Turkey's parliament recently called for more forceful involvement in Syria, and observers are now looking for clues on how Turkey may change its role in the crisis south of the border. The focus has been on Turkey's function as a main transit route for Islamist radicals. However, any shift in Ankara's foreign policy should not prioritize border control or invasion. Ankara's most effective contribution to changing the course of events in Syria would be a strategic reassessment of how weapons are allowed to flow across Turkish borders to opposition groups in Syria.
During the day, border crossings between Syria and Turkey provide a vital lifeline to the masses still residing in opposition-held northern Syrian areas. Essential goods come in and out, and passport-holding Syrians are free to enter Turkey. The business carried out across Turkey's borders at night, however, is of a different character. After the crossings close for civilians, trucks loaded with weapons rumble through, loaded with cargoes meant to arm Syria's many opposition groups. The improper oversight of these deliveries is a key obstacle to the development of a coherent Syrian opposition.
To be clear, the deliveries are vital to the Syrian opposition. Without these weapons, an even larger segment of northern Syria's population would have to flee regime forces and the Islamic State fighters who are close to encircling Aleppo and capturing the important border crossing near Azaz. Yet Turkey's weapons supply policy is also contributing to the instability. It is arguably at the root of the Syrian nationalist opposition's disarray, and by extension Turkey's handling of the situation hinders any resolution to Syria's crisis. In so doing, there is an opportunity for NATO to become more engaged in Syria and therefore become an actor which can politically direct the opponents to Assad's rule.
Scrutinize Turkey's weapons supply role
Turkey's role as the key transit route for foreign fighters and arms was established at the outset of the Syrian civil war. Ankara figured that by helping arm the opposition, it could contribute to a relatively quick end to the conflict, and an Ankara-friendly government would take charge in Damascus. There were plenty of donors who wanted to contribute to the cause: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates supplied weapons to a variety of groups, while Western governments supplied medical aid and communications equipment. Each donor supported the groups they saw as more closely aligned with their interest.
Three years on, Turkey's laissez-faire policy on weapons flows has failed miserably. Studies show that there are currently around 1,500 different opposition groups in Syria - and that number relates directly to the way weapons are distributed. A policy guided by strategy and implemented with the help of other NATO members would beget a coherent Syrian opposition - an absolutely central component to bringing the war to an end. This streamlining of supplies would be a top-down process, but it would be effective, since Syrian fighters are quite naturally drawn to groups that can supply them with weapons, training, food and a basic living standard. Military coherence, in other words, will result in a politically legitimate opposition movement.
Establish viable Syrian partners
Such a change could lessen the willingness of some donors to contribute, and Turkey would certainly reject some donations from Gulf states, meaning another power would have to step in to fill the void, unless the West wants to ensure an Assad or Islamic State victory. By implementing a policy of slow strangulating the extreme elements of the opposition, it would give Obama a golden ticket to establish a viable Syrian force that could counter Bashar al Assad's forces as well as the Islamic State.
Creating a viable opposition force in Syria is clearly in the West's interest. One of the main lessons we can draw from the U.S.-sponsored peace negotiations in Geneva is that Damascus does not take the opposition seriously. It is not difficult to understand why. In front of them sat a group of people with little real sway over the movements of armed groups on the ground. Further, opposition forces pose little existential threat to the regime - at best they control parts of cities, but in most cases, they control suburbs. It is never a good idea to hold negotiations with the opposing parties on such unequal footing. Not only will negotiations not succeed under such circumstances - they might even worsen the situation.
The West has long complained that there is no viable partner on the ground that it can work with. No such partner is likely to emerge if the West continues to engage the opposition so casually. Building leadership is not complicated. It rests on simple questions: What gives a person authority? What factors contribute to a leader being effective and uncontested?
First of all, they need to be able to deliver to their soldiers. This means military supplies, but also food, clothing and shelter. They need to be able to win battles. For this to happen, leaders need a strategic understanding of how, where and when to fight. Further, they need to have the funds necessary to train their soldiers.
Since the start of the uprising, the moderate opposition has been ever-changing mosaic of groups splitting apart and creating new coalitions. However, some opposition groups have maintained their rank and file soldiers and have thereby continue to gain strength. These have often been the Islamist forces such as Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusrah. Their coherence shows that consistency and effectiveness is possible. The disarray has been within the more secular and moderate groups, and this underlines the strong link between fluid lines of supply, and the lack of a strong moderate opposition. If supplies to moderates become consistent, we will see an organic emergence of pro-western leaders.
There is one element that western engagement will not inevitably produce: a strong non-sectarian political vision for a post-Assad Syria. However, by letting the current slapdash policy continue, we can be absolutely certain this will never happen. Through engagement, Washington's influence will rise. By not seriously engaging, it loses to more radical forces.
Move toward a political settlement
There is no clear path to victory for any of Syria's warring factions. A political settlement is the only possible solution to a crisis that both sides see as existential. However, a just and sustainable political settlement cannot be reached without a balance of power on the battlefield. An equilibrium of two forces, recognizing that no one can win an outright victory, would be the only basis for political talks between the opposition and the regime. Obama now wants to engage more forcefully in Syria. In so doing, he should address the key cause of the rise of ISIS, which is the increasingly failed state in Syria. In cooperation with Turkey and other NATO members, Obama should work to lay the foundations on which a political settlement can be built.
What does this mean for U.S. involvement? Washington needs to push Ankara to dramatically revise its policies and change the way its borders operate. The free flow of rebels and equipment into Syria has to stop. There needs to be strong border control, including in remote areas where most fighters cross. Beyond that, if the response to the new policy is disengagement by Gulf countries that supply opposition groups, Washington should assure Turkey that it will supply enough weapons and equipment for the opposition continue resisting the Assad regime. The goal should be to build up a nationalist opposition that is strong enough to threaten Assad's survival, only then will there be negotiations.