With more than 1,400 of his country's citizens killed in three months of protests, the president of Syria gave a speech on 20 June. It was the third time that Bashar al-Assad had addressed the nation since the Arab Spring reached Syria, but his renewed promises of dialogue and reform failed to convince the opposition; four days later they staged the biggest day of protest yet against the regime. The situation inside Syria has continued to deteriorate, especially after a violent crackdown in the northern town of Jisr al-Shughour and an exodus of thousands to Turkey. But despite concerns of a growing humanitarian crisis, the international response has been very different to that in Libya.
The consensus that led to military action over Libya has never existed where Syria is concerned. The country is a geostrategic linchpin, and instability there has greater ramifications for the region. The West's limited leverage over Damascus has forced it to tread softly, while the so-called Libya hangover effect has further dampened any aspirations to intervene. Permanent UN Security Council members Russia and China feel that the resolution allowing 'all necessary measures' to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Libya was 'over-interpreted'. So while the United States and the European Union have placed sanctions on the Syrian regime, they have failed to obtain a UN resolution condemning Syria for its brutal crackdown on protests.
From bad to worse
Syria's powerful security apparatus was able to contain smaller demonstrations in February inspired by the protests in Tunisia and Egypt; indeed it may have deterred some early protests. But in mid-March, civilians were killed by security forces in protests in the southwestern town of Deraa, and the uprising gained momentum. Marchers demanded 'hurriyya' (freedom) across scores of cities, including Baniyas and Latakia on the western coast, Hama and Homs further south, and, to a lesser extent, the capital Damascus.
The government made some concessions to the opposition, releasing political prisoners and lifting an emergency law that had been in place since the ruling Baath Party seized power in 1963. However, as more protesters were killed in security crackdowns their funerals became focal points for further demonstrations. On 22 April, dubbed 'Great Friday' by human-rights activists, mass protests were organised across the country. Three days later, tanks rolled into Deraa, beginning a lengthy siege. Throughout the country, more than 10,000 protesters have been arbitrarily imprisoned.
Two events fuelled the latest violence. There was outrage and intensified protest over the torture and death of Hamza al-Khatib, a 13-year-old boy detained by the intelligence services in late May during a march against the ongoing Deraa siege. Meanwhile, the deaths of security personnel during a stand-off in early June in the northern town of Jisr al-Shughour were followed by another government decision to send in tanks. As troops moved across the surrounding countryside, burning fields and crops en route, thousands of residents fled into neighbouring Turkey.
With foreign journalists banned from Syria, it has been difficult to evaluate conflicting government and opposition accounts of events. In his 20 June speech, Assad blamed 'saboteurs' for the recent violence, while official spokespeople have repeatedly claimed that Syria is facing an armed insurgency or religiously motivated terrorists bent on implementing a foreign plot to overthrow the regime. The opposition, however, insists it is peaceful and says the security personnel who died were trying to defect when they were shot by regime loyalists.
Jisr al-Shughour was a perfect example of the thick fog of this war. Syrian state media reported that armed groups inside the city attacked a police station, leading to violent clashes and the death of 120 security personnel. Residents say instead that the dead security personnel were army recruits who refused to fire on protesters and were shot in the back by intelligence officers. This latter version was apparently borne out in a video posted on YouTube, in which an officer of the army's 11th battalion announced his defection, but rumours still abound. (A BBC investigation may be the closest yet to a full account, although the idea that there is some truth to both sides' accounts has been put forward elsewhere.)
All of this makes it more difficult to understand what might happen next in Syria. Some government attempts at media management might strain credulity, and it is tempting to compare Assad's speechifying and unfulfilled promises of reform to that of Tunisia's ousted Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak. However, the army's decision not to back the regime against protesters was crucial in both those revolutions, and in Syria it is unclear just how far away such a development might be.
Potential for sectarianism
Since Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez al-Assad, became president in 1971 power in Syria has been concentrated in the hands of an Alawite minority. The Alawis, a heterodox Shia Muslim sect who account for 10-15% of the Syrian population, rule over a country that is almost 75% Sunni Muslim (including Kurds in the north, who have other grievances against the government). Other minorities include Shi'ites, Christians and Druze. The Alawis assumed an increasingly powerful position in the top ranks of the military during French colonial rule (1922-46), and eventually came to dominate the socialist Baath party - despite the fact that many Alawis have suffered under Baathist rule.
Although a moderniser, Assad senior was an authoritarian whose repressive rule provoked much opposition. He was notorious for ordering the massacre of at least 10,000 civilians to put down an uprising in Hama in 1982. His son, a mild-mannered ophthalmologist, pledged an era of reform when he succeeded his father in 2000. But after a 'Damascus spring' year of relative openness, he has never delivered on this promise, thanks largely to hardline elements within his government.
