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July 06, 2009Russian Editorial: Can't Start with a Clean Slate
Russian political establishment will hang on every word uttered at the US-Russian meetings in Moscow for the next three days. With so much being said and analyzed prior to Obama's visit, this particular commentary is worthy of notice. Aleksei Pushkov is the Director of the Institute of International Problems at the Diplomatic Academy of Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a Professor at MGIMO - Moscow State University of International Affairs (the most prestigious institution of its kind in Russia). In a lengthy commentary to the daily "Izvestia," Pushkov outlined major themes and thoughts prior to the U.S. president's arrival.
(Full text of editorial after the jump)
In the Kremlin and the White House, there is a feeling that you need to change something. There is a feeling in the United States administration that the original U.S. priorities, such as Iran's nuclear program, require a review of relations with Russia, and that Iran is much more important to the United States than the transformation of Georgia or South Ossetia into the main issue between Washington and Moscow. Of course, the Obama administration does not recognize either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, but it clearly does not want to limit its free hand in its relations with Russia because of the longer regional challenges. Secondly, Moscow, too, is tired of the constant rhetorical shift - and not just rhetorical - tired of the 'rope pulling' with the United States.The politics of 'cold peace' with Russia gave little to America. But does this mean that the Obama administration is ready to seriously update the policy on the Russian direction? This is a big issue. Some in the US political establishment think that our bilateral relations will be 'more of the same,' but in another rhetorical packaging, with another president, There is a second point of view - some in the US believe that America is indeed doing a deep rethinking of the role of the United States in the modern world. And in this rethinking, relations with Russia occupy a central place. This remind same of the proverbial 'is the glass half-empty or half-full' dilemma. But either way, there are several problems with either approach.
Russia and the United States can not start completely from scratch. The idea of a 'new beginning,' which was outlined by President Dmitry Medvedev that is in one way or another is supported by Barack Obama, is a very attractive approach. Moreover: it is promising, if that will be the will of the ruling elite. But it will be difficult to start with a clean slate. America will not be able to forget about Georgia and Ukraine, Russia also can not forget about what is happening in Kiev and Tbilisi. In the United States, the issue of NATO enlargement to the east is not closed - it is a boosted by enthusiastic supporters. It is unlikely that in the United States and Russia will be able to forget about plans for deployment of missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. In short, there is a political legacy with which we have to deal - it can not be put outside the brackets of our 'new' relationship.
Now, there is much hope in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament, which began in the second half of May. Perhaps the parties will sign a new contract. But Bush and Putin also signed such an arms control agreement in May 2002 - but has that contract strongly influenced the nature of the relationship? Not at all. It was a separate issue and had no impact on the overall context of relations between Russia and the United States.
At the same time, the Obama administration Obama says nothing about its willingness to part with a major symbol of the Cold War - the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Russians already have accepted that it will remain in force. It seems that every year by decree the President of the United States, the amendment is suspended for one year, so that next year again it goes into force and impedes trade with Russia. No matter how many times George W. Bush promised to Vladimir Putin to repeal the amendment, it has not been abolished to this date. The point is that when the United States needed support to Russia on important issues, then every time Washington has promised to repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in exchange for support from Russia, for example, on Iran. Today, few people are waiting for its abolition - in Russia and the United States. The American elite does not want to part with this political legacy of the past.
So we cannot start with a clean slate, nor should we pretend that it will be possible. On May 15, in an interview with Chinese journalists, President Dmitry Medvedev said that for Russia, the question of recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been resolved and is not negotiable. However, it is clear that the Obama administration did not agree with us - Vice President Biden has already said that the United States does not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is clear that the United States will continue supporting and arming Georgia, although perhaps not as actively as under Bush, but will still do so - and is already doing so.
A reasonable minimum that is required is restraint on the issues. Since the U.S. leadership said that it doe snot recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the mood in Moscow is not improving, but America is not seeking anything other than regular pronouncements that juts "shake the air." Such shocks would be wise to give up on both sides - for the sake of establishing a constructive dialogue.
Perhaps we should also try to understand our American partners, and not expect immediate changes in the position of the Obama administration. It is harder for America to change its policy than for Russia. In the 1990s, our policy was reactive. In most situations, Moscow responded to actions by the United States. We have only in recent years begun major initiatives of its own: the creation of rapid reaction forces within the CSTO, the idea of collective security treaty in Europe, the development and strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. But until recently, Russia only reacted - to the aggression against Yugoslavia, the Western alliance, the NATO expansion, the plans to deploy missile defense in Europe, the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the U.S. pressure on Iran.
So now we can not say that the situation is 50 percent dependent on Russia, and 50 percent of the United States as, say, during the first détente between Moscow and Washington in the 1970s. Today, much more depends on America. That United States was the initiator of major strategic actions - from the bombing of Belgrade, to the occupation of Iraq, to the expansion of NATO eastward to the plans for missile defense elements in Eastern Europe, to the establishment of its military bases in Central Asia before the war in Afghanistan. Thus, we can not talk about parity in the sphere of foreign policy activity of the U.S. The changes in U.S. policy will determine if our dialogue can become more meaningful.
If the Obama administration will not be able - or willing - to change the settings that have determined U.S. foreign policy under Bush administration, then the dialogue will be more limited, and Russian foreign policy will be confronted with the old approaches that are already established in Washington. If the Obama administration is seriously determined on "resetting" our relations, it should consider more carefully Russian initiatives as well.
The situation is also complicated by the fact that no sooner had Obama put forward the idea of a 'reset,' it then came a powerful attack in the United States. All the opponents of Russia, joined by representatives of Russia's pro-American liberal opposition, accused the Obama that he was going to 'surrender' the 'American ideals,' and begin the 'appeasement' of Russia. Thus, the idea of a "reset" is faced with significant domestic opposition in the United States. And this internal opposition will be difficult to overcome. The hostility to Russia is deep, from the start of the Cold War, it was the flesh and blood of American policy, and like a virus, it lives in the American political body, and lets itself be known from time to time. In addition, the United States has a very strong 'inertia of expansion.' This idea, which was put forth by Charles Krauthammer in the early 1990's, is that America is the most powerful world power, is self-sufficient and able to do everything, that the U.S. has sufficient forces to resolve all issues and establish total hegemony.
However, in practice, the idea of hegemony was totally false. And now, many in America, it seems, starting from Obama himself, believe that the United States can not be master of the world. Eminent experts recognized: a 'unipolar moment' has passed, and the United States has to realize that it lives in the multipolar world. However, in America, there remains a tremendous inertia for 'unipolarity,' both psychological and political - Americans think that 'we are still the strongest and most democratic nation, and therefore have a moral right to do anything that others have no right for.' This is a deeply rooted ideology - the main reason for the negative attitude to 'reset' in the American political class.
We are hoping that at the July summit in Moscow, the very blurred contours of the 'reset' policy in U.S.-Russian relations will gain greater clarity.
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