The downfall of Colonel Gaddafi was triggered by young rebels who overthrew a brutal dictator with scrounged arms and almost no military leadership and coordination - albeit with substantial and certainly pivotal NATO support.
Although this poses serious questions regarding the control of this somewhat ragtag liberation army when the fighting stops, it is clearly a victory for the people of Libya. It is their revolution. The new Libya can be what they make of it.
Without NATO support, it is unlikely the Gaddafi regime could have been defeated. And it may be necessary for NATO to provide military training and coordination of security forces in a liberated Libya. But, this will be a call that Libyans will make. As they made it their revolution, they need to make it their reconstruction - albeit with substantial external assistance for rebuilding oil production infrastructure so the new government can leverage renewed oil revenues. Hopefully, the Libyans will have learned from the Iraqi experience and will not dismantle institutions necessary for day-to-day operation of society even as they create new institutions of civil society to replace the bizarre personality cult of Gaddafi.
There are commonalities about the self-determination movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and now Syria. They are nationalistic movements led by young people using social media. They are mostly secular and decidedly home grown. And each has its unique characteristics. For example, Egypt's strong military ultimately joined in the overthrow of Mubarak, while the Libyan military was not strong enough to save Gaddafi nor flexible enough to become a major player for the future. And the Syrian outcome is not yet clear.
Some pundits have claimed that President Obama doesn't have a coherent foreign policy doctrine.
Yet there is a remarkably consistent conceptual framework in Obama's foreign policy, running from his Nobel Prize speech in December 2009 to his position on the Arab Spring, including Libya. It is remarkable both for its consistency and for its content.
Over-simplified, it takes each situation case-by-case (echoing Colin Powell a decade ago). Balances American national interests and values. Realizes that America's international power is not just military but also economic and moral, and that it depends in no small measure on domestic strength. It then reaches out to internationalize, to foster and leverage coalitions and consensus, rather than proceeding unilaterally. Robust, yet often discreet, multilateral diplomatic engagement comes first in any international conflict. It does not shrink from applying military force, but strives to mobilize others in support of its use. And when force is used, wherever possible civilians must be spared from violence. Limited goals. Limited means. A pragmatic foreign policy that has played out clearly and successfully in the case of Libya. With regional leadership bolstered by American support rather than relying on the U.S. always to take the first step, or to commit the majority of the resources. This is the essence of concerted action in the broader international interest.
The Arab League condemned and ostracized Gaddafi. France early on recognized the rebel leaders even before they could be characterized as a provisional government. France and Britain rallied a NATO consensus for military action to protect civilians and prevent Gaddafi's forces from pulverizing the nascent rebels, and eventually to arm and assist them by destroying Gaddafi's military superiority. All under authority of a unanimous UN Security Council Resolution in 1973 authorizing "all necessary measures to protect civilians" - passed 10-0 with abstentions - read acquiescence - by Brazil, China, India, Germany and Russia.
In an eerily prescient passage, Obama's 2009 Oslo address declared: "More and more, we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region. ... That is why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace." But these are not the only principles applied to Libya.
The roles of the Arab League, the UN Resolution and NATO were essential because "in a world in which threats are more diffuse, and missions more complex, America cannot act alone." Even limited consensus and ad hoc coalitions are preferable in a world where there lingers "a reflexive suspicion of America, the world's sole military superpower."
This was a central concern as America viewed the popular uprisings in Iran during and following the last Iranian presidential elections. Obama was urged to publicly support the protestors. Yet many of those who were opposed to Ahmadinejad warned against such support because it would undermine their efforts by lending credence to Ahmadinejad's charge that they were orchestrated and financed by CIA - -harking back to the 1953 overthrow of the Mosaddegh government.
Another core principle in the Oslo speech emphasized that for "those who violate international law by brutalizing their own people. There must be consequences ... peace is unstable where citizens are denied the right to speak freely or worship as they please; choose their own leaders or assemble without fear. Pent up grievances fester, and the suppression of tribal and religious identity can lead to violence ... No matter how callously defined, neither America's interests - nor the world's - are served by the denial of human aspirations." The Gaddafi indictments by the International Criminal Court further underscored the "consequences" for dictators who kill and otherwise brutalize protesters.
The world has been mesmerized by live TV coverage, YouTube videos and cellphone narratives of the Arab Spring, witness to the courageous actions by thousands of civilians who can no longer tolerate the brutal, corrupt regimes that deny them dignity and the chance for better lives. It has seen less of the turmoil and bloody repression currently going on in Syria because the Assad regime has successfully blocked most Internet and cell-phone communications with the outside world.
The Syrian situation is more complex than Libya was, in many ways, ranging from size (6 vs 21 million people) to location, to Syria's lack of rebel leadership able to mount armed resistance. Nonetheless, hundreds of thousands of unarmed Syrian civilians are regularly turning out after Friday prayers to demand Assad step down.and equally regularly hundreds are killed by security forces (the civilian death toll was recently estimated by the UN as more than 2,200). A clear case of a regime and its leaders "brutalizing their own people."
While the principles are the same, situations differ. Turkey has modified its "zero problems with neighbors" stance to condemn Assad and demand that Syria end the crackdown on the dissidents "immediately and unconditionally." Iran, which is believed to be aiding Assad in suppressing the demonstrations out of concern that one of its key allies could topple, is believed to be urging Turkey to mediate between Assad and his opponents to avoid regime change. Arab states in the region have supported UN Human Rights Council condemnation of the violence.
But within the UN Security Council, the dynamics are more complex. With the US, Britain and France pushing for sanctions and a trade embargo, Russia seems ready to veto a Libya-style Security Council resolution. Meanwhile, India and Brazil may insist that any UN action forbid military action.
Internal Syrian dynamics also seem more complex than did Libyan politics, where few other than elite military groups continued to support Gaddafi. The many different tribes and sects inside Syria all fear chaos that could result from a disorderly collapse of the Assad regime.
All of these factors interact in complex ways that follow their own dynamics and schedules. Sometimes, as Woodrow Wilson said many years ago, the most practical position is "watchful waiting." Something often hard for impatient Americans.