Ukraine is a country searching for its soul. Long torn between east and west, the country -- whose name translates as "on the edge" -- is not only redefining the relationship between Russia and Western Europe, but is proving to be a big test for the transatlantic relationship.
The relationship between Europe and the United States shaped much of the 20th century. American intervention was decisive in the first and second World Wars, and the Cold War remodeled Eurasia. For Ukraine, the new model meant independence, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Attempts had been made to found an independent Ukrainian state prior to 1991, but these were short-lived. One such effort between 1917 and 1921 succumbed to chaos, as conflict broke out among Ukrainians who supported different political and military factions. A second attempt, led by Stepan Bandera in Lviv in 1941, ended abruptly the following year.
Thus Ukraine is not only a young democracy, but also a young state. And Crimea, the province that finds itself in the news today, was only officially recognized by Russia as part of Ukraine in 1997 -- after Kiev granted the province autonomy. Rejection of Russian rule, on the other hand, has grown over time in western Ukraine, and the period following the Cold War allowed this feeling to flourish.
The post-Cold War period had two phases: pre-9/11 and post-9/11. During the first phase, economic liberalization was perceived as a complement to liberal democracy, and in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, countries in Central and Eastern Europe went through a process of economic opening. They tended to prioritize ties with the United States and membership in NATO and the European Union. This dovetailed with the EU's eastward expansion, begetting a process of enlargement that took concrete form in the mid-2000s. During this phase, the countries of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine included, started developing their own state institutions, transitioning toward independence while modeling their national strategies and determining their core national interests. They were fast-developing states in a fast-changing environment.
9/11 changed everybody's priorities. The United States and its partners focused on fighting terrorism. Russia started to regain its strength, at first internally before seeking to press its interests internationally. The newly independent states on Russia's periphery, meanwhile, were still seeking to define themselves. Before 2000, most of these countries focused on state building, and it was only in the early 2000s that questions regarding national strategy and foreign policy emerged. At a time when the West was focused on the war against terror and was entering the EU enlargement fatigue phase, Ukraine was starting to consider whether the West is a better option than the East, as Ukrainians had thought during the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005.
Russia was the key player. For starters, Ukraine and Russia are tightly bound by history, and history has taught Moscow the importance of maintaining secure buffer states. But in a more immediate sense, Ukraine gives Russia access to the Black Sea, and beyond, to the Mediterranean: the ports of Sevastopol and Odessa are crucial for military and commerce. Ukrainian territory is of strategic importance for Moscow, considering the pipelines that send energy to Europe. For Russia, the Orange Revolution posed an unacceptable danger. Moscow understood the popular uprising as an event engineered by the West to diminish Russian influence over Ukraine and to encircle and crush Russia.
A New Russian Assertiveness
Russia spent the years following the Orange Revolution looking for ways to avert the risk of a pro-Western Ukraine. Moscow worked to split the coalition that emerged from the events of 2004-2005 and set as its goal the installment of a pro-Russian government in Kiev. The United States was too committed to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to engage elsewhere, and Moscow began pressing its interests more aggressively, most boldly with its 2008 invasion of Georgia. Now more assertive, Russia had begun to complicate Germany's strategic challenge of maintaining close ties with Moscow while addressing the interests of the central and eastern European members of the EU. In the immediate aftermath of the Georgia crisis, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said during a visit to St. Petersburg that Germany would oppose NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Her statement reflected two realities that Merkel understood well: First, the German economy relies on Russian energy resources. Second, perceiving the approach of the European Union's economic crisis, Berlin knew that extending NATO protection over the two states would involve increased defense spending.
From Berlin's point of view, Merkel's stance is completely justified -- but it represents a significant tension within the transatlantic partnership. Germany has become softer on NATO integration since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, with German diplomats now discussing "the perspective of NATO membership," a feeble phrase that indicates Berlin hasn't actually changed its position -- Ukrainian and Georgian membership is not on the table for now. Berlin has, however, signaled support for closer economic integration with both Ukraine and Georgia.
