Two years after the uprising that ended the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt remains unsettled. Repeated changes to the rules of its political system have made for a bumpy and contentious transition in which many interested parties - the military, the judiciary, Islamist factions, the fragmented secular opposition, anarchist groups and labour movements - are jostling to impose themselves.
In January 2013, following several days of street violence, Egypt's defence minister and armed forces commander General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi issued a warning: 'Disagreement [between political factions] on running the affairs of the country may lead to the collapse of the state and threatens the future of the coming generation.' This alarming assessment reflected deep concerns in the military - and in society more broadly - about Egypt's trajectory and the capacity of the new government to run the country effectively.
In recent months, the Muslim Brotherhood - the Islamist movement behind President Muhammad Morsi - is perceived to have carried out a power grab. Executive orders were issued giving Morsi additional authority - later rescinded following protests. A draft constitution provoked controversy over its clauses on religion and because of anaemic political reforms, but was passed in a referendum on a low turnout. A sense that the Brotherhood was appropriating power has been compounded by appointments in the civil service, a crackdown on the press and a failure to fulfil political promises.
These events have precipitated a deterioration in public order and the economy. Political brinkmanship ahead of legislative elections in April could deepen divisions in society further still.
Morsi in power
Since his election in June 2012, Morsi has become a polarising figure. His narrow electoral victory was won by obtaining reluctant backing in the final round from secular groups who led the 2011 revolution (after the Brotherhood recanted on its initial promise not to field a candidate for the presidential election). Popular mistrust of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was sidelined from politicsunder the Mubarak regime, was demonstrated by the considerable support for the losing candidate, Ahmed Shafik, a former military officer and Mubarak establishment figure who was recently charged with the misappropriation of public funds. Morsi himself was not the Brotherhood's first choice as presidential candidate: it instead favoured Khairat al-Shater, a wealthy businessman widely seen as its prime political leader, who was disqualified over a prior conviction.
Morsi, at first seen as a weak president overshadowed by a dominant military, moved with surprising speed to consolidate power. In August 2012, the killing of Egyptian soldiers in an incident on the increasingly lawless Sinai Peninsula gave him the opportunity to overhaul the military's leadership by sidelining its top two commanders, Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and General Sami Hafez Anan. Heading the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the two men had led the country's political transition following Mubarak's resignation in February 2011. Al-Sisi succeeded Tantawi as the head of the SCAF.
Whether or not their ousting resulted from a secret deal between the Brotherhood and younger officers remains a matter of controversy. But the move won goodwill towards Morsi among revolutionaries who saw the military as a brake on democracy and as being intent on preserving its autonomy and privileges.
He enhanced his authority further by playing, to foreign plaudits, a role in ending the November fighting between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Morsi then made a highly controversial move. By presidential decree, he granted himself immunity from judicial action against his executive decisions. He - and the Brotherhood - feared that the judiciary, which it saw as still dominated by Mubarak holdovers, would challenge presidential decisions. Street protests and a massive outcry forced Morsi to rescind his decree in December.
Constitution criticised
The Muslim Brotherhood derives significant legitimacy from its victories at the polls: it won the largest share of seats in the National Assembly; it secured the presidency; and a constitution was approved in a referendum. However, it believes that its detractors seek to undermine its political mandate - a view fuelled by an enshrined sense of victimhood derived from its exclusion from politics under the autocratic military leaders that had ruled Egypt since 1952. While formally banned until 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an ambiguous relationship with the state, participating at times in national elections and being active in professional organisations and charitable work, but also suffering from state repression. (Morsi himself was sent to jail several times, including during the last days of Mubarak's rule).
Each of its electoral successes has indeed been contested. In April 2012, the courts dissolved the Constituent Assembly, established to draft a constitution, and in June the SCAF-backed Supreme Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the National Assembly, in which Islamist parties held a majority, on a technicality (rules about independent candidates had not been rightly applied). Non-Islamist politicians and civil-society activists, decrying the dominance of Islamists, have mounted boycotts of the second, Assembly-appointed Constituent Assembly, which was also established to draft the constitution.