The current protests are the worst challenge to the regime since 1982, and while they began as a grassroots movement for constitutional and political reforms, the prolonged conflict has also given rise to fears of a sectarian rift. Most ordinary army troops come from the Sunni majority (around 175,000 of a total 220,000 personnel are conscripts) and there have been reports of low-level defections in Deraa and Baniyas. However, the government has relied on loyalist Alawite army divisions in putting down dissent, and has co-opted criminal Alawite gangs, the Shabbiha. Activists also accuse it of arming Alawi civilians.
Troops involved in retaking Jisr al-Shughour in early June were largely from the army's elite Fourth Division, comprising loyalist Alawis and led by the president's hardline brother Maher al-Assad. The same division was earlier used to impose a crackdown in Deraa when Fifth Division troops reportedly refused to fire on protesters. The Shabbiha, meanwhile, have been particularly active in the Alawi strongholds around Latakia and Baniyas, as well as being implicated in crackdowns in Homs and Deraa, where they were blamed for the torture of Hamza al-Khatib. Residents of some cities say that the number of Mukhabarat, or secret police, on the streets has tripled.
Fragmented opposition
Many opposition activists have resisted the government's sectarian tactics. As Friday, the day of prayer, has also become the day of protest, one was named the Friday of Saleh Ali, an Alawite leader of the anti-French resistance. A popular chant has been: 'One, one, one, the Syrian people are one.'
However, the Syrian opposition is quite disparate. The driving force has been young people with access to the Internet agitating for constitutional reform and a genuine system of representation. Independent online activists such as Ausama Monajed, Wissam Tarif and Razan Zaiouneh have been important conduits of information through Twitter and other social media, circumventing a state media blackout (and attempts to control the online environment). They have been joined by Kurdish dissenters. Veteran opposition figures such as Riad Seif have also been involved in recent demonstrations, while established figures from the Hafez al-Assad government and prominent business figures have joined the ranks abroad.
There have been several attempts to try to form a coherent and unified front. In late April, a group of 150 activists calling itself the National Initiative for Change called on the army to protect Syrian civilians and to facilitate a national transition to democracy. A statement released by the group, based both inside Syria and abroad, provided a roadmap, including the drafting of an interim constitution, the monitoring of presidential and parliamentary elections, and the dissolution of the Baath party.
At a conference in the Turkish city of Antalya on 3 June, activists elected a 31-member consultative council to represent the Syrian opposition abroad. The meeting brought together secularists with Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite an initial threat to boycott, Kurd delegates also attended. The meeting agreed a declaration calling on the president to resign immediately and transfer power to his vice-president, Farouk al-Sharaa, but tensions between various factions were reported during conference proceedings. A meeting in Damascus on Monday 27 June showed further splits in the opposition. While one-day conference called for a peaceful transition to democracy, it was criticised by activists from the Coordination Union of the Syrian Revolt as a government-sponsored ploy.
International dimension
Under Assad, Syria has been a strong opponent of the West, and a strong ally both of Iran and Hizbullah in Lebanon. Damascus was suspected of involvement in the assassination of Western-leaning Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, and has been accused of shipping weapons to Hizbullah. Two Iranian warships that controversially sailed through the Suez Canal in February docked in Syria's main port of Latakia, while Iran is claimed to be providing material support to the Syrian crackdown on protests, as well as sharing 'lessons learned' from the suppression of the 2009 Green Revolution.
Some therefore look forward to the regime's demise as a means of breaking the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah nexus. However, this could provoke a backlash from Iran and Hizbullah - particularly if a Western military intervention were launched - and unleash other unpredictable consequences. Although an Islamist takeover is unlikely and Assad has cynically exploited the notion of 'Après moi, le déluge', a change of government in Damascus would inevitably alter the balance of power in the Middle East. In mid-May, the unexpected Nakba day protests on the Syrian-Israeli border near the disputed Golan Heights demonstrated how even Syria's enemy Israel has come to rely on the Assad regime to exert control. The flight of refugees into Lebanon, where Damascus still has influence, could be another destabilising development.
Faced with such a complex situation, the international response has been slow and uncertain. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has gone from calling Assad a 'reformer' at the end of March to saying that his legitimacy had 'nearly run out' in early June. The US has imposed sanctions on Assad and several officials; the EU has extended its sanctions to his brother Maher ('the overseer of violence against demonstrators'), other Cabinet members and, most recently, to three members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard for 'providing equipment and support to help the Syrian regime suppress protests in Syria'.
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé has also declared that Assad has 'lost his legitimacy to rule'. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, until recently a close Assad ally, has also joined the chorus of condemnation by demanding the Syrian leader 'refrain from violence and draw up and implement reforms'.
Moment of truth?
Meanwhile, the protest movement continues to gain momentum inside Syria, with nothing but the president's departure now likely to satisfy the opposition. With dissent within his country now too widespread for Assad to ignore, some analysts are hoping Syria's fast-degenerating economy will also prove a fatal weakness. In this context, the fact that protests have finally reached the country's second city and commercial hub, Aleppo, may be particularly significant. And how things now play out in Syria depends on whether Assad and his officials meeting growing dissent with ever-repressive force - or blink.