnership with Washington in the region
might wane over time. The region does not have the tradition of assuming a
more global role. Some items on the transatlantic agenda, such as climate
change, do not resonate in the Central and Eastern European publics to the
same extent as they do in Western Europe.
Leadership change is also coming in Central and Eastern Europe. Next to
those, there are fewer and fewer leaders who emerged from the revolutions of
1989 who experienced Washington's key role in securing our democratic
transition and anchoring our countries in NATO and EU. A new generation of
leaders is emerging who do not have these memories and follow a more
"realistic" policy. At the same time, the former Communist elites, whose
insistence on political and economic power significantly contributed to the
crises in many CEE countries, gradually disappear from the political scene.
The current political and economic turmoil and the fallout from the global
economic crisis provide additional opportunities for the forces of
nationalism, extremism, populism, and anti-Semitism across the continent but
also in some our countries.
This means that the United States is likely to lose many of its traditional
interlocutors in the region. The new elites replacing them may not share the
idealism - or have the same relationship to the United States - as the
generation who led the democratic transition. They may be more calculating
in their support of the United States as well as more parochial in their
world view. And in Washington a similar transition is taking place as many
of the leaders and personalities we have worked with and relied on are also
leaving politics.
And then there is the issue of how to deal with Russia. Our hopes that
relations with Russia would improve and that Moscow would finally fully
accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining NATO and the
EU have not been fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back as a revisionist power
pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods. At a
global level, Russia has become, on most issues, a status-quo power. But at
a regional level and vis-a-vis our nations, it increasingly acts as a
revisionist one. It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences.
It asserts a privileged position in determining our security choices. It
uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy
blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media
manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the
transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.
We welcome the "reset" of the American-Russian relations. As the countries
living closest to Russia, obviously nobody has a greater interest in the
development of the democracy in Russia and better relations between Moscow
and the West than we do. But there is also nervousness in our capitals. We
want to ensure that too narrow an understanding of Western interests does
not lead to the wrong concessions to Russia. Today the concern is, for
example, that the United States and the major European powers might embrace
the Medvedev plan for a "Concert of Powers" to replace the continent's
existing, value-based security structure. The danger is that Russia's
creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region could over time
lead to a de facto neutralization of the region. There are differing views
within the region when it comes to Moscow's new policies. But there is a
shared view that the full engagement of the United States is needed.
Many in the region are looking with hope to the Obama Administration to
restore the Atlantic relationship as a moral compass for their domestic as
well as foreign policies. A strong commitment to common liberal democratic
values is essential to our countries. We know from our own historical
experience the difference between when the United States stood up for its
liberal democratic values and when it did not. Our region suffered when the
United States succumbed to "realism" at Yalta. And it benefited when the
United States used its power to fight for principle. That was critical
during the Cold War and in opening the doors of NATO. Had a "realist" view
prevailed in the early 1990s, we would not be in NATO today and the idea of
a Europe whole, free, and at peace would be a distant dream.
We understand the heavy demands on your Administration and on U.S. foreign
policy. It is not our intent to add to the list of problems you face.
Rather, we want to help by being strong Atlanticist allies in a
U.S.-European partnership that is a powerful force for good around the
world. But we are not certain where our region will be in five or ten years
time given the domestic and foreign policy uncertainties we face. We need to
take the right steps now to ensure the strong relationship between the
United States and Central and Eastern Europe over the past twenty years will
endure.
We believe this is a time both the United States and Europe need to reinvest
in the transatlantic relationship. We also believe this is a time when the
United States and Central and Eastern Europe must reconnect around a new and
forward-looking agenda. While recognizing what has been achieved in the
twenty years since the fall of the Iron Curtain, it is time to set a new
agenda for close cooperation for the next twenty years across the Atlantic.
Therefore, we propose the following steps:
First, we are convinced that America needs Europe and that Europe needs the
United States as much today as in the past. The United States should
reaffirm its vocation as a European power and make clear that it plans to
stay fully engaged on the continent even while it faces the pressing
challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the wider Middle East, and Asia. For
our part we must work at home in our own countries and in Europe more
generally to convince our leaders and societies to adopt a more global
perspective and be prepared to shoulder more responsibility in partnership
with the United States.
Second, we need a renaissance of NATO as the most important security link
between the United States and Europe. It is the only credible hard power
security guarantee we have. NATO must reconfirm its core function of
collective defense even while we adapt to the new threats of the 21st
century. A key factor in our ability to participate in NATO's expeditionary
missions overseas is the belief that we are secure at home. We must
therefore correct some self-inflicted wounds from the past. It was a mistake
not to commence with proper Article 5 defense planning for new members after
NATO was enlarged. NATO needs to make the Alliance's commitments credible
and provide strategic reassurance to all members. This should include
contingency planning, prepositioning of forces, equipment, and supplies for
reinforcement in our region in case of crisis as originally envisioned in
the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
We should also re-think the working of the NATO-Russia Council and return to
the practice where NATO member countries enter into dialogue with Moscow
with a coordinated position. When it comes to Russia, our experience has
been that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not
only strengthen the West's security but will ultimately lead Moscow to
follow a more cooperative policy as well. Furthermore, the more secure we
feel inside NATO, the easier it will also be for our countries to reach out
to engage Moscow on issues of common interest. That is the dual track
approach we need and which should be reflected in the new NATO strategic
concept.