The constitution was criticised for being long-winded, vague and open to competing interpretations. Secular revolutionaries complained that it was too Islamist in character and not genuinely reformist. They sought the strengthening of the civil state, and protested provisions that enshrined Islamist principles and gave clerics an expanded role in overseeing legislation.
Article 2 of the constitution states that the principles of Islamic sharia law are the main sources of legislation. Article 219 narrows these sources down to those recognised in the Sunni school of thought. Under Article 4, Al Azhar, Egypt's top centre of Sunni learning and jurisprudence,is to be consulted in all matters pertaining to sharia. Salafists had pushed for the insertion of Articles 4 and 219 to ensure strict compliance with interpretations of sharia according to complex Sunni jurisprudence.
While freedom of religion is asserted, this extends only to the Muslim, Christian and Jewish faiths, and not to groups such as the Baha'is. In addition, the constitution has an expansive definition of blasphemy.
The omission of clauses specifically protecting the rights of women and children raised concerns that both groups would be vulnerable to a more rigid Islamic legal framework.
In addition, despite calls for security reform, the constitution does not provide for greater civilian oversight of the military, and even allows for the prosecution of civilians in military courts, reinforcing suspicions of collusion between the Brotherhood and the military leadership.
Because of criticism of the drafting body's make-up, and fears that the judiciary would suspend it (which prompted Morsi's presidential decree granting his decisions legal immunity), the Constituent Assemblyrushed through its approval of the 234-article document in November 2012. The December referendum, in which the constitution was passed with 64% of the vote, was marred by a turnout of only 33%.
A further sign of the complex legal and political dynamics complicating the transition is the recent ruling by the Supreme Constitutional Court that the electoral law governing the upcoming legislative elections in April contravenes the constitution. Egypt's Upper House, the Shura Council, will, therefore, have to review and amend that law. The constitution, however, stipulates that procedures for parliamentary elections must begin within 60 days of its ratification. As this took place on 25 December, the 60-day period will come to an end on 23 February. Serious doubts are looming whether the Shura Council can meet this tight deadline. If not, there is a risk the elections will be delayed.
Growing disenchantment
Critics of the Muslim Brotherhood assert that, given Egypt's heterogeneous fabric, its
'majoritarian approach'to politics and governance ignores the role of other actors in bringing about political change, and is designed to marginalise them. Protesters have demanded the resignation of the government and have vilified Morsi himself. Morsi has adopted a style of governance that, detractors contend, prioritises the interests of the Brotherhood over those of the nation. Appointments in the government, senior civil service and in the provinces have reinforced the perception of a power monopoly. Despite pledging to include a broad segment of the population in decision-making, the balance between the executive and legislative branches has not been decisively altered. The constitution has largely preserved the powers of the presidency.
Publicly, Brotherhood figures have at times responded by accusing its critics of being criminals, anarchists, remnants of the Mubarak regime and agents of foreign powers. Brotherhood leaders have also complained about unfair treatment given the magnitude of their task, their short term in office, and the constraints imposed by the military and judiciary. They say that the country's challenges demand a political de-escalation and that Egyptians should instead rally around the president. They have vehemently disputed accusations of a new kind of Islamic authoritarianism, claiming instead to be the real defenders of the 2011 revolution.
As a result, several of Morsi's non-Brotherhood advisers have resigned (including Ayman al-Sayyad, Amr al-Leithy and Saif Abdul Fattah), feeling used and marginalised. Khaled Alam El-Din, a leading member of the Salafi al-Nour Party, was sacked from his role as presidential adviser causing outrage within his party and exacerbating the power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis. The president became embroiled in a public quarrel with the prosecutor general, Abdel Meguid Mahmoud,after the latter resisted Morsi's attempt to remove him, prompting accusations that Morsi had interfered with the judiciary's independence. His failure to attend the investiture ceremony of the new Coptic Patriarch was perceived as a needless slight to the Christian community. The media also complained about censorship and lawsuits issued for the vague charge of 'insulting the president', despite Morsi's promise not to clamp down on press freedoms.
