It is often said that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a "paradox." Wrapped up underneath the robes and veils of stodgy religious strictures is, so the argument goes, a young and liberal nation just waiting to shed its religious garbs and embrace the modern world.
Indeed, roughly 60 percent of the country is under the age of 30, and the median age is just shy of 29. Across social media, young Iranians can be seen pulling back their veils, shortening their garments, and showing off skin long concealed by decades of militant morality policing. As one fashionable young Iranian woman recently put it to Humans of New York, a popular photoblog and Facebook account, "this country is full of mischievous, curious Iranian children. And the people who make the rules are getting older."
But looks can be deceiving. At its heart Iran is still a deeply religious and ascetic country, and those of us observing the flashy cars and nightlife of the North Tehran jet set can often confuse pockets of cosmopolitanism and opulence for broader systemic change.
But there is, reports New York Times Tehran correspondent Thomas Erdbrink, a new sense of freedom and optimism in the country, and it's not just in traditionally trendy Tehran:
"In the universities, students have started wearing bright colors. Street musicians line up at busy crossings, even though music is still frequently denounced by conservative clerics as ‘haram,' or forbidden in Islam. Fashion shows with models and runways, previously banned, are popping up. At night, women can be seen riding in cars without their head scarves, while billboards, long the exclusive domain of political figures, now feature celebrities like the Iranian actor Bahram Radan, who advertises leather coats.
"Where previously even joking in public gatherings was considered politically risky, cafes now organize stand-up comedy evenings. Groups of citizens have formed nongovernmental organizations around issues like animal rights and the environment."
This newfound confidence, explains Erdbrink, can largely be attributed to the efforts of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani:
"Analysts say that is the work of officials appointed by Mr. Rouhani, who have taken up high-level positions in the Culture and Interior Ministries. They cannot rewrite Iran's laws: the Parliament and the judiciary will block any changes. But they have allowed ordinary citizens more space to breathe. Suddenly there are too many concerts to choose from, and public initiatives like campaigns to boycott Iranian carmakers to press them to raise the quality of their offerings or to save stray cats are mushrooming all over town."
And unlike the heady days of 2009 -- when young Iranians flooded the streets to protest a presidential election widely believed to have been rigged in favor of hardline incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad -- Iran's young liberals appear to have reached a kind of compromise with the ruling elites and mullahs.
"They've realized they can't manage the country without us," said Saeed Laylaz, an Iranian economist, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal. "We've learned we can't ask the regime to change too fast. We are gathering in the middle."
But Rouhani, much like Iran's young population, still has a ways to go. In spite of its young and increasingly liberal population, Iran remains a country in which the levers of power are tightly clutched by a coterie of extremists and insiders. Corruption is rampant, and the regime's human rights record is repugnant.
Moreover, the moderates and centrists who have enjoyed a recent renaissance thanks in large part to the July nuclear agreement reached between Tehran and six world powers will ultimately be judged by their ability to turn around the post-sanctions economy. As in other Mideast countries, youth unemployment in Iran is high, especially among its women. President Rouhani will need to help spur economic growth in the country and get these young people to work.
Failure to jumpstart the Iranian economy would likely spell the end of Rouhani's promising political career, and stifle the aspirations of millions of young Iranians.
Around the Region
The Soleimani-Moscow plot. As Iran's young enjoy greater freedoms at home, Reuters reports on the country's mischief abroad, and on the role Tehran has played in the four-year-long civil war in Syria -- a role spearheaded by Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani:
"At a meeting in Moscow in July, a top Iranian general unfurled a map of Syria to explain to his Russian hosts how a series of defeats for President Bashar al-Assad could be turned into victory -- with Russia's help.
"Major General Qassem Soleimani's visit to Moscow was the first step in planning for a Russian military intervention that has reshaped the Syrian war and forged a new Iranian-Russian alliance in support of Assad.
"As Russian warplanes bomb rebels from above, the arrival of Iranian special forces for ground operations underscores several months of planning between Assad's two most important allies, driven by panic at rapid insurgent gains."
Syrian missteps. By wading into a potential quagmire in Syria, Moscow may be repeating the errors of its old Cold War ally Egypt, writes Trinity University professor David Lesch:
"Nasser learned the hard way that an ownership stake in Syria can be a disaster. After he "saved" Syria, Nasser shackled his country to the Syrian matrix, which compelled him to reluctantly agree to the UAR - a union that quickly failed, taking the luster off Nasser's glow and deepening divisions in the Arab world. In hindsight, it may have been the beginning of the end of Nasserism, the immensely popular pan-Arabist movement that gained center stage following Egypt's survival against the British-French-Israeli tripartite invasion in the 1956 Suez Crisis, which also transformed Nasser into a regional hero. The problems Egypt experienced in Syria before and after the breakup of the UAR ultimately led to the disastrous 1967 Six-Day War."
[...]
"Perhaps Putin's intervention in Syria will result in something akin to Egypt's Pyrrhic victory in 1957 or to the Soviet Union's sudden expansion of influence in the late 1950s that was accompanied by an exponential increase in foreign-policy headaches. Fifty years from now, historians may identify Russia's 2015 push in Syria as the beginning of the end of Putinism, just as the 1957 landing was the beginning of the end of Nasserism."
America's unreliable allies. Moscow should perhaps ask someone in Washington about the perils of proxy warfare in Syria. Its efforts to train a force of reliable fighters to confront ISIS mostly wasted, Washington now finds itself relying on Syria's Kurds, in addition to a collection of various militias, to take the fight to the Islamic State group. Voice of America's Jamie Dettmer has the story:
"Renamed the Syrian Arab Coalition last week by U.S. military commanders, the group would serve as an alternative to a ground force the Obama administration had hoped to recruit from scratch, train and equip.
"The loose coalition of Sunni Arab factions, who have been collaborating with Syrian Kurdish fighters along the border with Turkey, may be provided with arms in a U.S. plan that would have them support re-equipped Kurds in a major offensive on Raqqa, the de facto capital of the Islamic State terror group."
But critics of the new coalition have called the force a collection of washouts and "opportunists," and tensions between Arabs and U.S.-backed Kurds, reports Dettmer, are on the rise:
"FSA and Islamist commanders have warned the YPG to stay in Kurdish areas and not to push into Arab villages. Earlier this year, they accused the YPG of displacing Arab families in villages captured by the Kurds. Mutual suspicion between the FSA and Islamist rebel militias, and the Kurds has deepened as Kurdish-led forces have gone beyond their traditional home territory."
Feedback
Questions, comments, or complaints? Feel free to send us an email, or reach out on Twitter @kevinbsullivan.
To sign up to receive the Mideast Memo click here.