Third, the thorniest issue may well be America's planned missile-defense
installations. Here too, there are different views in the region, including
among our publics which are divided. Regardless of the military merits of
this scheme and what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has
nevertheless also become -- at least in some countries -- a symbol of
America's credibility and commitment to the region. How it is handled could
have a significant impact on their future transatlantic orientation. The
small number of missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia's strategic
capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide the future of the
program as allies and based on the strategic plusses and minuses of the
different technical and political configurations. The Alliance should not
allow the issue to be determined by unfounded Russian opposition. Abandoning
the program entirely or involving Russia too deeply in it without consulting
Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of the United
States across the whole region.
Fourth, we know that NATO alone is not enough. We also want and need more
Europe and a better and more strategic U.S.-EU relationship as well.
Increasingly our foreign policies are carried out through the European Union
- and we support that. We also want a common European foreign and defense
policy that is open to close cooperation with the United States. We are the
advocates of such a line in the EU. But we need the United States to rethink
its attitude toward the EU and engage it much more seriously as a strategic
partner. We need to bring NATO and the EU closer together and make them work
in tandem. We need common NATO and EU strategies not only toward Russia but
on a range of other new strategic challenges.
Fifth is energy security. The threat to energy supplies can exert an
immediate influence on our nations' political sovereignty also as allies
contributing to common decisions in NATO. That is why it must also become a
transatlantic priority. Although most of the responsibility for energy
security lies within the realm of the EU, the United States also has a role
to play. Absent American support, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline would
never have been built. Energy security must become an integral part of
U.S.-European strategic cooperation. Central and Eastern European countries
should lobby harder (and with more unity) inside Europe for diversification
of the energy mix, suppliers, and transit routes, as well as for tough legal
scrutiny of Russia's abuse of its monopoly and cartel-like power inside the
EU. But American political support on this will play a crucial role.
Similarly, the United States can play an important role in solidifying
further its support for the Nabucco pipeline, particularly in using its
security relationship with the main transit country, Turkey, as well as the
North-South interconnector of Central Europe and LNG terminals in our
region.
Sixth, we must not neglect the human factor. Our next generations need to
get to know each other, too. We have to cherish and protect the multitude of
educational, professional, and other networks and friendships that underpin
our friendship and alliance. The U.S. visa regime remains an obstacle in
this regard. It is absurd that Poland and Romania -- arguably the two
biggest and most pro-American states in the CEE region, which are making
substantial contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan -- have not yet been
brought into the visa waiver program. It is incomprehensible that a critic
like the French anti-globalization activist Jose Bove does not require a
visa for the United States but former Solidarity activist and Nobel Peace
prizewinner Lech Walesa does. This issue will be resolved only if it is made
a political priority by the President of the United States.
The steps we made together since 1989 are not minor in history. The common
successes are the proper foundation for the transatlantic renaissance we
need today. This is why we believe that we should also consider the creation
of a Legacy Fellowship for young leaders. Twenty years have passed since the
revolutions of 1989. That is a whole generation. We need a new generation to
renew the transatlantic partnership. A new program should be launched to
identify those young leaders on both sides of the Atlantic who can carry
forward the transatlantic project we have spent the last two decades
building in Central and Eastern Europe.
In conclusion, the onset of a new Administration in the United States has
raised great hopes in our countries for a transatlantic renewal. It is an
opportunity we dare not miss. We, the authors of this letter, know firsthand
how important the relationship with the United States has been. In the
1990s, a large part of getting Europe right was about getting Central and
Eastern Europe right. The engagement of the United States was critical to
locking in peace and stability from the Baltics to the Black Sea. Today the
goal must be to keep Central and Eastern Europe right as a stable, activist,
and Atlanticist part of our broader community.
That is the key to our success in bringing about the renaissance in the
Alliance the Obama Administration has committed itself to work for and which
we support. That will require both sides recommitting to and investing in
this relationship. But if we do it right, the pay off down the road can be
very real. By taking the right steps now, we can put it on new and solid
footing for the future.
-----
Valdas Adamkus - Former President of the Republic of Lithuania
Martin Butora - Former Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United States
Emil Constantinescu - Former President of the Republic of Romania
Pavol Demes - Former Minister of International Relations and Advisor to the President, Slovak Republic
Lubos Dobrovsky - Former Defense Minister of the Czech Republic, former Ambassador to Russia
Matyas Eorsi - Former Secretary of State of the Hungarian MFA
Istvan Gyarmati - Ambassador, President of the International Centre for Democratic Transition in Budapest
Vaclav Havel - Former President of the Czech Republic
Rastislav Kacer - Former Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United States
Sandra Kalniete - Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia
Karel Schwarzenberg - Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic
Michal Kovac - Former President of the Slovak Republic
Ivan Krastev - Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria
Alexander Kwasniewski - Former President of the Republic of Poland
Mart Laar - Former Prime Minister of Estonia
Kadri Liik - Director of the International Centre for Defense Studies in Tallinn, Estonia
Janos Martonyi - Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hungary
Janusz Onyszkiewicz - Former Vice-president of the European Parliament, former Defense Minister, Poland
Adam Rotfeld - Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland
Alexandr Vondra - Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, Czech Republic
Vaira Vike-Freiberga - Former President of the Republic Latvia
Lech Walesa - Former President of the Republic of Poland
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