The Brotherhood's portrayal during its election campaign of Morsi as pragmatic, competent and action-oriented has been dented by worsening living conditions. A key test of the government's effectiveness will be its ability to conclude a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over a much-needed $4.8 billion loan. Given the drop in revenues from tourism and other sectors, and falling foreign-exchange reserves, an IMF accord is seen as key to ensuring macroeconomic stability and reassuring investors.
However, the political cost of an IMF deal would be high, as it would entail fiscal and economic reforms, as well as cuts to energy subsidies, that would alienate important constituencies. Given the tense political climate, the government has been unable to create an internal consensus on the matter. Despite an agreement in principle with the Fund, Morsi announced in December that he had 'decided to halt the decisions until the degree of public acceptance is made clear.'
Rising tension
Meanwhile, demonstrations have escalated into street battles not only between police and protesters, but also between supporters and opponents of the government. During clashes outside the presidential palace, anti-Morsi demonstrators claimed to have been beaten and detained by supporters of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm. FJP offices have been torched countrywide.
Tense politics have eroded public order and border control. The worst instance of violence occurred in January. The sentencing to death of 21 Port Said residents for the killings in 2012 of football supporters of a rival Cairo club during a game (for which police inaction has also been blamed) sparked several days of violence, causing the deaths of more than 60 people. To quell these protests, Morsi announced a state of emergency and a curfew in Port Said, Suez and Ismailia - populous cities along the Suez Canal. However, many defied the curfew and continued to protest.
The Sinai Peninsula has seen repeated attacks against military and police personnel by tribal, criminal and jihadi groups. Pipelines transporting gas into Israel and Jordan have been blown up. Reports of increasing criminality suggest a breakdown of control along Egypt's borders with Libya and Sudan.
The brutality of the Central Security Forces (CSF), the main police unit of the Interior Ministry, has also fuelled violence. Despite historical acrimony between the Interior Ministry and the Brotherhood, the CSF remain unreformed. It is unclear whether reform has been shelved because Morsi lacks the required muscle to contain his adversaries, or because he is oblivious to the urgent need for reform of the security apparatus. At the same time, discontent among the ranks of the police is running high after two years of constant deployment and vilification. The possibility of a resort to the army to ensure public order is distant, but plausible.
Fragmented opposition
Disaffection with Morsi and the Brotherhood has failed to crystallise into a coherent opposing force. Secular elements have tried to coalesce into a National Salvation Front (NSF), whose ranks include the liberal Mohamed ElBaradei, the nationalist-leftist Hamdeen Sabahi and the establishment figure Amr Moussa. The front consists of several political parties.
However, the NSF is plagued by personal rivalries and disagreements over tactics. Torn between traditional politics and calls for street action, the opposition has yet to capitalise on the Brotherhood's declining popularity (it has fared progressively worse at the polls since its massive win during the legislative elections in late 2011. Morsi only captured 25% of the vote during the first round of the presidential election.) Some factions called for the postponement or boycott of the December referendum and the coming April elections, while others pressed for active participation. The NSF called for the resignation of the government and the formation of a government of national unity. It had initially called for the prosecution of Morsi for 'killings and torture', only to backtrack on this extreme language. The NSF has, however, agreed to enter a non-official national dialogue with other political factions under the auspices of Al-Azhar and aimed at containing the violence.
Much now depends on the performance of the NSF in the April elections, should it decide to enter the contest, or alternatively the success of a boycott, which the NSF has called for unless the government prosecutes those responsible for recent violence. To counter the NSF, the FJP has formed a coalition, the National Conscience Front (NCF), grouping mostly like-minded Islamist figures and parties but also minor secular politicians. The al-Nour Party, which came second in the 2012 legislative elections, has stayed outside the NCF and has instead split, with moderate members founding the competing al-Watan Party. The NSF commended a recent al-Nour Party initiative to end Egypt's political turmoil and 'peacefully achieve revolutionary objectives'.
Despite recent unrest and disillusion with the new order, a second revolution remains unlikely. There is a risk, however, of a continued erosion of the state's authority as a result of ineffective governance and sporadic violence.