The Russo-Georgian war was meant to send a specific message to Ukraine and all the other countries in the former Soviet Union: Russia was again going to be the heart of Eurasia. Vladimir Putin's most important project since 2008 is the creation of the Customs Union -- the soon-to-be Eurasian Union -- which ties together Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, creating an economic and potentially military bloc that covers a wide swath of the former Soviet Union. Russia's moves alarmed the former USSR satellites in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as countries bordering the Baltic and Nordic Seas -- some of them newly minted EU and NATO members -- making them seek the supplementary protection of bilateral strategic partnerships with the United States and other states in the region. They also pursued strategic alliances among themselves, such as the Nordic and Visegrad groups. In practice this has meant little, but it illustrates a diminishing trust in what Euro-Atlanticism means for these countries.
Challenges to the European Union
While marking the dawn of a new Russian assertiveness, 2008 also saw the beginning of crisis in Europe. As the United States returned to the cycle of economic recovery and growth in 2011, the EU, on the other hand, continues to struggle with economic problems that have entrenched a structural social malaise. And despite efforts to forge an institutional political consensus, the union is still divided on fundamental questions regarding military and foreign policy. The national interest still surpasses EU prerogatives in defining foreign policy strategies. If Mali, Libya and Syria served as examples of the weak joint foreign policy interests between France and Germany, Ukraine is now testing both EU cohesion (over the Eastern Partnership Policy, launched in 2011 by Poland and Sweden) and the power of Euro-Atlantic links.
The opportune moment for Moscow to consolidate its influence in Kiev arrived in 2010, with Orange leader Viktor Yushchenko discredited and Viktor Yanukovych reassuming power. At the outset of the current crisis in Ukraine, Germany backed pro-Western protesters in Maidan, giving particular impetus to Vitali Klitschko's rise as an opposition leader. As the crisis has escalated, the Weimar Triangle partners -- Poland, Germany and France -- took the lead in negotiating the deal that created a new government in Kiev. Then Russia occupied Crimea, and the crisis went global. A diplomatic war is now being waged between mighty global actors, the United States and Russia. Germany, while showing support for pro-Western Ukrainian ambitions, has again demonstrated that it is aware of its own interests above all, and that Berlin does not want to damage European-Russian relations.
While Russia moves its military, Western "attacks" are limited to the threat of economic sanctions. The United States has actually imposed small sanctions on Russia. The European Union continues to schedule meetings to discuss the sanctions it could put in place. Meanwhile, individual European countries are announcing their own potential sanctions on Moscow. This situation clearly frames the struggle facing the transatlantic relationship: While the United States remains strong economically and militarily, Europe lacks not only strength, but also coordination.
NATO Needs a New Course
This is troublesome when one considers that with the 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan, NATO is still struggling to redefine its role. At the last Russia-NATO council, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen delivered a diplomatic message, emphasizing "the situation in Ukraine presents serious implications for the security and stability for the Euro-Atlantic area."
Decisions taken during the summit were symbolic: the suspension of NATO-Russia joint missions (as if they were still possible), the cancellation of staff-level civilian and military meetings and, of course, the announcement of a comprehensive review of the entire range of NATO-Russia cooperation. NATO also plans to analyze the possibility of strengthening Ukraine's military capabilities. Per Rasmussen's speech, the moves were intended to show that Russia's actions do have consequences.
Moscow responded to Rasmussen's speech through the voice of Russian ambassador to NATO Alexander Grushko, who, besides talking about Russian disappointment with the meeting, also emphasized the "catastrophic domestic situation in Ukraine," something that the West has forgotten to discuss as of late.
A New Era
If Ukraine as a young nation-state is searching for its soul, the country's crisis has shown that the Euro-Atlantic alliance is seeking to define its role for a new era. Events in Ukraine prove that we've fully entered the post-post Cold War, an era in which the interests of the nation-state prevail over all others. The United States remains the world's dominant power, while the European Union is defined by multiple competing nation-states and a re-emerging Russia. In this world, events in the east and the west of Europe are making the countries in the middle -- a line of nations from the Baltics to Romania that Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski defined as "Intermarium" -- increasingly nervous. These nations are willing to strengthen cooperation among themselves but still need backing from the major European powers, and especially from the United States.
As the crisis in Ukraine moves into uncertain territory, a major test of U.S. willingness and ability to stand up to Russia is emerging. While Washington has been vocal on the crisis and has shown signs of engaging further in the region, concrete action from the United States -- and the backing that action receives from the Europeans -- will show just how solid the Euro-Atlantic partnership still is.